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PREFACE
Prior to joining the Organizational Analysis Research Unit, my
first research attempt in this field was a study of distribution of
power in Brazilian steel and textile firms. The "Strategic Contin-
gencies' Theory of Power" had then provided much of the stimulus for
this research. With the intention of obtaining a more profound pro-
fessional commitment in this area and gaining further expertise in
research methods in the Social Sciences area, 'I then contacted
David Hickson in 1977. I learned from him that the Unit was involved
In a project on Power and Decision Making in Organizations. After
joining the Organizational Analysis Research Unit, I gained initial
experience by joining in some interviewing that Richard Butler was
conducting in the Open University about decision making. This re-
affirmed my interest in a research theme which I thought fascinating
and worth pursuing.
Having decided to commit myself to research in the decision
making area, which culminated with the writing of this thesis, I
found myself struggling to learn fresh ways of thinking. Coming
from Psychology, most of my earliest research experiences were in
experimental methodology where we are taught that concepts have to
correspond exactly to what is observable in behaviour. Generaliza-
tions and inferences should be restricted to what is directly observ-
able. In the field of work of this thesis I was puzzled at first by
the anecdotal style derived from Sociology, and found myself in a
dilemma between my first principles and the more discursive argument
typical of a less developed research area. I gradually got used to
this, and my three years at Bradford's Organizational Analysis
Research Unit eventually consolidated my interest in organizations.
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The development of a thesis is overwhelmingly dependent on the
doctoral candidate's own commitment and previous experience. However,
I could not have accomplished the research without the encouragement
and help of many people to whom I wish to express my gratitude. In
particular, there are so many at Bradford whose support was vital.
It would be impossible to acknowledge adequately David Hickson who
acted as my supervisor. He devoted much of his time in helping with
the elaboration of concepts and project design. I am grateful for
his constant encouragement and support in my efforts to learn a new
language and adapt to a new country. I also could not fail to
mention his patience in correcting the English in this thesis.
I am also indebted to Richard Butler for his repeated support
and encouragement. I would like to thank him for many ideas and
suggestions at various stages of this research. I am also grateful
to Graham Astley for his help with practical advice on data collection,
and suggestions for the statistical analysis. He helped to sustain my
spirits at a Orifice' phase which I thought hopeless. Equally, thanks
are due to Geoff Mallory and David Cray for their support with data
analysis, extricating me from its problems. Special thanks are also
due to David Wilson whose very full and thoughtful comments helped on
the structure of the theoretical chapters. Peter Makin was a friend
in need to see me through the difficulties of introductions of "trans-
Pennine transport".
Words cannot match Judith Hyde's willingness to type endless
questionnaire drafts, and to help on innumerous occasions. What would
all of us at Bradford have done without her skills. Always there at
need, and there were many unforeseen needs, was Gill Sharpley -
telephoning, trying to keep track of candidate and supervisor, a
cheerful and reassuring presence.
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But there comes a point when a thesis leaves the hands of its
author and must be entrusted to capable hands on a typewriter. I owe
a special debt of gratitude to Wendy Taylor who helped and retyped
this thesis with remarkable skill and patience, under the same great
time pressure as I was myself. She kept cool, and somehow we did it.
Living in Manchester, I have benefited from the help of many
people on that side of the hills that divide Northern England.
Or Michael Lye offered the opportunity to use a spare desk in the
postgraduate students' office at the University of South Manchester
Hospital. Mr Barr and Mr Kae from the University of Manchester Extra-
Mural Department and Mr Cunningham from the Manchester Business School
allowed me the use of the computer installations.
Nothing could have been done without the support of two organiza-
tions, the Universidade Federal de Minas Gbrais and the Conselho
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Technologico, which provided
financial support for this research. I am thankful for the "decision
making" of both of them.
Above all, I must thank my family. I would like to thank my
husband Anielo for his encouragement and support which has been
constant throughout my professional career. Tercila for her dedica-
tion and love to my daughter Angela whilst I was doing this research.
My mother, Lenir, for her encouragement and sacrifice which allowed
me to go to university. Finally, this work is dedicated to Arthur,
my father, who has taught me that one can create what one wants to be.
Muito obrigado a todos voces.—	 -
Suzana Braga Rodrigues
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
.1.1. The Stimuli for the Research
Upon reflection, it seems that one gets involved with a particular re-
search problem because of the accidents of personal and professional experi-
ence. Then ideas which initiate a project change as a result of what comes
across when reading or what is said in conversation with other researchers.
In the case of this project, the initial ideas go back to my early re-
search on distribution of power and decision-making in Brazilian steel and tex-
tile firms, when the question of power and decision-making appeared highly
Interrelated. Then, when joining the Organizational Analysis Research Unit,
the Research team's.
 own efforts to unfold-the nature of decision-making and
translate into concepts provided much of the stimuli to this thesis concern
with decision-making and concepts which were later developed.
However, interest in what makes for successful, as against unsuc-
cessful decision-making arose from some peculiar examples which I have wit-
nessed and from reading case studies about decisions whose processes have
shown some interesting peculiarity and whose consequences upon the organi-
zation were quite visible.
In mid January 1977, for example, the Brazilian government in a
reaction to a sudden increase in oil prices and the consequent burden on the
balance of payments, decided to reduce oil consumption. One of the measures
2Introduced was petrol rationing. On 19th of January of this year, ministers
of economy in a television broadcast announced that vehicle owners should,
from mid March onwards, buy petrol using vouchers acquired from commer-
cial and state banks. The consumers had to buy a pack of vouchers of dif-
ferent values comprising a minimum of 200 cruzeiros. Instead of a direct
Increase on the price of petrol, which is fixed in Brazil, the government
preferred to adopt a policy intending to achieve compulsory savings in three
ways: firstly, the pack of vouchers required a minimum spending cash - the
greater number of consumers would not have the 200 cruzeiros available
at once. Secondly, consumers would tend to save petrol since vouchers
might not easily be available either, for example at weekends. Thirdly,
the vouchers implied an increase of 2 cruzeiros per litre in the price of
petrol which consumers were entitled to recover after two years. Public
reaction was unfavourable, not only because it would mean petrol rationing'
but because bureaucratic mechanisms would certainly not work efficiently
and a "black market price" for vouchers would ensue, if some people wished
to pay more to obtain petrol. Industry too has shown reservations as to the
policy, particularly the car industry, which would be more affected.
On March 10th, four days before implementation, after vouchers
had already been distributed to banks and all procedures had been prepared
to put the new scheme into practice, the government announced that the pro-
posal had been withdrawn due to an unexpected increase in export sales having
offset the burden of oil costs in the external debt. At this point 30 million
3packs of vouchers had been printed by the Brazilian government costing 10
million cruzeiros.
The consequences of this decision were clear: resources had been
committed without a return. Interruption of implementation has suggested
that consequences could have become serious and wider. Costs to ensure
the efficient operation of the system would probably have overcome savings
In petrol consumption. Apart from that, vehicle owners would have developed
their own ways to cope with the system so as to maintain the usual level of
petrol consumption, making the scheme useless as far as the initial purposes
were concerned. Thus, events suggest that this decision could have been
even more "consequential". The peculiar characteristics of this decision had
an intuitive appeal fdr research. It would be interesting to see whether dif-
ferent types of decisions would have similar characteristics, to reveal whether
they would also have unanticipated consequences and whether their initial pur-
poses were achieved.
This initial interest led to a literature search in the early days of
the project which disclosed some cases of decision making whose exceptional
consequences further focused attention on this research theme. In 1958, for
example, the Ford company launched in the USA the middle range price Ford
Edzel, which resulted in a loss of 250 million dollars. The Edzel failure was
reported by Business Week (November 28, 1959) as follows:
4"Ford Motor Company last week admitted for all
,	 to know that its Edzel car was one of the most
expensive mistakes a USA corporation has ever
made. After costing Ford 250 million to bring
to the market the Edzel lost an estimated 200
million dollars more during nearly 2-1 years it
was in production" (Deutsch, 1976:44)
An explanation for the failure provided by Business Week was that Ford had
not done a conventional market research but had used instead a motivational
type of study, "imagery studies", in which models are supposed to reflect
consumer's images (Deutsch 1976:45).
The literature of decision-making has plenty of such examples in
•
which organizations or governments make decisions which have important
consequences for people's lives and organizations. Some consequences aro
so organization-wide that they may create new opportunities and stimulate
growth, or on the other side of the coin, they may threaten the survival of
the system. As Deutsch (1976) observes, only a big company like Ford
could make a mistake costing a quarter of a billion dollars and still survive.
Other examples in the literature suggest that what happens in the
decision process may seriously affect the attainment of intended objectives.
Allison (1969) describing the Cuban missile crisis decision, reports on the
territorial disputes between the CIA and the US Air Force which put at risk
the successfulness of the decision. Difficulties in settling the dispute delayed
confirming the need for a decision which may have turned the eventual action
into a failure. Allison (1969:705) comments on these events:
"This ten days delay constitutes some form of
"failure". In the face of well founded suspicions
concerning offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba
that posed a critical threat to the United States
most vital interests, squabbling between organi-
zations whose job is to produce this information
seems entirely inappropriate".
Another example reported in the literature is a case of a Presidential
decision which was not implemented because it was invalidated by the Supreme
Court. Hah and Lindquist (1975) report this case in which President Truman
embargoed the steel mills in an attempt to avoid an industry strike in a period
where the maintenance of steel production was very important for the USA
performance in the Korean war. The steel workers' strike started immediately
after the Supreme Court's decision. As Hah and Lindquist (1975) note, this was
the first time in the history of the United States that the Supreme Court had
invalidated a president's decision. Pressure of time, White House inability
to anticipate events, and lack of presidential power to influence events, left
no other alternative to the President, who decided to attempt seizure to guarantee
_
steel production.
The case examples above suggest, in the first place, that consequences
of decisions are quite visible, that is, it seems possible to distinguish decisions
by outcomes. Then a question which this immediately prompts is - Can deci-
sions be defined as more and less successful by comparing their outcomes?
6A second question which emerges as a consequence of the first is - Would
there be many reasons for failure and success? Answers to such questions
are neither easy, simple nor immediate. The interest to clarify some of
• the many questions linked to the problem of decision failure and success led
to the design of a project aimed to define the characteristics of more and less
successful decisions and aimed to understand the reasons for variations in
the degree of success.
.1.2. The Focus of the Thesis 
In relation to the second question mentioned above, some aspects ap-
peared particularly salient when examining the cases just presented. For
example in the Brazilian case a remedial decision was taken under conditions
of scarce resources. In the Ford Edzel case, search by the company concerned
was said to be insufficient and inappropriate. Deutsch (1976) has argued that
in the Ford case, search activities had not been successful in bringing critical 
Information; a change in the consumers' habits and needs had not been detected
in time so as to influence the sort of car Edzel should be. President Truman's
decision was made under time pressure  and was blocked by political contention.
The success of the Cuban missile crisis on the other hand, was threatened by
unexpected delays, until conflict between different groups as to each others
respective areas of influence was solved. Thus, although the aim in providing
the case examples was to illustrate the reasons for concern with successful
decision-making, some clue has been provided about where explanation for
variations in the degree of success would possibly lie. From this earlier
literature review, the means to make a decision appeared to be as important
as what happens during the process of deciding.
A further examination of the relevant literature has shown that decision-
making is explained within the most diverse perspectives. However, the various
approaches have traditionally concentrated on three major themes: MEANS,
PROCESS and RESULTS. Each approach has nevertheless focused on mutually
exclusive paradigms. Within a means results perspective, normative theorists
(Churchman 1961 ,A lexis and Wilson 1967, Keen and Morton 1978)have focused on the mean
to achieve intended outcomes; better decisions can be achieved with an approp-
riate use of time, resources and information. Here one gets the image of
decision-making as a goal directed process.
Satisficing theory emerged as an alternative and more realistic view.
In this theory, information gathering activity is seen as a process in its own
right. This approach has given importance to behavioural constraints to
decision-making. Here emphasis is transferred to the limits of the decision
-maker as an information processing agent; which seeks courses of action
which are only satisficing. Those working within similar lines, have been
concerned with rational bounded and irrational aspects of choice (Cohen et al
1972, March and Olsen 1976, March 1979).
Alternative views focus on the process of making the decision itself.
Among those , there has bc pn s current pnthu g iasrn for the pnlitiea I scpnetq
decision-making (Lindblom 1970, Baldridge 1971, Pettigrew 1973, Abell 1975,
Crozier 1976) and for its structural aspects (Witte 1972, Mintzberg 1976).
Within the political view, emphasis is given to the pluralistic aspects of
decision-making; studies describe how antagonistic interests compete for
common resources and how powerful groups make their views prevail.
Under this perspective, decision-making outcomes are seen as a result of
bargaining and use of power. Approaches concerned with the structural
aspects of the process address to an entirely different question. Here
decision-making is seen as a series of activities which develop over time
but not necessarily in sequence. Such activities may be either problem or
politically oriented. The various decision-making approaches have thus,
concentrated on alternative themes; studies are concerned either with means x
results, means x process and yet are interested in the characteristics of the
process only. In consequence this project aims to examine the sources of .
decision-making success which has its roots in alternative paradigms. Suc-
cessfulness is first examined in terms of constraints set by resources infor-
mation and time to make the decision; •secondly in terms of forms of activation 
of the decision process  which focus on conflict levels and influence distribution.
Finally, success is analysed in terms of the pace at which the process proceeds.
Focusing on instrumental and behavioural variables, this research represents
an attempt to establish the links between MEANS, PROCESS and RESULTS.
It therefore meets the criticisms of more recent research in the field which
see the need for a theoretical synthesis and refinement (Horvath and McMillan
1979, Astley et al 1980).
The interest in comparing decisions in terms of the degree of success
required a research design which led to an attempt to find extreme cases -
successful and unsuccessful decisions which made the 53 decision cases studied
in this research - and to a definition of the concept of success. Once success
is defined a second ambition consists of explaining decision success with
basis on the decision-making characteristics just presented above. The need
to obtain maximum variation on the instrumental and behavioural aspects led
to a project design incorporating decisions from business and non-business
organizations. The comparison of the 53 decision cases across these two
types of organizations nevertheless did not prove as fruitful as the separate
analyses for business and non-business organizations. From this, another
major concern emerged which consists of examining the relative importance
of instrumental and behavioural aspects in each type of organization, as well
as, whether these organizations would differ in their concept of success.
.1.3. The Plan of the Thesis 
This thesis is presented in nine chapters. Chapters II, III and IV are
theoretical expositions leading to the development of a concept of successful
decision-making (Chapter III) and then to the construction of a conceptual model
aimed at examining the importance of constraints, modes of process activation
and decision pace to successful outcomes of decisions taken across the two types
of organizations, business and non-business (Chapter IV). Some hypotheses
postulate how these variables are interrelated and how they relate to decision-
making outcomes.
10
Chapter V focuses on the methodology. It describes the sample of
organizations and decisions obtained and the reasons for concern with business
and non-business organizations. Here some practical problems which research-
ers have to confront in field studies are also discussed. An account is given of
the data collection methods used. In Chapter VI, the operational definitions of
the variables of the conceptual framework are given, and the contribution of
data analysis techniques, such as factor analysis, is explained. Chapter VII
presents an analysis of the plausibility of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter
IV in the light of correlational results. Emphasis is given to results for non-
business organizations in relation to the importance given to behavioural as-
pects of decision-making as opposed to instrumental aspects. Some examples
•
of less successful decisions are discussed in this chapter, with a focus on vari-
ables which are shown to be important in terms of decision outcomes. A final
section discusses some theoretical implications which arise from the empirical
results for non-business organizations. Chapter VIII presents the results for
• business firms as compared to those for non-business organizations. Chapter
IX considers the conclusions that can be drawn from this work.
,
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CHAPTER II
SUCCESSFUL DECISION-MAKING WITHIN A THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
This chapter deals with two apparently separate themes: first it des-
cribes the unit of analysis which concerns this research. Secondly, it provides
a theoretical justification for concern with decision-making success. In pro-
viding justification for development of a study interested in the definition of
decision-making success, three traditional decision-making approaches are
examined in their major characteristics. Emphasis is given to rational, satis-
ficing and incremental theory which have broached this subject, but as it will
be seen, in a rather superficial manner. In the final section, recent develop-
ments in decision-making theory are briefly examined so as to present the
reasons for using different types of explanation of decision-making success.
.2.1. The Unit of Analysis
The explosion of studies in decision-making in the last few years has
led Horvath and McMillan (1979) to state that decision-making is now at the top
of the researcher's agenda. However, the study of strategic and non-routine
decision-making has still not received the attention it deserves. A recent re-
view of the literature in decision-making as related to organization theory sug-
gests that researches have concentrated either on case studies or on decisions
of a similar kind in just one type of organization. Within this, too much attention
is paid to decisions concerning computers and data processing (Butler et al 1979).
The major excrption is the work of Mintzberg et al (1976) who analysed different
12
strategic processes in various organizations.- They have argued that so far
researchers have paid little attention to non-routine and unstructured decisions
preferring to concentrate on the ones more easily subjected to quantitative
analysis.
If little attention has been paid to the less routine decisions, even less
research effort has been spent on understanding the characteristics of the pro-
cesses of making them in different types of organizations, as Butler et al (1979)
point out. This study therefore while providing a framework for the analysis
of decisions varying in the degree of success has developed concepts to capture
the essence of non-routine decisions potentially in all types of organizations,
public and private, business and non-business, etc.
Theoretically, this research focuses on two levels of analysis. First
there is an interest in exploring how decisions vary in the degree of success
and in explaining these variations by means of the concepts developed in this
present research. The theoretical focus is on non-routine decisions and the
level of analysis is that of the decision process. From this, a second question
emerges which refers to what aspects of the decision process are more salient
to decision-making su. ccess in different types of organizations. Then the unit
of analysis became the organization. Before elaborating on the interest in dif-
ferences between types of organizations, it is necessary to examine theoretically
the characteristics of the type of decisions this research is concerned with to
comprehend the subsequent empirical project design.
13
.2.1.1. Some Characteristics of Non-Routine Decisions
Non-routine decisicns have been the subject of concern of both business
policy and organization theory although with a different emphasis. Business
•
policy views management as an opportunist agent (Bourgeois and Astley 1979).
Organizations theorists, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with the
way in which organizations respond to environment (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967,
Pugh et al 1968). In its concern with non-routine decisions, business policy
is particularly interested in strategic decisions and emphasize quantitative
factors. Organization theory, on the other hand, tends to focus on the behav-
ioural aspects of these decisions; then it concerns not only with strategic
decisions but with those non-routine which are innovative and represent a
change in the organization's State of affairs (Harvey and Mills 1970, Pettigrew
1973).
Differences in the two approaches are also reflected in the way in
which strategic decision-making is defined. Business policy is mostly con-
cerned With decisions about resource allocation. Chandler (1962:383) referred
to strategic decisions as being those which deal with long term allocation of
existing resources and with the development of new resources to ensure the
health and growth of the enterprise. These decisions usually affect the selec-
tion of product mixes (the business areas of the firm) and the identification of
markets (the business which the firm will seek to enter) (Ansoff 1968:18). In
Ansoff's (1968) terms "strategic" decisions are the ones "pertaining to the
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relation between the firm and its environment". Strategic decisions have some
peculiar characteristics: usually they involve important resources, are gener-
ally centralized, non-repetitive, and the need for taking them is not easily rec-
ognized. This view resembles Drucker's (1963:311) idea of strategic decisions,
which he refers to as being decisions to define a situation or resources. Exam-
ples of these decisions are: defining business objectives, and the means to at-
tain them; and decisions affecting productivity, on form of organization, and
on capital expenditure.
Huntington (1961), studying development of American military policies,
distinguishes between strategic and structural decisions on a similar basis.
Thus, strategic decisions are those related to international politics and struc-
ture decisions to domestic politics. They are also distingaished by content:
strategic decisions are concerned with the uses, strength and weapons of the
armed forces whilst structural decisions are concerned with financial, man-
tower and material allocation.
However, organization theory, instead of identifying a strategic decision
by its content, defines it in terms of characteristics of the strategic process and
of the strategic stimuli. Mintzberg and associates (1976) note that a strategic
decision can be distinguished from others in terms of importance of resources
committed and precedents which it sets for similar decisions. The strategic
decision process is then characterized by "novelty, complexity and open ended-
ness". That is, it is a process in which the understanding of what the situation
15
is about comes gradually with the making of the decision (Mintzberg 1976:250).
In distinguishing non-routine decisions from the routine ones, organ-
ization theory calls attention to the innovative character of the former. If non-
routine decisions are new, precedents or guidelines cannot yet have been estab-
lished. Thus, these decisions are likely to disturb the on-going state of affairs
of the organization and require some adaptative changes (Harvey and Mills 1970).
Pettigrew (1973) has argued that new decisions are likely to threaten the estab-
lished resource-sharing patterns of the organization and consequently provide
an occasion for political behaviour and power shifts. It seems, therefore,
that this kind of decision affects the organization in a much wider manner than
the more simple and routine decisions.
Intensity of search and duration appears also to be a distinct facet of
non-routine decision-making. When a decision is routine, procedures to
handle it are already available within the organizational structure, and search
activities tend to be limited and institutionalized. By contrast, a new non-
routine decision, due to its unprecedented nature, requires a wider exploration
(Harvey and Mills 1970). Because of the amount of search involved, the presence
of political behaviour and other reasons, these decisions seem to have a longer
duration. Mintzberg and associates (1976) have noted that most of their deci-
sions spanned a long period of time; only a few lasted less than a year.
Non-routine decisions appear therefore to have some peculiar
16
characteristics. These may be summarized as follows:
(a) Some non-routine decisions are new to the organizations, therefore
- they begin with a vague understanding of the situation;
- they disturb the organizational status quo: and
- they require some adaptative changes.
(b) They may involve valuable resources.
(c) They may involve top management in the organization.
(d) They may have a long decision process.
Which of these factors are the most important in defining what non-routine decision-
making is, is a question which calls for empirical examination, and is at the
moment beyond the purpose of this research. All decisions in this present
research are non-routine in character. Some fall into the category of strategic
decisions and then have some of the characteristics peculiar to these decisions
as described above. Others are simply new decisions without any precedents.
Nevertheless, most of the decisions studied here are strategic in the sense
that they were processed at top management level and have been defined as
important to the organization by the chief executive.
In studying the processes of making non-routine decisions, this research
Is primarily concerned with single decisions. A distinction, therefore, must be
made between these decisions and strategy which have traditionally been the con-
cern of business policy (Chandler 1962, Ansoff 1968, Shirley et al 1976, Newbould
and Luffman 1978), but has recently awakened the interest of organization
17
theorists (Mintzberg 1977,
  Horvath and McMillan 1978, Bourgeois and Astley
1979). Strategy has usually been defined as a set of guidelines which define
the overall directions of the organization or as rules for making decisions
.(Ansoff 1968, Shirley et al 1976, Child 1977). Other studies, nevertheless,
claim that this definition is incomplete and does not include those decisions
which have gradually evolved into a strategy without any previous clear inten-
tions. These studies prefer to define strategy as a cluster of interrelated deci-
sions which occur over time. (Mintzberg 1977, Hedberg and Johnson 1977,
Horvath and McMillan 1979)
This present research does not concern itself with a group of inter-
related decisions but with discrete decisions some of which may have been
extracted from a stream of decisions, others nevertheless may consist of
isolated decisions taken by the organization. The definition of non-routine
decisions as summarised above should then be understood within the context
of single decisions as they have been studied by Mintzberg eta! (1976), Astley
-
et al (1980).
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, only recently has organ-
izational theory directed attention to critical unstructured decisions. In fact,
the need for understanding important non-routine decisioni has long been felt
In organization theory. Bower (1971) has noted that behavioural-decision
theorists have neglected the Important decisions in organizations under the
plea of their unstructured characteristics. It remains to be shown in the
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following sections that evaluation of non-routine decision-making has not been
Integrated into behavioural theory in a coherent and comprehensive form.
Little work has been developed on the relative success of non-routine decisions.
'Rational decision-making theory has addressed itself to the question of decision-
making efficiency or to the "best decision", nevertheless, reference is made
to only technical and routine decisions. The justification of concern for vari-
ations in the degree of success of non-routire decisions come from weaknesses
in the literature of decision-making which ranges from lack of interest for the
subject through failure in integrating it to theory in a coherent and complete
manner, to lack of empirical work in the subject.
-.,
The following section describes three traditional decision-making
approaches in their principal characteristics particularly in how they see the
question of a best decision.
12.2. Traditional Decision-Making Approaches: the Best Decision Controversy 
Since the idea of bounded rationality has come to the forefront in organ-
izational theory, the notions of attaining the best and most correct decisions as
well as the concern for the quality of decision outcomes from the rational model
have been rejected. With the impact of these major influences on organizational
theory, the problem of relating the decision process to the decision results comes
to be seen as not important or not as plausible. The idea that courses of action
only achieve satisficing levels suggests that results will be satisficing whatever
is done or whatever occurs in the decision process. This argument is discussed
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further in this section after the examination of the main propositions of
traditional decision-making approaches and the controversy around the best
decision issue, in which the idea that analysis of the decision outcomes is not
theoretically relevant appears to have originated.
.2.2.1. Rationality Paradigm
Research proposing to deal with decision-making success must not
neglect ideas about rationality in decision-making. This concept is so per-
vasive that it influences not only ideas about how an organization should be
(Weber 1969), but what decision-makers should aim at - the assumption of
maximization from economic theory - and what means they should use to make
decisions under conditions of uncertainty such as Bayesian statistical dccision
techniques, payoff tables and decision trees' same theory (Moore 1976, Scott
1976, Harrisson 1975, Luce and Raiffa 1957). A common characteristic of,
such approaches is their normative character, that is they propose models of
how organizations and decisions ought to be rather than describe what an or-
ganization is or how decisions are actually made. Secondly, they are character-
ized by the aim of efficiency, associated with,Choosing means which best achieve
ends.
At the decision-making level, rational behaviour has been understood
as a condition for making the best choice and consequently for obtaining success.
The decision-maker is assumed to behave rationally when there is an occasion
for a decision. He orders alternatives in terms of their desirability (Arrow 1951),
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for "(he) is a maximizer who settles for nothing less than the best" (Simon
1978:2). Given these assumptions, the basic pattern of decision-making
process as described by Feldman and Kanter (1965) consists of :-
(a) Breaking the problem down into its elements.
(b) Attributing values to a set of preferences according to states of nature.
(c) Assigning values to consequences of alternatives.
(d) Choosing the alternative which maximizes utility.
A logical deduction is that the correct decision is the one which follows the
rational pattern.
Extended to organizations, rational economic theory assumes that
decisions are taken with a view of profit maximization. When the situation is
risky, decision-makers are assumed to maximize expected utility (Edwards •
1954). When the situation is uncertain, techniques derived from Statistics and
Economics provide guidelines for achieving the best choice. As Arrow (1951:409)
suggests, the statistician and the businessman find themselves in similar
situations:
"The statistician's problem is of the same general type as
the businessman's and even the information getting aspects
have their economic counterparts. The various theories
which have been proposed from time to time as foundations
for statistical inference are therefore closely related to
theories of economic behavior under uncertainty."
The underlying assumptions of this approach are:
(i) that the decision-maker is omniscient, i. e. that he has perfect knowledge of
demand and supply prices; (ii) that there are no conditions which make it impos-
sible to transform choice into action; and (iii) that a choice is made by a single
individual. The business firm is seen as a unit where intra-orga.nizational
relationships do not operate (Katona 1964).
Despite his different emphasis on organizational structure and systems
of authority, Weber's (1969) ideas axl those of economists converge at the point
where organizations and individuals are viewed as purposive, both choosing
the best means to attain ends. Additionally, the assumption that organizational
goals and those of individuals correspond is vested in their ideal types.
The ideas of rationality adopted by classical bureaucracy theory and
economic theory have been challenged by Simon (1976) who criticized them mostly
for their lack of realism. He proposed a new model of organization based on
decision-making systems. Another critique which influenced decision-making
theory came from Lindblom (1959). He argued that rational theory failed to
explain how political decisions are actually made and put forward a model for
policy which he believed would enable politicians gradually to introduce drastic
changes without rucking the boat or where change seemed impossible (Lindblom
1979).
In the next subsection these two points of view will be examined for their
22
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criticism of the rational models and for the ideas they put forward on decision
process and the evaluation of decision-making results.
•
.2.2.2. Satisficing Paradigm 
Although Barnard (1962) had already recognized man's limitations in
making decisions, Simon's (1976) criticisms of the rationality assumptions had
the greatest impact on the theory of decision-making. In view view, choice in-
stead of being rational is only boundedly rational. Choices are not only made
under incomplete knowledge of the consequences of alternatives, they are influ-
enced by psychological factors such as habits, skills and motivations. The
decision-maker seeks simplification; search stops when he finds a satisficing
alternative (March and Simon 1958). Rationality exists but only in a partial way.
Choice behaviour is not integrated by a continuous weighting of means and ends;
information comes gradually with the search process. The organization is seen
as an adaptive system, it avoids uncertainty by exercising more control over the
environment. The organization develops repertoires as a result of learning, so
that standard procedures are activated to cope with uncertainty (Cyert and March
1963).
Thus the satisficing approach rejects ideas of a correct decision and
sees instead one that will do for the time being in the current circumstances.
Simon (1976) also criticized the eccnomic concept of efficiency and showed dif-
ficulties in applying it to decisions in non commercial organizations. The usual
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criteria for comparing decision results in commercial organizations, an analysis
of profits and costs, do not easily apply to public services where objectives are
more vague and stated in terms of value. He has argued that while the criteria
• in commercial organizations tend to be more definite in terms of being based
upon economic factors in public organizations the concept has to consider the
interest of divergent groups:
"In the language of the economist, the problem of efficiency
in the public agency must be approached from the standpoint
of the general rather than from the partial equilibrium". (Simon 1976:XXIX)
Simon has also questioned the comparison of means and ends as an alternative
criterion for decision efficiency on the grounds that this kind of analysis does
not consider the implications of alternatives which have not been chosen, and it
does not account for the time factor. Moreover, means and ends cannot in prac-
tice be separated and means are not completely free from values. Instead, the
only valid distinction is between the factual and value elements of the decision.
Value judgements provide the organization's ultimate goals and factual judge-
ments define the implementation of such goals. Therefore, criteria of efficiency
can only be employed for factual decisions, for those technical in character.
Correctness has no meaning for decisions where value considerations are
necessary.
Although rejecting ideas of profit maximization in principle, Simon
really does not move very far from those ideas when he proposes a comparison
between positive value and costs as a form of evaluating decisicn results. It
appears that he has not completely abandoned the rational perspective as an
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explanatory'tool. He explains how "Administrative Behavior" should accom-
modate ideas of rationality and those of bounded rationality:
"Administrative Behavior was first published to construct
a model of rational choice that incorporates the actual
properties of human being and at the same time retains
some of the formal clarity of the economic behavior".
(Simon 1976: XXIX)
The idea that organizations' decfsions are oriented towards a single
goal of profit maximization has been criticized by Cyert and March (1963) who
conceive of an organization as a coalition of individuals with conflicting goals.
Both individuals and coalitions of individuals within the organization have their
own goals. Goals are not fixed, they are developed through bargaining and
change over time as organization members change. Aspiration levels change
with past experience. Even though conflict is unresolved, the organization can
still survive due to devices such as factoring goals, so that each unit can pursue
its own goal without interfering with other units' goals. Coalitions are feasible
because there are formal arrangements which specify sequential attention to the
claims of different subunit.
Whereas there is common ground for Simon (1976) and Cyert and March
(1963) that organizations have multiple conflicting goals, they have different
explanations as to how these influence decision-making. Cyert and March
(1963) do not believe that organizations resolve conflict. By factoring goals
and allowing for sequential claims, different subunits do not need to compromise
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or revise their aspirations. In Simon's view, individuals' goals are not neces-
sarily different from those of the organization. The organization's goal is the
universe of goals which are not linked to personal motives. The balance be-
tween inducements and contributions may alter the extent to which the indivi-
dual "joins" the organization or accepts the organisation's role. He may do so
very fully if the inducements are sufficient. On the other hand, there may not
be much coherence. Problems are solved, but only partially, and at a satis-
ficing level. Solutions, therefore, may not be compatible with the organiza-
tion's overall goals. (Simon 1976:247). Coherence with more general goals
may be obtained at the end by mechanisms inherent to the system, such as
organizational learning and by establishing penalities and rewards for conformity
with role constraints. The system may look uncoupled but not necessarily inop-
erative.
While sat isficing theory has been recognized as providing a broader
framework in the understanding of how organizations make decisions, it has
been criticized for many reasons. Loasby.
 (1968) and Soeberg (1967) disagree
...
with the idea that organizational goals in fact prescribe choice. Another argu-
ment relies on an idea that decision-makers do frequently go beyond the satis-
ficing level, mostly when the situation is one of innovation and requires new
patterns of behaviour (Krupp 1961, Soeberg 1967, Loasby 1968).
.2.2.3. Incrementalism Approach 
Conventional ideas of decision-making were also questioned in their
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main assumption by Lindblom (1959) who proposed an alternative model which
be named "muddling through" to characterize the partial and incremental features
of the decision-making process as opposed to the static conception of rational
theory. An important notion is the one of fragmentation. Whilst rational methods
assume perfect agreement on goals, Lindblom's incrementalism assumes that
goals and values are fragmented.
At a societal level fragmentation is a result of how democratic societies
are organized. Interest groups, by virtue of their specialized functions have
different views and attitudes concerning the same issue. Therefore, fragmen-
tation of political interests may lead to analytic fragmentation That is, if
variables central for one group are considered peripheral by another and power-
ful group, such variables can be left out of consideration when decisions are
made (Lindblom 1958). Linked to this idea is the idea of partisan mutual adjust-
ment, which it is suggested occurs in decentralized forms of decision-making
where fragmentation exists. In this situation "policy making happens instead
of being decided upon", so that connections between a policy and the reasons for
making it are not easily identifiable (Lindblom 1979:523), Although Lindblom
was referring here to decision-making at a societal level the same may be applied
to organizations.
The central assumption lies in the idea of incrementalism. Rather than
attempting to foresee all consequences of alternatives, the policy maker, due to
his intellectual limitations simplifies the situation and examines only those
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alternatives which are slightly different from policies already in effect. As a
result, policies are actually made in terms of successive comparisons between
the status quo and anticipated marginal changes which may result from the
introduction of the policy.
Lindblom (1979) distinguishes this type of analysis which he called simple
Incremental analysis from disjointed incrementalism which he defines as a type
-
of policy making characterized by a set of strategies to simplify the situation,
such as the limitation of analysis to familiar alternatives, the intermixture of
values with empirical aspects of the problem, concern for ills to be defined
rather than for positive goals, a sequence of trial and error, and fragmentation
of policy (Lindblom 1979:517).
Given this view, the analysis of decision-making results cannot be made
in traditional terms by comparing means with achievement of ends. Nevertheless,
with incrementalism, it is still possible to test a policy against its results by
comparing how incremental it was. The test way of making decisions is therefore
by an incremental process, little by little, especially in conditions where change'
seems more difficult or impossible (Lindblom 1979). In these circumstances, it
is possible to attain agreement. But here, participants agree on an "ad hoc"
policy rather than on ultimate values.
Lindblom's analysis, nevertheless, has been subject to much criticism.
First, as an explanatory theory of decision-making behaviour it has been criticized
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for being partial, that is, it does not explain behaviour in conditions of innovation
where there is no past policy from which to begin (Dror 1969, Cates 1979), or
In the most complex political situations (Adams 1979). Dror (1969) argues that
intentional use of the method is appropriate only when the results of previous
policy are satisfactory and when there is continuity in the nature of the problem
and the means of dealing with it. Therefore, it does not provide a sufficient
framework to analyse decisions which occur at top level, such as strategic
decisions.
Another aspect which has been criticized is the implied use of incremen-
tal politics (a concept recently re-elaborated by Lindblom 1979) as a method of
policy making. Dror (1969) argues that it is a method for "maximising security"
and favours inertia. Other criticisms of incrementalism as a deliberate means
of making decisions focus on the remedial aspects because it concentrates more
on the relief of symptoms than on the diagnosis of problems and their solutions
(Nees 1979).
The idea of agreement on policies as a criterion for the quality of policies
is surely a debatable point. While people may agree on sensible policies, they
may just as well agree on disastrous ones. Dror (1969) picks up this point and
argues that agreement must not be taken as a substitute for examination of alter-
natives. Some who adopt a pluralistic view, such as George (1972) and Argyris
(1976), see conflict and disagreement as functional and as conditions for achieving
better decision making. They would certainly oppose the idea that agreement is
always associated with the best decisions.
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.2.2.4. The Theoretical Challenge and a Justification for Concern with the 
Relative Success of Non-routine Decision-Making 
The major characteristics of the three traditional approaches are
presented in Table 2.1. As this table shows, the satisficing and incrementalism
approaches have suggested that organizations and, in consequence, the decision
process are much more complex than rationalism will have it. Instead of pur-
suing just one goal of profit maximization, organizations have multiple goals
which may not correspond to those of its participants. Decisions are not taken
by just a single individual, but are made by a coalition of interests whose goals
may be in conflict. As satisficing and incrementalism see it, the decision process
is subject to various sorts of constraints, such as limitations of cognition and
learning. Based in technical and routine decisions rational theory has suggested
that a correct and successful decision is the one which maximizes values. Satis-
ficing and the incrementalism approaches based on less routine decisions argued
that most decision-making outcomes are only satisficing or mean a small change
in the status quo, respectively. The criterion to assess the successfulness of
the decision employed by rationalism also appeared inappropriate to these two
approaches. Satisficing theory questioned whether the criteria to assess the
successfulness of a decision can be applicable in the same way to technical and
less technical decisions and to commercial and public organizations. Incremen-
talism in its turn defends the point that it is not possible in practical terms to
describe objectives of a policy without describing the policy itself. In Lindblom's
(1959) views correctness of a decision cannot be assessed as rational theorists
argue, since values attributed to consequence of alternatives depend themselves
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on agreement. When it is not possible to attain agreement there is no way to
test for the best policy. While agreement on values is difficult and sometimes
Impossible, agreement on policy is much more easily attained. This, therefore,
-
should be the test for the successfulness of decision-making.
While satisficing theory and incrementalism have rejected the basic
Ideas underlying rationality theory, they have also rejected the ideas of decision-
making efficiency and therefore, concern for decision-making outcomes come to
be regarded as a subject of interest of normative theory. In fact, this issue is
at the heart of the argument which distinguishes normative theories from behav-
ioural decision theory. Whereas normative theories are concerned with how
people should make decisions in order to arrive at the best ones, behavioural
theories are concerned with how people make decisions independently of what
the outcomes are (Bauer 1971). Nevertheless, this research addresses itself
to a slightly different question which so far has been neglected. Rather than.
attempting to suggest better forms of making a decision this research aims
first to identify the outcomes of a decision and then define what a successful
decision-making is. It therefore does not consider satisficing a fixed objective .
which decisions achieve whatever happens in the decision process. On the con-
trary, it assumes that decisions vary in the degree of satisficing achieved.
This point has already been indirectly raised by Loasby (1968) and
Soeberg (1967), who believe that search activities may achieve various levels
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of satisficing. Krupp (1961) has similarly argued that the achievement of dif-
ferential returns indicates that some firms may satisfice more efficiently than
others. It is precisely these variations within the satisficing continuum that
this research intends to examine, with decisions as units of analysis. Thus,
decisions vary in the degree of satisficing in much the same way as they vary
in the level of success achieved.
Those well-established ideas in the decision-making - literature and the
complexities of organizational processes, added by the behavioural approaches,
and yet the lack of a coherent integration of decision-making outcomes within
a theoretical context, presents many obstacles to studies interested in examining .
the degree of success of a decision. These difficulties represent a challenge
• which this research proposes to face.
Although both Simon (1976) and Lindblom (1959) disclosed various
weaknesses of rationalism and raised the point of decision-making quality, little
theoretical insight has been gained in terms of what successful decision-making
may be. The question of a criterion to evaluate decision-making activities has
been left unresolved. The criterion for decision quality based on agreement
introduced by incrementalism is not applicable to all types of decisions. For
example, it does not apply to non-routine decisions which may involve a radical
departure from other decisions taken by the organization. As Lindblom (1959)
has noted, decisions which are incremental in nature, are likely to yield un-
predictable consequences and agreement may not be possible. On the other hand,
•
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Simon (1976) discusses different ways organizations analyse decision-making
activities: by comparing means with ends, by comparing positive with riegative
values, by analysing how decision-making activities maintain the organization's
....
pasitive balance of output over input. He suggests that each alternative is in-
complete and applicable to some decisions and in some organizations. As he
points out
"Improvement in the quality of decision awaits empirical
research into the production function that relates activities
to results. Our knowledge of these functions is frag-
mentary at present yet they are indispensable as a reason,
without which it operates in a factual vacuum". (Simon 1976:197)
Up to this point, it has been important to describe the unit of analysis
of this study and to justify the reasons for concern with variations in the degree
of decision-making success. The examination of traditional decision-making
approaches has shown that the analysis of decision-making success is an un-
resolved issue in organization theory.
The lack of interest and coherent integration of decision-making success
by traditional behavioural theory reflects on the little empirical work which has
been developed so far. This question is examined in detail in the next section
where a concept of success used by this research is elaborated in detail.
CHAPTER In 
THE CONCEPT OF DECISION-MAKING SUCCESSFULNESS 
In the previous chapter, traditional decision-making approaches
were examined in their understanding of decision-making success and related
subjects such as decision-making efficiency or quality. This review has shown
first that this subject has not been Integrated to decision-making theory in a
complete and coherent form. Decision-making success comes to be seen as
a subject of normative theories. This lack of theoretical interest reflects on
the little empirical work covering this area. This is what this present chapter
shows, by examining some empirical studies concerned with evaluation of
organization activities.
Another point which has been raised in the previous chapter refers to
the criteria used to analyse the result of decision activities suggested by the
traditional decision-making models. Satisficing and incrementalism theories
have criticized the conventional criterion of decision-making efficiency.
Simon (1976) suggests that the usual criterion used by normative theory cannot
be applicable in the same way to technical as well as to less technical decisions
and to commercial and public organizations. Nevertheless Simon (1976) him-
self does not suggest a criterion which could be applicable to both types of
decisions and organizations. On the other hand, the criterion for decision
quality based on agreement as suggested by Lindblom (1959) may not be applic-
able to decisions which mean a departure from previous policies like innovative
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decisions and to decisions which are strategic. Thus in a second part, this pre-
sent chapter proposes and elaborates a concept of success which is poten-
tially applicable to various types of decisions processed in various kinds of
• organizations public and private, business and non-business.
.3.1. Research on Decision-Making Success 
As already mentioned the question of which dimensions best describe
decision-making in terms of results has been left open. A few suggestions
and many difficulties have been identified by the various types of studies con-
cerned with decision-making outcomes and other studies aimed at evaluating
organizational activities.
In general, studies relating decision processes to decision results
are of three types. The first type of study investigates small group phenomena,
• controlling for one or two independent variables. Consisting mainly of labora-
tory experiments, such studies relate different styles of leadership to different
degrees' of group acceptance of a decision and, further, to the quality of the
decision (Maier 1970). Some of these studies investigate relationships of group
size with the quality and speed of solutions (Cummings et al 1974). Others
relate patterns of group interaction to satisfaction with the decision process,
creativity (Ven and Delbecq 1974) and with quality of solution (Vroom et al
1969). Maier (1970) recognises quality and acceptance as the main dimensions
of decision effectiveness. Quality implies a comparison with facts whilst accep-
tance involves an assessment of whether group members like a decision and/or
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believe in it. Effectiveness is a function of both these dimensions acting
together. Thus, when either quality or acceptance is zero, the decision is
zero in effectiveness.
Experiments with small groups generally consist of a simulation of
a problem upon which a decision has to be taken. Usually, the problem is more
or less technical, so that it admits a correct solution without much ambiguity.
The criteria for the degree of success of these decisions are usually based on
the correctness of the decision, on the quantity of ideas generated and on the
time taken to arrive at the solution. Satisfaction is assessed by asking group
members how satisfied they were with their own participation and with the prob-
lem solution.
Another type of study follows the work of authors such as Arrow (1951),
Luce and Raiffa (1957) and Churchman (1961) and then follows the presumptions
of efficiency and other assumptions of normative theory. A common character-
istic of these studies is the suggestion of techniques to improve decision-making
quality. For example, decision quality may improve with the use of algorithms
or heuristics for well-defined problems but brainstorming should be used when
the problem is ill-defined. Taylor (1974) Emery and Tuggle (1976) make sug-
gestions as to how to control people's behaviour during implementation in order
to attain better decisions, and other studies concentrate on the improvement
of abilities to make decisions (Schuller 1976, Tregoe 1977). Decision-making
quality can be measured by the quality of search (Bower 1965), in economic
terms (Trull 1966), or by comparing actual performance with desired performance
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(Pounds 1969, Ansoff 1971). Most management science research has concerned
itself with quantitative criteria of decision-making success and with the efficient
means to manage the logistic of the process.
Within organization theory, decision-making studies have moved
away from traditional ideas of efficiency. Rather, some studies have attempted
to prove that the decision-making process is far from a linear goal-directed
behaviour. The widely believed ideas of stages of problem-solving introduced
by psychologists like Dewey (1910) and adapted by Simon (1955) to describe the
decision-making process in organizations were first challenged by Witte (1972).
He defined process efficiency in terms of speed, thoroughness and internal and
external friction. His findings have indicated that not a single decision showed
a high degree of efficiency in the above criteria. The examination of the thorough-
ness of the decision process has shown that only one decision has met this cri-
• terion. Witte's results have completely refuted the traditional notions of
decision-making as sequential process which goes step by step from the iden-
tification of the decision problem to evaluation of alternatives.
The traditional assumptions of decision-making as a straightforward
process have also been challenged by Cohen et at (1972). They argued that often
decision processes do not appear to be much concerned with the making of a
decision. The process appears anarchical, where problems are not solved
and outcomes are not connected to explicit intentions of the process participants.
The efficiency of the decision process in their study is defined in terms of
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problem activity, problem latency and decision time. It appears rather, that
these dimensions depict the inefficiency of the process: problem activity refers
to the amount of time during which unresolved problems are attached to alter-
natives; problem latency consists of the amount of time problems remain acti-
vated but not attached to choices and decision time refers to persistence of
choices.
More recent studies contrast decision-making types of performance.
Emphasis is given to decision-making as a goal-directed process contrasting
with an incremental, muddling process. (Wilson 1980, A stley et al 1980).
Sequentiality, continuity, rapidity, incrementality are examples of the concepts
used by these studies to depict a decision performance characteristic. Yet,
Astley et at (1980) contrasts rapidity with satisf icity, incrernentality and cres-
civity, again comparing outcomes of straightforward process with outcomes of
a slow and incremental process.
Thus organizational decision th.eory models appear more concerned
with process description than with unravelling the different dimensions of
decision-making outcomes. They do not attempt to predict the dimensions
of outcomes from process characteristics. Some few studies concerned with
the characteristics of the decision process leading to better quality decisions
are exceptions to this rule. But they focus only on the dynamics of group pro-
cesses. In these studies, a successful decision process is viewed as one in
which a free choice results Zrom examination of a full range of values. These
4 0
values necessarily include those attached to unpopular alternatives and conflic-
ting values and beliefs (e.g. George 1972). This model, developed by George
(1972), is specifically relevant to foreign policy making. A successful decision
for George, results from the involvement of competent people in the decision
situation. He defines a successful decision situation as having no maldistri-
bution of power, participants who are able to generate the necessary resources
for the decision and time available for the exchange of ideas. Within a similar
perspective, Argyris (1976) views effectiveness of a decision as associated to
the factors of the generation of valid information, free choice and internal
commitment. However, in these studies, the independent variables are
treated in a highly sophisticated manner while little concern is shown for the
definition of more or less effective decisions. Thus, the effective decision
remains a vague construct.
The lack of more sophisticated treatment of decision-making success
by current research in the field may be explained by the difficulties encountered
In finding a concept which could lead to something more than the over-used and
restricted economic measurements. Difficulties in the empirical identification
of decision outcomes may also be a reason for the sparse theoretical coverage
of this aspect.
As mentioned in the earlier chapter, some types of decisions tend to
affect the organisation in a wider manner than others. One problem encountered
in judging the effectiveness of a decision is the difficulty of empirical identification
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of those effects. On the other hand, time lapses between the occurrence of
the decision and its feedback, and the intertwining of decision effects with .
other ongoing activities, produces a complexity which easily discourages at-
tempts to unravel its dimensions (Shuller 1975).
Further, there is the question of finding criteria to analyze decisions
which do not reach the phase of being implemented. Huntington (1961) argues
that it is not really possible to speak of effective decision in American govern-
ment, in the usual terms, since decision processes never reach the final stages.
Almost any decision can be appealed to another body. Therefore, criteria for
effectiveness can only assess the extent to which the issue has been acceptably
settled, however temporarily.
Another problem in conducting this type of research is that judgement
of the degree of success that a decision has achieved changes over time. As
Emery and Tuggle (1975) point out, there is no guarantee that a good decision to-
day will still be considered as such in the future. To overcome this problem, a
judgement about past decisions must be related to the conditions which prevailed
,
at the time it was taken. George (1972) comments on this point and warns re-
searchers about the risk of false evaluation of a decision made on the basis of
new information which was not available to decision makers at the time.
While decision-making theorists wrestle with the dilemmas of the multi-
plicity of decision effects and other theoretical and methodological pitfalls which
appear in this kind of research, these dilemmas, however, do not apply only to
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studies involved with evaluating decisions. Research on organizational effec-
tiveness and orgailizational performance has to face similar problems.
Yuchtman and Seashore (1967) and Steers (1975) have reviewed the models used
by previous studies to analyze organizational effectiveness and showed that the
conceptual approaches employed are far from satisfactory.
Usually, terms such as organizational success and organizational effec-
tiveness have been used interchangeably to compare the achievement of different
organizations. A common approach to the problem of comparing organizations
consists of defining effectiveness in terms of attainment of goals (Parsons 1956,
Thompson and McEwen 1958). However, the analysis of effectiveness by goals
attainment has been one of the most controversial issues in organizational
analysis. While some studies argue that the goal concept is one of the most
useful tools to explain organizational activities (Perrow 1969, Hall 1974), the
use of the concept as a standard for appraising organizational performance has
also been criticized (Etzioni 1964, Yuchtman and Seashore 1967).
The goal approach has been attacked on various grounds. A major ob-
jection lies in the argumf2nt that goals, as ideal states, cannot easily be subjec-
ted to realistic assessment (Etzioni 1964). Yuchtman and Seashore (1967:893)
argue that the goal approach has not only theoretical but also methodological
shortcomings. In fact, "organizational objectives are generally ambiguous, if
not controversial and therefore difficult to identify and measure". Thus, organ-
ization members do not always agree on the goals of the organization. Even
when there is agreement, there is no guarantee that these goals will be realized.
Organizations do not have complete control over the environment. Therefore,
goals may be imposed by contingencies rather than produced from a chosen
situation.
Operational definition of goal attainment involves the use of accounting
•
data such as profits and growth rates (Child 1974, 1975). The concept of goal
attainment has also been described in terms of variables such as productivity,
flexibility and absence of organizational strain (Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum
1957). In their study goal attainment has been defined as a multidimensional
concept, a tendency which is observed in recent studies concerned with evalu-
ation of organization activities. The tendency of recent studies to abandon the
quantitative univariate measures and employ concepts which can account for
multiple facets of organizational effectiveness has been shown by Steers (1975)
who analysed 17 models of organizational effectiveness.
Recent studies concerned with corporate decision-making and organ-
ization performance have also followed this trend. Some studies have given
equal weight to different aspects of performance, to financial as well as to
behavioural aspects (Stagner 1969, Miller and Friesen 1978) and to differences
in view of various interests concerning what is seen as successful (Newbould
and Luffman 1978). In Newbould and Luffman's views the criteria of success in
western capitalist societies have been changing in order to account for the dif-
ferent interests of various groups. As they state:
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"Once the movement away from the pursuit of profit has
reached as far as it has through the western world,
success in business generally, and in large companies
in particular, becomes a many-sided and often contra-
dictory concept. What is good for the shareholder is
no longer acceptable as a justification for a decision by
the board of directors".
(Newbould and Luffman 1978:12)
.3.2. A Synthesis of Concepts and Contributions to this Research Concept of Succes.
Table 3.1 summarizes the three main forms of evaluating organizational
activities used by studies concerned with decision-making or organization perfor-
mance. Some of these studies focus on decision-making outcomes such as cor-
rectness and quantity of ideas generated, on characteristics of the decision
process such as speed sequentiality, generation of information and resources
or even on the overall performance of the organization such as attainment of
goals. It suggests that performance in organizations can be evaluated taking
as reference direct outcomes of the decision-making process, how the decision
has been made (process characteristics), and by examining the overall effective-
ness of organizations. Although these researches have suggested various alter-
natives to evaluate decision-making activities (by looking at the pr9cess, to
direct outcomes of the making of a decision, to the overall effect on the organ-
ization performance) the concepts they propose are not really appropriate either
to the research aims or to the kind of decisions it investigates.
Organization decision-making research is primarily concerned with
processes of making decisions. Here, features which describe efficiency
• UNIT OF
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CRITERIA	 - STUDIES
Small group behaviour :
decision-making
outcomes
Cummings et al (1974)
Ven and Delbecq (1974)
Vroom et al (1969)
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Maier (1970)
(b) Organizational
effectiveness
Wilson (1980)
Astley et al (1980)
Cohen et a; (1972)
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Steers (1975)
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TABLE 3. 1 FORMS OF EVALUATING DECISION-MAK1NG AND
ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES SUGGESTED BY SOME
EMPIRICAL STUDIES.
- Solution speed
- Solution quality
- Group satisfaction
- Quantity of ideas generated
- Solution speed
- Implementation plan
- Quality of the solution
- Acceptance and quality of
the decision correctness
- Sequentiality, continuity,
rapidity
- Incrementality,
satisficity, crescivity
- Problem activity
- Problem latency
- Decision time
- Attainment of organiza-
tional goals .
(Productivity, flexibility
absence of organizational
strain)
(Profitability, Growth)
- (Attainment of operational
goals)
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(Witte's 1972 and Cohen et al's 1972 concepts) refer to characteristics of the
process rather than describing what results from the making of the decision.
Although these concepts may be of interest to this present research whilst
examining how characteristics of the process affects the decision success,
they do not help the definition of success. In the analysis of success this
research is primarily concerned with outcomes which emerge after the decision
has already been made.
An analysis of the correctness of a decision as suggested by social
psychology research cannot really be applied in this research. The kind of
decisions these studies are concerned with are relatively simple admitting a
single solution which can be treated against correctness. This present research
on the otirr hand is concerned with non-routine decisions which may require
some adaptative changes and then may affect the organization in a much wider
manner as it was pointed out in the previous chapter. The concepts proposed
by social psychology built up from laboratory studies of group decision-making
as shown in Table 3.1, may be incomplete in describing organizations' decision-
making whose outcomes may be complex au c) unpredictable.
However, some types of decision-making outcomes proposed by group
decision-making, such as creativity and acceptance, can be included under the
concept of success developed here, although within a framework made approp-
riate for the analysis of non-routine decisions. As will be seen further on,
one of the dimensions of success is capable of detecting, though indirectly, the
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degree of acceptability of a decision. However, we have avoided the use of
acceptance as a dimension of decision success, due to the theoretical and
empirical difficulties associated with it. It is not easy to judge if a decision
Is fully accepted or not, given the complications of reality highlighted by Cyert
and MarcHs(1963) study where the organization is seen as a coalition of interests
who compete for common resources. Competition for scarce resources may
yield a situation where gains of a given unit are obtained at the expense of
another acceptance may vary between winning and losing. While winners may
be satisfied with the decision, losers may hardly agree with it. Theoretically,
a concept of success based on acceptance would necessarily require a specifi-
cation of the various interests having a stake in the decision process. Empiri-
cally, however, there would be many difficulties in identifying groups affected
by a decision, some of which may not be members of the organization or may
' have left by the time of data collection.
Thus, whilst accepting the fact that people at different levels in the
organization who are affected by a decision outcome may hold different views
on its success, the direct investigation of how wide within the organization is
its acceptance or how much agreement there is among various interest groups
on the successfulness of a decision is a step which is beyond the scope of this
research. It is assumed that because most of the decisions included here were
processed at top management level, this study should therefore concentrate
at least on what decision-makers see as a successful decision. To restrict
the investigation in this way does not imply that their views are necessarily the
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best or representative. When resources for a project cannot stretch any further,
a point of reference has necessarily to be taken.
Finally, various criteria to examine organization effectiveness by
relevant studies are proposed, which could be adapted to the decision-making
level of analysis. However, most of them are based on the concept of goal
attainment which this present research wishes to avoid as being too controver-
sial and as yet an unresolved issue itself in the organization theory. Moreover,
the literature examined so far has clearly described decision-making either in
terms of a linear goal-directed process organized around the principles of
efficiency and attainment of maximization of values or as a process which is
unstructured and whose outcomes are unintended. The use of the goal concept
would disregard the unintended outcomes of the process and the fact that the
decision-makers may not know which goals served as an input for a decision.
As Weick (1969) has pointed out, reasons for a decision may only become ap-
parent after it has already been made. "The sequence of action preceding goals
may well be a more accurate portrait of . or:;anization functioning", Weiek (1969:
8).
In this research it is therefore assumed that whilst some outcomes
are worked on and guide decision-making activities, others are unplanned
emerging with the process of making the decision. There is no ready explah-
ation for some of these outcomes; their effects may be known only when they
have a fleet Cu tho organizal ion or afiei the decision has been made.
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.3.3. Proposed Dimensions of Success 
Because many previous research projects have left the task of elab-
orating what success or effectiveness may be for the reader to figure out,
there is a pressing need for a clear and coherent definition of these terms.
In view of what has been said in the previous section, it seems that little prog-
ress has been made in the search for some form of defining successful out-
comes. Whatever means are used must account for the different effects of
decision-making and the general 2haracterist1cs of non-routine decisions.
Thus, variables which define successful outcomes are entirely new in formu-
lation and are postulated here for the empirical testing which will be reported
later. In venturing into the conceptualization of successful decision-making
this research makes no claim to solve all the theoretical and methodological
problems which have been discussed here. However, at least the model devel-
oped here seems to be appropriate for studying non-routine major decisions,
and appears to consider some important facets of success.
The examination of traditional decision-making approaches in the previous
chapter have indicated two forms of explaining decision-making activities. The
first point of view sees decision-making as a goal directed process oriented towards
attainment of maximization of a function. Alternatively decision-making is under-
stood as a behavioural process where outcomes are only satisficing and incremental;
then they maybe a result of lack of sufficient knowledge on future events ,fragmentation
of interests and lack of agreement. This same tendency towards polarization can be
noted in the empirical studies examined in this chapter. While research which fol-
lows normative theory tends to emphasize forms of attaining efficiency, behavioui,i1
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studies emphasize the dynamics of the process of making decisions. In attemp-
ting to understand these processes, some of these studies have been focused
on two contrasting aspects of the processes: the planned, linear and continu-
bus characteristics resembling activities of human thinking and problem-solving
as opposed to muddling and incremental characteristics of the process.
,
The literature eXamined so far therefore renders two definite and
separate views of decision-making. On the one hand ideas like straight forward-
ness towards an objective, planned intellectual activity and efficiency can be
combined to describe an instrumental process. On the other hand unstructured-
ness , lack of control of the events in making a decision and conflicting views on
what objectives to achieve may define some characteristics of a behavioural
process. Within the first perspective decision-making outcomes are a result
of a planned activity oriented according to norms of efficiency, but within the
second perspective outcomes just happen from a process which does not very
much resemble the making of a decision. They just emerge and may have nJ
close relation to what has been explicitly planned.
Following the perspective which sees decision-making as an instrumen-
tal process studies have been made which tend to follow the classical rationality
but nevertheless see organizations in a less strict quantitative form. These
..
studies emphasize the opportunistic aspects of decision-making which is viewed
as a response to opportunities and problems (Pounds 1969, Ansoff 1971,
Mintzberg 1976). Decision-making consists of activities undertaken to reduce
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the differences between actual and desired performance - problem solving
functions - coping with threats and exploiting opportunities (Ansoff 1971).
Emphasis is directed to the ability of the organization to recognize and react
'promptly to environmental changes so that the best advantages of the situation
are obtained (Ansoff 1975).
If decision activities are explained within these alternative views
then a concept of success has necessarily to include planned and unplanned
dimensions. The first results from a planned intellectual or opportunistic
activity, the unplanned happen with the making of the decision having no con-
nections with initial intentions. As Perrow (1972) points out, unplanned out-
comes are less subject to control and are onfy noticed when their effects are
quite evident.
To describe the concept of success used by the present research and
to explain how the idea of planned outcomes is linked to it, it is first necessary
to review Mintzbert and associates' (1976) description of the decision process.
This study, in fact, provided much of the ground work for the concept of suc-
cess developed here, since it has dealt with important non-routine decisions.
Adotping a similar view to Ansoff (1971), Mintzberg and associates (1976:251)
suggest that decisions are evoked by multivariate stimuli which may be cate-
gorized in three types. Decisions may be organized along a continuum accor-
ding to the stimuli which evoked them. Opportunities are at one extreme,
crises at the other end and problems in the middle. Differences between the
two extremes are based on the characteristics of the stimulus and the amount .
of pressure it imposes on the organization. Opportunity decisions may be
voluntarily initiated and proceed under low pressure, as opposed to crises
'decisions where there is an imperative need for action and pressure is high.
In the present research, it has been assumed that decisions are
evoked either by opportunities or by problems. Crises and problems are
considered within one category. Since crises are rare (Herman 1963), it
was thought that data collection would yield too few to be treated separately.
Thus, a decision is successful either when the problems which evoked it are
solved, as in the case of problem decision, or when opportunities are realized,
as in the case of opportunity decisions. Con gequently, the two first dimensions
of decision-making success are proactivity (which refers to opportunity real-
ization) and closure (which refers to the degree to which problems are solved).
Proactivity and closure reflect the instrumental characteristics of the decision
process and they constitute so-called "planned dimensions". The assumption
is that, upon the recognition of the need for the decision, behaviour is directed
to seizing the opportunity or solving the problem. Thus, if a decision is made
to resolve an industrial dispute, and settlement is achieved then closure is
attained. If, on the other hand, a company is acquired abroad as a mean to
expand business in the host country and this is achieved then also proactivity
.,
has been attained.
	 4
however, not. all consequences of a decision are previously planned.
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They are better described as "happening" or "emerging". In this case, what
results from a decision may not reflect an intellectual exercise, but may emerge
within the decision process of making it. Propitiousness and disturbances are
'therefore included in the category of unplanned success dimensions. Propitious-
ness refers to any unexpected opportunities which are brought about by the
decision process. Thus, in a problem decision ,. interest conflicts may generate
a wider examination of alternatives and a new opportunity may be discovered.
Disturbances on the other ,
 hand, refer to otherproblems which may be brought
about by the making of the decision. A decision about a wage settlement, for
example, may terminate an undesirable strike, but, on the other hand, the
organization will have to struggle to cope with additional costs. A decision
may intensify conflict between the parts which were already hostile, or may
Introduce changes in the work situation which make it less interesting. Thus,
the concepts of propitiousness and disturbances may be able to capture how
the decision has affected the organization's internal environment and perfor-
mance. In a way, the concept of propitiousness may correspond to the creati-
vity concept of small group studies and the concept of disturbances permits
in a sense, an assessment of the level of acceptance of a decision. For example,
propitiousness captures whether a greater share of the market has been obtained
with the decision and disturbances grasps whether labour relations have worsened
as a result of the making of it. The types of propitiousness and disturbances
which appear vary with the decision content.
Table 3.2 summarizes the four dimensions which define the concept of
OUTCOMES
Problems not solved
Opportunities lost
Unpropitious (dead end)
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success used in this present research.
TABLE 3.2 DIMENSIONS OF DECLION-MAKING SUCCESS
Planned dimension of success Unplanned dimension of success
Closure Disturbances
Proactivity Propitiousness
Here, success is understood within a multidimensional fashion following the
tendency shown by studies in Table 3.1. Variation in the degree of closure,
proactivity, propitiousness and disturbances, gives a rate on the degree of
success achieved. Each variable therefore contributes to a final assessment
on a continuum of success/unsuccess. Figure 3.1 shows how these four
variables in Table 3.2 portray high or low successfulness.
FIGURE 3.1 ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SUCCESSFULNESS
SUCCESSFULNESS
High	 Low
DIMENSIONS 
Closure	 Problems solved
Proactivity	 Opportunities realized
Propitiousness	 Propitious (new oppor-
tunities evoked)
DisturLances	 Undisturbed (Smooth, unimpeded)
	 Disturbed (Difficult es
generated)
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The degree of successfulness a decision attains depends upon the com-
bination of these variables. Each varies along a continuum ranging from high
to low, representing the variation of scores of each variable. Outcomes which
'result from a decision process may be specified and vary from high closure
to low closure, to high proactivity to law proactivity and so forth. A high
degree of three variables (closure, proactivity and propitiousness) combined
with low disturbances may define the more successful decisions. Then, some
relationship is expected to be found between what the executive sees as a successful
decision, examined by the variable perceived success and the outcomes just des-
cribed above. Less successful decisions by contrast may be defined by com-
bination of other outcomes: low closure, low proactivity, low propitiousness
and high disturbances. In this case, some positive relationship is expected to
be found between decisions perceived as less successful  and these outcomes.
.3.4. Applications of the Concept of Decision Successfulness 
As already mentioned, studies which are somehow concerned with
evaluation of decision-making have used- either a quantitative criterion or
have been based on attitudinal measures such as group satisfaction and accep-
tance. Research on group decision-making and studies based on rational theory
have examined decisions which are technical in character or on those subject2d
to quantitative analysis. Organization theory studies on the other hand have
concentrated on the variables of the process which indeed confirms the boun-
daries between normative and behavioural theory of decision-making mentioned
by Bauer (1C71). Thesc concepts, however, do nut describe outcomes of a
decision when resources are committed fo implement it.
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On the one hand, the examination of satisficing theory in Chapter 11
has indicated that the quantitative criterion as suggested by normative theorists
based on the analysis of profit and costs cannot literally be used to measure the
'efficiency of certain types of decisions, and in some organizations for which
considerations of social character are more important and where factors in-
volved are not directly measurable in monetary terms. An alternative criterion
based on agreement has been suggested by Lindblom (1959). Again, this cri-
terion refers to what happens in the process of making decisions; it does not
describe the outcomes after resources have been committed to implement it.
Moreover, it is based on decisions which represent a small change in the status
quo and then it may not be applicable to decisions which are innovative or rep-
resent a departure from a previous situation as Dror (1969) has argued.
Thus, while previous studies have suggested a criterion whose applic-
ation is limited to certain types of decisions and organizations and yet others
have giver primacy to characteristics of the process, the concept of success
elaborated in this present research may be applicable to decisions varying in
topic and importance in various types of organizations. Application of the set
of variables elaborated in the previous section may permit a comparison of the
relative success of decisions having different inputs such as a decision to intro-
duce a new product in the market and a decision to acquire a computer. Simi-
larly, more important decisions such as the opening of a factory may be com-
pared to less important decisions such as the acquisition of now equipment.
Additionally, a decision to close a ward in a hospital could be compared in
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the degree of success to a decision to close a factory in a manufacturing firm
or to a decision to expand the sports facilities in a university.
The concept used here has other advantages, apart from not being as
restrictive as the quantitative criterion or too complex and controversial as
the traditional goal approach. The use of a multidimensional concept permits
the analysis of various facets of success. As mentioned in Chapter II certain
types of non-routine decisions such as those innovative may imply a change in
the organization's status quo and then may affect the organization in a wider
manner. In this, the concept developed here considers how the organization
has coped with the situation which evoked the decision and, at the same time,
•
It accounts for any other unplanned decision-making effects. The four success
variables are able to depict not only financial but also social outcomes.
Some authors (e. g. Hall 1974) have criticized the use of a multi-
dimensional model of effectiveness on the basis that compounded variables
may not vary together. By the type of variables included in the concept,
achieving effectiveness in one criterion means being ineffective in another.
This may not occur with the variables composing the concept of decision sue-
ccss used here since it is expected that these variables vary together, although
not in the same direction in the case of disturbance. Moreover, the use of many
variables to characterize decision-making success has the advantage of per-
mitting a rich analysis of factors leading to successful outcomes; independent
variables can be related to each success dimension.
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Having conceptualized decision success and then defined the indepen-
dent variables, the next step must be to explain variations in the degree of
success. The examination of decision-making case studies in Chapter I, the
*alternative forms of understanding decision-making activities discussed in
Chapter II and in this Chapter have suggested some factors which may possibly
explain why the making of a given decision has rendered certain types of out-
comes.
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CHAPTER IV 
DECISION-MAKING CHARACTERISTICS AND SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES
- A MODEL FOR ANALYSIS OF DECISION SUCCESS -
With the conceptualization of decision-making success and the definition
of its dimensions, it is now possible to distinguish decisions by variation in the
degree of success. Variables like closure, proactivity, propitiousness, and
disturbances constitute the dependent component of the conceptual framework.
If decisions vary in outcomes and then in the degree of success, this variation
needs an explanation. As Heydebrand (1973) points out, comparison of organ-
izational phenomena is fruitless if it is not aimed at an explanatory synthesis.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this research attempts to explain some
of the variation in the degree of decision success. In doing so, of course, it
does not claim to cover all the infinite reasons for success or lack of success.
It can at most concentrate on variables which reflect the major forms of inter-
preting decision-making activities and then t.o
 elucidate features which are more
or less salient in different types of organizations.
In attempting to explore the decisional characteristics which could
explain the variations in the degree of success this research concentrates on
three sets of variables: constraints, forms of process activation and pace.
Constraints consist of variables seen as instrumental to carry the decision
through; process activation consists primarily of behavioural variables and
pace depicts time dimensions of the decision process.
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This chapter, therefore, first describes the reasons for concern with
the kind of variables described above. Secondly, it shows how the independent
component is possibly linked to the success variables. Here, some hypotheses
are formulated on the interrelationships among independent variables and be-
tween these and the dependent component.
.4.1. Justification for the Independent Component
The inclusion of instrumental and behavioural factors as alternative
explanations to decision-making can be seen as an attempt to avoid the partiality
of previous decision-making studies which have traditionally paid too much at-
tention to certain types of variables while neglecting others. As has been shown
in the previous chapters, two forms of interpreting decision-making activities
appear to prevail in decision-making theory: while the first focuses on the
behavioural aspects, the second pays attention to the instrumental and oppor-
tunistic aspects. If some of the studies mentioned in Chapter II, particularly
those concerned with means to improve decision-making quality, are recalled
it can be seen that while some studies ba .-ied on management science literature
emphasize the use of algorithms and brainstorming, (Taylor 1974) optimum
time for a decision, optimum time for a decision, optimum amount of infor-
mation (Trull, 196G), as important factors to decision-making success/failure
other types of studies have concentrated on the dynamics of group processes,
on use of power, bargaining, blockage of information by rivals and so forth
as an explanation for malfunctions of decision-making (George 1972, Argyris
1976).
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As Mouzelis (1967) points out, the tendency towards polarization in
theories of organization is historical. Indeed, Gore (1959) reviewing the
decision-making literature published up to that date has criticized the state
of knowledge of the subject and the tendency of studies to direct attention to
just one facet of decision-making. As he states:
"There is a large body of literature dealing more or less
directly with some facet of decision-making. (A generous
list might run to five thousand entries). The sample of
one hundred items included here is a true sample to the
extent it reflects no common core, no universal dimensions.
It is probably accurate also in reflecting more concern with
technical problems than with fundamental organizational
problems, such as role conflict and pluralism of objectives".
(Gore 1959:121)
At present, it cannot be said that power and conflict have been completely
neglected in organization theory. Certainly the study by Dahl (1957) on power
dependence relationships, the subsequent study by Crozier (1964) on control
of uncertainty as a source of power, and the addition of the ideas of Bachrach
and Baratz (1962) on one-decision, where the use of power prevents non-safe
issues from being examined, have prompted cohceptions of organizations as
arenas for political behaviour. In their wake come recent studies which pay
attention mostly to social process in decision-making. Baldridge (1971) for
example, explains policy-making in universities in terms of social structure,
political action and conflict. Abell (1975) sees organizations as bargaining
influence systems where outcomes are the result of the constraints of tasks
,
situations and power over participants' initial preferences. Another significant
study sees innovative decisions as an occasion for allocation of resources and
redistribution of power (Pettigrew, 1973). Although decision-making theory
has developed to incorporate political models concerned with power and conflict
In the process of making a decision, tendency towards concentration in a limited
facet of these processes predominates in this field. In the studies above for
example, focus has shifted from psychological and instrumental variables to
political variables.
The limitation of specialized models have generated criticisms and
disputes as to what. factors are the most critical determinants of decision-
making process and performance. Organization theory studies have been
criticized for paying too much attention to power-behavioural processes while
neglecting the ways in which systematic data analysis shapes important aspects
of strategic decision processes (Quinn 1978, Horvath and McMillan 1979). On
the other hand, research focusing on behavioural decision-making has criticized
research focusing on normative prescriptions of ignoring the fact. that important
decisicns are made by negotiation and bargaining -rather than representing an
outcome of a detached intellectual analysis (George 1972, Pettigrew 1973).
Decision-making studies have been criticized for concentrating on limited
aspects of the process of decision-making. Nevertheless, the question of whether
to give primacy to rational instrumental aspects as opposed to behavioural aspects
is much more profound than may have appeared so far. It involves a much more
fundamental question in organization theory which has to do with how organizations
should be viewed. Within the concept of organizations as open systems, they
became seen as systems dependent upon the environment for the exchange
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goods and services (Parsons 1961, Katz and Kahn 1966). Studies following this
perspective have focused on how environment impinges upon the organization
and its adaptative capacity of fulfilling environmental requirements. (Thompson
1967, Pugh et al 1968, Hickson et al 1971). The basic problem of organizations
Is therefore to cope with uncertainty; under norms of rationality, environmental
Influences are buffered and levelled, but when this is not possible, organizations
anticipate and adapt to environmental changes (Thompson 1967). Within this
paradigm, organization performance depends on whether the organization res-
ponds appropriately to requirements of the environment (Lawrence and Lorsch
1967,Woodward 1965). Goal attainment is a function of the way in which resources
are mobilized (Parsons 1961) and effectiveness depends on how successful the
organization is in obtaining scarce resources (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967) and
also whether the organization structure is appropriate to the degree of environ-
mental uncertainty. (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).
This point of view has nevertheless been attacked on the grounds •that it
provides a mechanistic view of organizations. As Wilson (1980) points out,
"by considering only the influence of external factors organization theory runs
the risk of implying that organizations are a passive recipient of external stimuli:'
Opponents to this point of view argue that organizations do not react; their mem-
bers do. Attention therefore should be paid to the meanings participants attach
to situations; these are the sources of decisions made in organizations (Silverman
1976). Similarly, Child (1972) has criticized those studies which defend the case
for a contingency theory in its assumption that contextual factors im)inge directly
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upon organization structure. He argued that choice of structure depends in the
first place on how those who have power to make decisions interpret the limits
Imposed by the environmental context. The evaluation of the position of the
organization by the executives is what provides them with a goal.
It seems that those who criticized this approach argue that behaviour
in organizations is not only a rational unified response to external requirements.
Organizations do not have goals or needs. As Krupp (1961:169) points out, or-
ganizations should instead by understood as an "amalgam of different groups
and social classes joined in various ways". These groups have goals and needs,
not the organization. Organization analysis should therefore concentrate on
examining how members impose their goals on the system. Its task should be
to understand the mechanisms by which goals became stable (authority) and the
sources of organizational change (power and conflict).
It seems that criticisms of partial views of behaviour in organizations
have been taken and acted upon, for recent studies of decision-making have at-
tempted to synthctize contrasting views and have defenled the point for a more
comprehensive theory of decision-making which would account for both, instru-
mental and behavioural aspects. For example, an attempt to connect a rational
versus behavioural perspective can be found in Horvath and McMillan (1979) who
sec strategic decision processes as a function of an interplay among contextual
and power factors. Bourgeois and Asticy (1979) have proposed a model to examine
orp,nrizltion strategy, cmphas:zing organizations as opportunistic ageuts, (a
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perspective widely accepted by business policy), and as a reactive adaptative
system, a notion underlying contingent studies (Thompson 1967, Pugh et al
1968, Hickson et al 1969). Along this line, other recent studies have concen-
trated on testing the relative importance of technical and political aspects
•	 (Astley et al 1980, Wilson 1980).
The contrasting views in which decision-making is analysed and the
consequent neglect of either instrumental and behavioural facets of decision-
making by previous studies and, by contrast, the encouragement given by recent
researches providing a more comprehensive view of the subject, led to a study of
the relative influence of these two aspects to decision-making success. Following
authors like Thompson (1967), Yuchtman and Seashore (1967), Lawrence and
Lorsch (1967), it focuses on variables which are seen as instrumental to goal
attainment - resources/information.
To examine the importance of behavioural factors the present study
focuses on forms of process activation, that is, on how the coalition has made
the decision: who was involved, how much influence interest groups had in the
process and how much friction there was. According to Baldridge (1971) and
Pettigrew (1973) for example, this research focuses on influence and conflict
variables.
Additionally, this research focuses on process pace. The study of more
complex decisions have urged the understanding of decision-making within a time
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perspective. Studying various examples of complex non-routine decisions,
Mintzberg et al (1976) have shown that these decisions are characterized by
cycles and recycles for redefinition of the situation and the gathering of more
Information. They have suggested that the process of making these decisions
is far from being linear; rather it is discontinuous and lengthy. Unexpected
constraints, such as lack of resources and political impasses are seen as
frequent causes of interruptions and delays. Thus, following Mintzberg et al
1976, this research concentrates on process delays and duration, and assumes
that variation on these variables depends upon constraints and process activation
factors.
Figure 4.1 summarizes the independent and the dependent component
of the conceptual framework. (A detailed definition of each of these variables
is presented in Chapter VI.) Some hypotheses suggesting the links among the
variables of the independent component and between these and the dependent
variables are formulated in this chapter. In describing the links among variables
of the conceptual framework this research focuses on how decision-making ot.t-
comes could potentially result from constraints, process activation and process
pace, according to different types of decisions and organizations.
.4.2: Process Pace 
The study by Witte (1972) and Mintzberget al (1976) has revealed the
non-sequential and discontinuous nature of complex non-routine decisions.
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Mintzberg et al (1976) have described strategic decision processes as a sequence
of events mostly cyclical and discontinuous. Then recent researchers began to
study aspects of the decision process such as continuity, rapidity and crescivity
(Astley et al 1980, Wilson 1980). Cohen et al (1972) have concerned themselves
with the time problems and opportunities dependent upon a decision in an organ-
ization where no action is taken. They also called attention to the frequency
in which an arena is apparently involved with the making of a decision, but
the process drags on for years with no visible outcome.
Secondly, it has been suggested that environmental events, activities
for the purpose of gathering information, opportunistic awaiting and political
impasses can interrupt the decision process causing delays and thus extending
the total length of the decision 'process (Mintzberg et al 1976). In addition,
Hickson et al (1978) have suggested that power distribution in the coalition may
impose a pace in the decision process. Would a faster decision process result
when external interests exercise more influence in a decision process? Would,
alternatively, a slow pace result when a coalition is dominated by internal units?
\\Ilk these studies have suggest.ed that external and internal factors
may influence a decision process being fast or slow, other types of studies have
emphasized the importance of a quick adaptative response of organizations as
a factor to cope with environmental discontinuity, and rapid decisions as a key
element in grasping opportunities (Ansoff 1971).
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The above studies not only suggest that the decision process consists
of a stream of activities which occur over a period of time, but also that there
are factors which disturb the continuity of the stream such as availability of
resources, influence and conflict. If there are factors which may influence
the way that decision activities are distributed over time, delays and long deci-
sion processes on the other hand seem to affect whether the intended decision out-
comes are achieved.
Insight provided by these studies has led the research reported here
towards examining some temporal characteristics of the decision process such
as pace. Wilson (1980) has used the term pace to refer to the rate of activities
In the decision-making process distinguishing between areas where the level of
decision-making activities is high - "urban-type arenas" - from "rural type
arenas" where the level of decision activities is low. In this present research,
process pace  refers to how certain activities in the decision process are distri-
buted over time. It includes concepts which have to do either with the duration
of the decision process or with its tardiness. These concepts were derived from
Mintzberg and associates' (1976_246) definition of a "decision process as a set of
actions that begins with the identification of a stimulus for action and ends with
the specific commitment to action". The set of actions includes various steps
which the decision goes through but not necessarily in a given sequence. The
first step though, is the recognition of the decision stimuli and the last step leads
to implementation. The process durntion includes, therefore, the period of time
from the recognition of the deci s ion stimuli and the commitment of resources to
implementation of the decision.
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However, reaction to a stimulus for making a decision may not be
• immediate. The agent that perceives the strategic stimuli may not have the
power to initiate the decision, having to persuade powerful interest units to do
so (Segev 1976), or the decision issue may be a matter of power struggles before
It is allocated to interest units (Baldridge 1971). There is also the question of
availability of resources and information to carry the decision through. Non-
availability of money may push the decision temporarily into a limbo until pros-
pects as to financial resources improve its feasibility. Lack of information .and
anibiguity also may retard the initiation of a decision. Hesitation may occur
when there is no easy answer for what is happening and what to do. Attention
to decision issues depends in the first place upon the clarity associated with
the situation which waits for a decision (March and Simon 1958, Olsen 1976).
Hence,  promptness  captures how fast the organization reacts to decision stimuli;
It refers to the period of time between the recognition of a need for a decision
and activation of the decision process, where a special coalition is formed and
Interest units start doing something in the direction of solving the problem or
seizing the opportunity. It corresponds to Nees (1978-79:70) preprocess which
Is described as "a time lag between the occu .rrence of events and the initiation
of the process". Once the process is initiated, process length is the period
during which a decision remains in activation until implementation.
Figure 4.2 illustrates both concepts which together constitute decision
duration. Here it is assumed that the decision stimuli occur over a period of
time, during which decision activities may take place. Like Mintzbern . and
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associates (1976) this research has assumed that a decision process starts with
the recognition of the decision stimulus. As the organization may not act im-
mediately on the appearance of this stimulus there may be an interval until an
appropriate coalition is formed and the decision is allotated to it. Process
activation denotes activities which a coalition develops when making the decision.
These may involve Mintzberg and associates' (1976) steps which lead to imple-
mentation such as diagnosis, search, design, evaluation, choice and authorization.
However as .will be mentioned further, this research is primarily concerned
with the political aspects of activities to implement a decision.
While concepts mentioned above refer to actual decision duration,
tardiness of the process  refers to perceived delays in activities to implement
the decision which took place. It attempts to capture how close these activities
are from one another. For the reasons already stated, the strategic stimuli
may wander about for some time without recognition. As Mintzberg (1973a)
points out, some firms only start making decisions after the problem has already
hit the organization; their decisions are.remedial in type as compared to those
firms which tend to anticipate problems before they are hit by them.
However, independently of the organization, there are conditions in which
. decision stimuli is not easily identifiable. Organizations sometimes are confron-
ted with unfamiliar and threatening events which are departures from previous
experience (Ansoff 1975). According to Ansoff (1975), normal methods of fore-
casting do not provide information about discontinuities, since these mrlhods are
only able to detect "strong signals" in the environment. An ea] her identificatiJn
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of a discontinuous opportunity or threat may only occur if the organization
is able to detect small variations in the environment which come persistently
over time (Ansoff 1975:23). Thus, an organization which is late in the recog-
nition of a strategic stimuli  may suddenly realize that an opportunity has just
been missed or that survival of a product line is Under threat.
Delays in the process activation  as mentioned before, may be due to
political impasses, for example, or to lack of appropriate resources where
to base the decision. Thimm (1976) reports how a decision to build a Volks-
wagen plant in the United States had to be postponed due to disagreement within
the board and interference of Trade Unions. It is also impressive that in 16
out of 25 decisions cases, Mintzberg and associates (1976) have found political
impasses which blocked the decision process or interrupted it for some time.
Delays may occur due to some activities to gather information and, on some
occasions the process has to be interrupted because personnel to implement
the decision has not yet been prepared for it. They have also found a strong
relationship between interrupts in the decision process and its duration; the
more interrupts the longer the duration of the decision.
Sonic arguments suggesting how constraints and process activation
Influence process pace are developed later in this chapter. It is also shown
how process pace could possibly affect decision-making outcomes in the last
section of this chapter.
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- .4.3. Process Activation
Terms such as dominant coalition (Cyert and March 1963, Thompson
1967), bargaining zone (Abell 1975) and arena (Astley et al 1980) have been
used to describe the locus of decision-making. Child (1972:13) points out
some advantages in the use of the notion of dominant coalition. First, "it
refers to those who collectively happen to hold most power over a particular
period". Thus in an organization there may be more than one dominant
coalition, and coalitions may confront each other when their interests are
challenged. Secondly, although the term may imply a differential access
to decision-making it does not necessarily imply that other groups in the
organization do not have influence in determining outcomes.
Although including the notion of dominant coalition, the concept of
process activation is wider. Similar to Astley and associates' (1980) idea
or process arena, process activation is concerned with activities by the domi-
nant coalition, when making the decision.
The notion of process activation indicates bow problems and opportunities
are energized and changed into outcomes. It is a concept which resembles
Cohen and associates' (1972) idea of a garbage can, where activation of a .
decision depends on participant's attention to opportunities and problems, and/or
on their degree of involvement in a given decision. Activity is a major charac-
teristic of the garbage can; in an attempt to attach problems to solutions and
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opportunities to choice, participants are activated to commit time and energy.
Process activation therefore, denotes activity; what people do towards making
a particular decision and how they do it.
When a decision stimulus is recognized and attention is drawn to ways
of dealing with it, one of the initial steps is the formation of a coalition which
may be composed of diverse interests, representing internal and external
units to the organization or both. During the process of making a decision,
this coalition will probably go through a series of phrases, such as the definition
of the situation, gathering information, selection of alternatives, choice and
authorization. Process activation refers . to how the decision proceeded through
these phases but within a political perspective, that is, it captures the diversity
of interests involved in the decision process, how much influence each of the
interests involved in the decision process, how much influence each of the
interests had in the process and how much conflict there was.
The present research therefore, fpcuses on three forms of process
activation: conflictfulness, centralization, and influence. As shown in Figure
4.1 conflictfulness captures how much conflict over views there was in the
decision process (intensity of disagreement) and whether some degree of agree-
ment has been achieved (compromise settlement). Centralization examines the
amount of influence exercised by higher hierarchical levels (higher management
influence) and the amount of influence spc 'ialists had on the decision process
(specialists' influcnoc). Influence r•xamines the amount of influence exerci,eki
by all interest units in the decision process (total influence), the number of
Interests in the decision process (diversity of intere3ts), and the distribution
of actual and desired influence.
The reasons for concern with conflictfulness, centralization and
influence as forms of process activation have their basis in the findings of
studies concerned with the behaviour of groups who have a stake in the decision
process. Studies by Wilensky (1967), Baldridge (1971) and Pettigrew (1973)
for example, have shown how the dynamics of relationships which develop
during the making of a decision shape the process and set the limits on what
it is possible to achieve. As has been suggested by these studies, who is
involved in the process is important. Most influential for the groups are
those which possibly have control over the relevant resources of the decisions
and information and then set the guidelines for action. Dominance of top man-
agement in a decision coa.lition may result in a faster decision process, as op-
posed to the case in which specialists predominate. According to Wilensk-y
(1967) independent groups of specialists represent division of values, open
conflict and competition. A decision with inany diverse interest groups may
be held up by paralysing delays. Additionally, Baldridge (1971) has argued
that political activities are the essence of the decision process; options are
delimited by previous conflicts and outcomes of decisions are changed as those
making the decision yield to the pressure of groups who may be affected by the
outcomes. Some hypotheses showing how forms of process activation shapes
the decision process and outcomes are formulated in the next and following sect;ons.
77
.4.4. Decision-Making Constraints 
In order to examine the influence of instrumental variables, this
research focuses on resources, information, and time. These are seen as
constraining the decision-making process to the extent to which these factors
are scarce and then setting limits under which d decision may be more or less
successful. Provision of resources and acquisition of information are tradi-
tionally viewed as rersistent areas of uncertainty to organizations (Thompson
1967, Yuchtman and Seashore 1967, Dill 1958 ,Duncan 1972). Because re-
sources/information are scarce and are a source of competition of diverse
Interests, acquisition of these factors may be problematic to organizations.
This may influence organization processes and determine how effective organ-
ization activities are.
.4.4.1. Resources as a Problematic Constraint 
Scarcity of resources and control over their disposability have been
considered as major determinants of organizational behaviour (Thompson 1967,
Yuchtman and Seashore 1967, White 1974, Aldrich 1979). Thompson (1967)
suggested that although in the short run organizations seek to control uncer-
tainties, in the long run the aim is to obtain munificence of resources to achieve
more discretion on reallocation. Yuchtman and Seashore (1967:898) define
organization success in terms of obtaining resources. They suggest that suc-
cess in competinfor scarce resources defines the position of an organization
on a scale of effectiveness. Organizations are, therefore, more or less effec-
tive depending on their capability as a "resource getting system".
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Similarly, Aldrich (1979) argues that organizations should be ranked
in terms of their efficacy in terms of resource acquisition. Competition for
scarce resources is seen as shaping interrelationships between the organization
and its environment, and organization success depends on its ability to win this
competition.
If organization performance depends upon success in the acquisition
of scarce resources in a competitive environment, then a change in the level
of resources an organization may make use of may affect important organiza-
tion activities like goal-setting decisions, as Thompson and McEwen (1958)
point out. It seems that the amount of resources available may influence an
organization's decision-making process and outcomes in various ways. As
White (1972) suggests, new alternatives may be open, norms and rules are
changed, criteria reinterpreted as a function of the level of resources available.
Lack of necessary resources can slow down or interrupt the continuity of the
decision process as Mintzberg et al (1976) suggest and yet may determine who
is involved on the coalition making the decision in the first place (Zald 1969,
Pfeffer 1972). Scarcity of resources is seen as a motive for dispute among
groups claiming the same resource (Baldridge 1971, Pettigrew 1973) and as
a reason for increasing the number of participants in a decision (Olsen 1976).
Resources may be ranked on a series of dimensions which capture why
organizations compete for them. The more liquid a rcsource, the more attrac-
tive it is (Iruchtman and Seashore 1967, Zald 1969). Resources of a univrrsa I
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type are highly valued. Personnel, money, physical facilities, raw material,
are universal because they are important to all forms of organizations. Other
resources are critical because of difficulties in finding substitutes for them,
though sometimes organizations develop alternatives as safeguards (Yuchtman
and Seashore 1967).
Following Yuchtman and Seashore (1967),.this research focuses on
resources of the universal type ranging from money and technology to raw
material. It assumes that some decisions require critical resources which
may not be easily available. Thus, decisions vary in the criticality of resources
they require and in their availability. Within the concept of availability, quan-
tity and timeliness can be separated. More strategic decisions involve greater
amounts of resources, as Mintzberg and associates (1976) have suggested.
Conversely, a greater quantity of resources may be mobilized when a decision
is strategic (Wilensky 1967). Timeliness of resources as the name indicates
refers to the point when resources become available. For example, an organ-
ization may not have the financial resources to build a new plant immediately,
but resources may still be obtained in time. Resource availability, criticality,
and timeliness may influence modes of process activation, and pace. Some
hypotheses on these relationships are formulated further on in this chapter.
.4.4.2. Information as a Problematic Constraint 
Availability of information may be problematic to organizations mainly
for iwo reasons. First, information concerning- the environment is uncertain
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because of the complexity and dynamics of events about the decision situation.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967 :29) have found that decision-making units vary on
how they perceive environmental uncertainty. They have defined environmental
uncertainty in terms of lack of clarity of information, long time span of feedback
and lack of understanding of causal relationships. In a similar approach (Duncan
1972:318) has concluded that decision-makers in organizations subunits operating
in a dynamic complex environment experience the greatest amount of uncertainty
In decision-making. Environmental uncertainty was defined as lack of information
about environmental factors associated with a given decision-making situation,
lack of knowledge of the consequences for the organization, inability to predict how
environmental events may affect the success or failure of a subunit performance.
Information may therefore be more or less problematic depending on
where in the organization the decision process occurs. However, it is also
known that information concerning strategic decisions is more problematic than
for routine decisions (Mintzberg et al 1976, Harvey and Mills 1970). Situations
which strategic decisions are concerned with have been described as ambiguous,
novel and complex. Ambiguity comes from lack of patterns to follow. Since
they involve newsituations, actions cannot rely on past experience, new patterns
and standards have to be created.
A second reason for information being problematic is because souri
of information arc unreliable or because various sources may provide conflicting
information. Decision-makers in monitoring the environment may distort infor-
mation by inadequate scanning and filtering (Aldrich 1979). Indeed, inforinntkin
may already be distorted when it reaches the decision-maker. As Pfiffner
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(1960:129) points out, information does not flow in an orderly way through hier-
archical channels. It comes from a "galaxy of points" which often are not for-
mal channels of communication.
Thus, information to feed the decision process may be lacking or inac-
curate for the complexity of the situation which evoked the decision, or because
of obstacles concerning information processing within the organization. In this
present research, decisions are compared in terms of information constraints
by means of the variables of availability and criticality. Availability examines
the amount of information for a decision (quantity), when this information became
available (timeliness), how reliable the information was (accuracy) and whether
search was successful in bringing relevant information (information generation).
Criticality depicts the importance of information which a decision requires. Some
assumptions follow later in the chapter on how characteristics of information, in
particular availability, affect modes of decision-making, and process pace.
Pressure of Time as a Problematic Constraint 
The reasons why attention is directed to a stimulus for a decision
have been a concern of recent studies in decision-making (March and Olsen
1976, Mintzberg et al 1976, Segev 1976). Usually, decision-makers do not
respond immediately to such a stimulus. Time is a scarce resource; the
new stimulus is only one of the many claims on decision-makers' time.
Usually, there are more demands on people who know more about the system
than on others mil° !mow little (March and Olsen 1976). Top manager's
attention to decisions tends to be less than stable; continuity of attention
to a problem depends on other high priority items in their agenda (March and
Simon 195S). Mintzberg 97313) has argued that top manager's activities
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are characterized by brevity, variety and fragmentation. Involvement in
too many activities may prevent attention to important issues. Work over-
load makes routine activities and short term demands appear more Impor-
tant than they really are (Adams 1979). Many demands on time are legiti-
mate, all of them may be important to somebody, and there is usually a
price to pay for overlooking more important issues.
Apart from involvement in other decision arenas, there are other
reasons why interested parties may hesitate before initiating a strategic
decision. As mentioned elsewhere, information for making a decision may
be contradictory and vague. Logic dictates making commitments as late as
possible consistent with information being available. Thus in some situations
decision-makers prefer to wait and gain time before initiating a decision.
For example, where a decision involves a. major reorganization and power
shifts they may prefer a step by step approach, beginning slowly (Quinn 1978).
. Nonetheless, it is not always possible to wait, for a clear definition
of the situation and events do not always come at a convenient time. There
are events like sudden environmental discontinuities which require rapid action
despite vagueness and ambiguity. Organizations may be caught unaware by
events like the petroleum crises, a sudden nationalization, withdrawal of a
major customer. As Quinn (1978:9) has noted, "when these events did occur
there might be neither time, resnurces, nor information enough to undertake
a full formal strategic analysis of all possible options and their consequence:;".
Ansoff (1975) argues that in these conditions either the organization reacts
quickly despite inadequate information, or it waits until information becomes
more precise but then runs the risk of being overtaken by a crisis.
Although urgency may be imposed externally, for instance by the
actions of customers, suppliers, or competitors, pressure of time may also
come from institutionalized deadlines. Olsen (1976) has noted that when a
decision is too complex and difficulties in reaching agreement lead to frequent
interruptions, imposing a deadline may be the only way to make a decision
process move forward. While pressure on middle and lower management
decisions may be imposed by intefnally set deadlines, decisions at top level
may be more subjected to external sources of control.
Within the conceptual model in Figure 4.1, time pressure depicts
whether there was urgency to make the decision, either because of the re-
quirements of the strategic stimuli or because of deadlines imposed on the
coalition by the organization. As it will be seen, the decision process may
have some peculiar characteristics when a decision is made under time pres-
sure. Some hypotheses on the patterns of relationship which develop
within the coalition under time constraints, are formulated further in this
chapter.
.4.5. Constraints and Process Activation
This section is concerned with how rcsources and information
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determine modes of process activation. Some initial hypotheses are for-
mulated as broad guidelines particularly to indicate relationships between
principal variables. Although running the risk that the same relationship
may not prevail for all the variables of a group there is no attempt to for-
mulate predictions for every relationship between every variable. In a
field where so much is speculative this would result only in a mechanistic
list of possible links. At this stage only broad lines of thought are expressed,
where ideas are most developed. Hypotheses concerning the impact of
pressure of time on process activation are examined later in another
section.
.4.5.1. Relationship between Constraints and Influence: Some Initial 
Hypotheses
As mentioned previously, scarcity of critical resources and ac-
quisition of information are a source of uncertainty which organizations must
cope with. Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) found that scarcity is related to sub-
units decisional power, which in turn enables subunits to acquire those re-
sources. Pfeffer (1972) has noted that organizational response to conditions
of the external environment tends to be rational: power is concentrated on
units able to cope mith important sources of dependence. In this respect,
Zald (1969) has noted that distribution of power within the board of directors
Is a function of individual members capability to obtain important resources
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that the organization needs. Hickson and associates (1971) suggested that
a subunit's power is a function of its ability to cope with uncertainty, that
is, a subunit will have power if it can cope with lack of knowledge of future
events by prevention or absorption of the uncertainty. The subunit's power
would also vary with the sutstitutability of its capacity to cope, and its cen-
trality in the organizational work-flow. In an analysis of French organ-
izations, Crozier (1964) provides an example where the power of mainten-
ance engineers came from their exclusive knowledge of equipment repairs.
An important point about this case is' that the engineers kept maintenance
details out of the files so as to avoid divulging relevant information to others.
Routinization of information reduces power (Hickson and associates
1971).
Additional insights into this type of power are provided by Perrow
(1970:67) in a study of departmental power in American manufacturing
firms. Perrow observed a similar situation whereby a production depart-
ment controlled the computer with all information about purchasing and in-
ventory. This enabled the department to give directions to the sales depart-
ment and draw limits for sales actions. He noted that in this case distribu-
tion of power did not follow the "natural" pattern - where the most
critical function in an organization tends to have more power - but was
instead a situation of power manipulation.
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This raises the question a power mobilization whereby groups and
individuals gain power by exercising monopoly over sources of critical
information. Mechanic (1962:352) has argued that lower participants in
an organization have power to the extent to which they can control access
to important resources, information, persons and instrumentalities.
Some interest units in the organization because of their position in the hier-
archy are in a better position to mobilize power and control the flow of
information through the organization. Pettigrew (1973) has attributed
"Kenny's" power to his gatekeeper role whereby he controlled all infor-
mation from computer manufacturers to the board. "It was his major
ability to control decisional outcomes" (Pettigrew 1973:235). On this
same issue, Zald (1978:238) has noted that differential power between sub-
units may be attributed to a subunit's ability to define internal information
flow, the rules of the game, and the external environment.
Possession of information is therefore a valuable resource within
an organization for it is an instrument for securing status and power (Burns
and Stalker 1961). In Wilensky's (1967. :43) views there are many reasons
for holding back information and distorting it within an organization since
"information is a resource that symbolizes status, enhances authbrity and
shapes carriers". Thus, if interest units are in a position to obtain infor-
mation not easily obtained by others they are themselves information sources
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and they can control the release of information.
These findings suggest that resources and information are closely
related to concentration of power. A hypothesis may therefore be for-
mulated
Hypothesis 1 :	 the more critical the resources/
Information the more influential are the interests .
involved.
Under conditions of little information and scarcity of resources,
there is more activity in the decision process, search is more intensive
(Cyert et al 1958) and more interests are involved in the decision process
(Olsen 1976). As Olsen (1976) argues, there may be a tendency to re-
view the criteria for decision-making and a pressure for resolving in-
•consistence. Thus, if as mentioned above organizations tend to be
rational in the distribution of influence, and under conditions of scar-
city, members tend to direct more effoi qs to resources acquisition
and to resolve inconsistcnces , it is likely that any discrepancies in
the distribution of influence tend to be perceived by decision-making
participants.
At the other extreme of the resources availability scale, under
conditions of great slack, decisions can be made without any attempts by
the participants to redefine value and solve inconsistences. "The 'neon-
sistences are in effect buffered from one another by the slack." (Olsen
.	 .
1976:88) Generation of resources is not problematic and inconsistences
In the distribution of power, if they exist, tend not to be perceived as an
obstacle to the smooth running of the decision or to its success. Therefore,
two hypotheses may be formulated:
Hypothesis 2: The less resources are available, the greater
the discrepancies perceived between actual and desired distri-
bution of influence.
Hypothesis 3:	 The less resources are available the more the
number of interests involved in a decision process.
A common phenomenon of strategic decision-making is the formation
of special interests coalitiors composed of internal and external interest units. Be-
cause of the unprecedented nature of non-loutine dnisions and the consequent
absence of guidelines they tend to be innovative, and as such may be disruptive
of the status quo (Harvey and Mills 3970, Pettigrew 1973). Such a decision
requires specific effort to gain information to structure the situation and it
also makes demands for new resources. Existing patterns of resource
sharing may be threatened by this and the generation of resources may
eventually fall under the control of different units. In consequence,
behaviour appears in the course of these decisions as some interests try to
gain power whilst others attempt to retain it. Since distribution of influence
tends not to follow the usual patterns, members tend to perceive it as "ir-
rational". Thus, it may be formulated that:
Hypothesis 4: The greater the criticality of resources the
kreater the discrepancies perceived between actual and desired
distribution of influence.
.4.5.2. Relationships Between Constraints and Conflict: Some Initial Hypotheses 
With a conception of organizations as interdepartmental systems
created to cope with uncertainty, influence imbalance and conflict come to
be seen as a normal part of organizational life. Subunits are understood as
subsystems with unique structures, patterns of behaviour and interests.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) have noted that subunits are differentiated mostly
on three points: each tends to be concerned with different objectives, each
develops its own pace of work and orientation to time, and each has its style
of interpersonal orientation. Agreement among subunits may be particularly
difficult in circumstances where integtation is needed, since subunits have
their particular ways of looking at problems and have their own performance
standards.
The division of work in organizations not only promotes differenti-
ation but also creates task interdependence among them. The way in which
subunits depend on each other may provide the opportunity for emergence of
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conflict. When subunits are loosely coupled, performance of one may have
little effect on another, and therefore, there may be few opportunities for
confrontation as opposed to the situation where subunits are tightly coupled
and interdependence is reciprocal (Aldrich 1979). Task interdependence
may prevail in a coalition, but here, subunits may depend on each other for
securing scarce resources and information. In the circumstances where
there is mutual interdependence and scarcity conflict tends to be high
(Thompson 1967, Aldrich 1979).
It has been mentioned in a previous section that under conditions of
scarcity participants tend to review values and inconsistencies. There may
then be more conflict of interests since each unit tends to be the guardian of
Its own share and sees others as rivals competing for the same resources.
As March and Simon (1958) point out, limited resources tend to transform
decision-making into a competitive game. Olsen (1976:88) describes clearly
what happens when resources are scarce in decision-making.
"When slack is further reduced (or time passes without
the "managerial" strategies to intrease total resources
working successfully), more part-time participants are
activated and it becomes obvious there is 110 way all the
demands can be met. As the participants confront each
other with an overt conflict of interest the "managerial"
style of leadership is replaced with a "political" style;
and the terms of the organizational coalition are re-
negotiated."
Organization subunits may contend not only for material resources
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but they compete for information and areas of influence (Pettigrew 1973).
Benson (1975) argues that money and authority are the most important re-
sources which decision-makers try to secure. Goldner (1970) has suggested
that when organization structure creates overlapping and ambiguity in the
division of work, conflict may result from subunits attempt to secure what
they see as their area of responsibility. Similarly, Baldridge (1971) has
noted that spheres of influence are usually defined in an organization and
there is often conflict when a group tries to redefine its domain at the ex-
pense of another. Disputes for "territory" occur when rights are weakly
held or have yet to be established (Krupp 1961).
As already suggested, information for making the decision may be
problematic not only because information is a scarce resource which sub-
units may deliberately withhold as a power gaining tactic (Wilensky 1967),
but also because of the ambiguity associated with the strategic stimulus in
. itself. March and Simon (1958) have argued that complexity inherent in
innovative decisions may impose difficulties in achieving an agreeable solot toil.
In this respect, Harvey and Mills (1970) argued that in a routine situation,
as opposed to an innovative one, conflict is minimum since organizations
may have developed standardized forms of dealing with problems, narrowing
the range of possible dispute. Innovative decisions characterized by ill-
structured problems and vagueness as to what steps are necessary to arrive
at a solution allow multiple interpretations and encourage vested interests to
compete as to where and when resources should be committed.
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Considering the arguments developed here it can be seen that lack
of resources and information are both related to the arising of conflict in a
coalition. It may be, therefore, postulated that:
Hypothesis 5: The less resources/information are available
the more conflict in the decision process.
Can any link be foreseen between criticality of information/resources
and conflict? The literature provides evidence that political struggles tend
to be more frequent in innovative decisions (Harvey and Mills 1970, Pettigrew
1973), in more "critical" than in "routine" decisions (Baldridge 1971191)
and in resource allocation decisions (Salancik and Pfeffer 1974). If critical
and innovative decisions involve important resources as it has been argued
in Chapter II, it may be that conflict manifestations tend to appear more
intense in a decision process involving valuable resources. It may be,
therefore, postulated that:
Hypothesis 6: The greater the criticality of resources/inforruntini
the moi-e conflict in the decision process.
•4.5•3• Relationships Betxeen Constraints and Centralization of Influence:
Some Initial Hypotheses
The concept of centralization has been associated with authority for
making decisions (Pugh et al 1968, Child 1973, Astley et al 19S0), dispersion
of the decision making system throughout the org-anization	 ct al 1.;171:;),
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and concentration of power within the hands of a few people (Hall 1974,
Mintzberg 1979). Typically, these studies have investigated how contextual
variables such as size relate to centralization of authority and to aspects of
organization structure such as formalization and standardization. Only
recently, an entirely different question has been proposed in organization
theory, namely how centralization affects decision-making outcomes. A
notable exception is found in the study by Astley et al (1980), who proposed
a model in which the level where a decision is authorized is seen as affecting
its level of satisficity. This same question is addressed in the present re-
search, although using a concept of centralization based on influence processes
rather than on formal authority for making decisions. The concept used here
is similar to Tannen baum's (1968) approach to hierarchical distribution of
control.
As mentioned previously, decision-making requires the formation
• of a special coalition having various interests represented. A decision can
involve an Outside organization and different internal subunits, or just top
management. Thus, an analysis of centralization as defined in this research
implies examining how this coalition is composed in the first place. More
narrowly, centralization of influence refers to the question of how much
influence higher hierarchical levels have in determining decision-making
outcomes (as against greater influences by a wider range of interests). For
a study interested in how modes of process act ivation affect decision outcomes
this approach N'as more appealinE,r. While the locus of formal authority may
be the same for various decisions the amount of influence subunits from
different hierarchical levels have varied with the decision. As Bachrach
and Aiken (1976) point out, a limitation of previous researches on central-
ization is the lack of distinction between centralization of authority and cen-
tralization of influence. Influence on making decisions can be dispersed
throughout all levels in the organization but authority may still rest in the
higher echelons. This point is also raised in Blau's (1970) study, which
like Bachrach and Aiken (1976), argues that conflicting pressures for cen-
tralization result in decentralization of influence over some decisions, despite
reluctance to formally delegate authority.
Two factors appear important for the level of centralization in deci-
sion-making: the kind of knowledge a decision requires as opposed to where
in the hierarchy it can be found, and the importance of the decision. These
• two factors seem to exercise pressure in opposite directions. For making
important decisions top management must rely on all possible sources of
Information which can be found at every level in the hierarchy. Yet while
need for relevant knowledge is a pressure for decentralization, the importance
of the decision itself is an imperative for retaining control at the top (Blau
1970, Bachrach and Aiken 1976). Probably the importance of the decision
is the most compelling factor of the two (Wilensky 1967, Blau 1970). if so
it may be assumed that:
Hypothesis 7: The greater the criticality of resources, the more
centralized the process (i.e. the greater the influence of higher
hienirchical levels).
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Although top management may retain control of decisions involving
valuable resources, centralization can be selective according to where in
the hierarchy the relevant knowledge for making decisions is found
(Mintzberg 1979). Mintzberg sees the organization as a "constellation
of work groups", some composed exclusively of staff members, others
composed of top management and members of staff.
"Each constellation exists at that level in the hierarchy
where the information concerning the decisions of a
functional area can be accumulated most effectively"
(Mintzberg 1979:198).
In this respect, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) have argued that for some
decisions information may be accumulated at lower management level
with specialists and it may not be possible to transfer knowledge up the
hierarchy. They have presented evidence that more effective organizations
may rely on those hierarchical levels most able to deal with problematic
areas. For example, in the plastic firms they studied research and develop-
ment decisions involved very sophisticated knowledge which was in the hands
of lower and middle management and was difficult to transfer to upper levels.
Therefore, when technical knowledge is required, and even though final
authority for a decision is held by top management, their influence on a
given decision process may be small as compared to influence exercised
by other levels in the hierarchy. Thus, it follows that:
H- ,11pothesis 8: The more technical the relevant information
the more decentralized the process (1. e. the less the influence
of higher hierarchical levels).
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So far, only the interrelationships between resources - information
and modes of process activation have been examined. In the following section
assumptions are made on how time pressure changes the pace of the decision
process and affects decision outcomes.
•4.6. Relationships Between Time Pressure, Process 
Activation, Process Pace and Decision Outcomes: Some Initial Hypotheses 
There is some evidence that when a decision is made under time
constraints the decision process has some particular characteristics. Fewer
participants may be involved (Snyder and Paige 1958) and there may be more
bias towards preconceptions (Wilensky 1969).
The impact of pressure of time in the decision process is not clear
yet. Some authors argue that search is more vigorous, although less fruitful
- (March and Simon 1958) and some believe that a full range of alternatives may
not be completely investigated (Wilensky 1967) and that decision-makers tend
to shorten their decision horizons thereby risking the successfulness of the
decision (Smart and Vertinsky 1977).
_	
_ _ 
	 Furthermore, if pressure to respond quickly arises from a crisis
situation there may be a concentration of authority, and standards for decision-
_ __	 making may change so inducing a conflict of values. If conflict intensifies,
organization members may leave the decision or even the organization
(Herman 1963).
97
Conversely, Wilensky (1967) argues that pressure of time may
induce even higher quality decisions. Urgency makes the system function
more efficiently and overcomes many deficiencies in information. Generally,
rules become less rigid and structures more flexible; distortions of hier-
archy, centralization, formalization and specialization diminish. As Wilensky
(1967:76) states: "a hasty decision made under pressure may on average be
better than a less urgent one". Comparing the United States' decisions on
Korea and the Bay of Pigs crises, he argues that in the former, urgency
overcame hierarchy. Communications were less obstructed by formal chan-
nels and a wide range of important alternatives was explored. In the Bay of
Pigs crisis, the situation was less urgent but hierarchy obstructed communi-
cations, exploration of alternatives was limited and consequences were disas-
trous.
In these circumstances, where success or failure depends highly on
the timing of action, the normal patterns of decision-making change so as to
speed up the pace of the decision process. Although changes in the process
may be greater when the organization is facing a crisis situation, mechanisms
to speed up its pace may also be observed in other circumstances. Weiner
(1976) reports a case of a decision to promote racial desegregation in San
Francisco elementary schools. The deadline imposed by law urged the School
District to present a plan to the court in a short period of time. The decision
had been "muddling through" for years, but when the deadline was set the
. result was a redefinition of participation and an increase in the decision pace.
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More active participants got more involved and spared more time for the
decision, whilst less active members tend to withdraw. Weiner noted that
three effects of deadlines were prominent in the decision process: "garbage
ejection" when members due to the pressure of time tend to simplify the
situation and exclude many problems of consideration; t bnergy conservation"
- a tendency to retain problems which have attracted participants, and i tom-
petence multiplication" - when members who are more competent to deal
with relevant problems participate more intensively than other members.
It is interesting to note that under time pressure, the tendency is
towards centralization, towards elimination of factors which may delay the
decision process. Then in 'successful cases the coalition may develop
mechanisms to compensate for the disadvantages of centralization (Wilensky
1967). At this point, a hypothesis may be formulated:
Hypothesis 9: The greater the time pressure the greater the
centralization (i.e. the g-eater the influence of higher hierarchical
levels).
As Olsen (1976) notes, the first effect of time pressure on decision-
making is to direct organization attention on to the decision issue. Yet the
greater the ambiguity associated with the decision the more there is a tendency
to . avoid any early_comrnitment._ Thus although decision-makers recognize
the stimulus for a decision, if there is ambiguity action may not begin until
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a deadline is imposed. . What- time constraint does is to shorten the
interval between recognition of the problem and initiation of the decision
process.
When under time pressure, opportunities for political behaviour
may decrease. It is wdliknown in Behavioural Psychology that individuals
for whom the consequences of behaviour depend on passage of time, tend to
reduce the frequency of irrelevant behaviour and engage in more functional
behaviour in terms of control of environmental consequences (Lundin 1969,
Skinner 1969). For example, students tend to put more effort in preparing
for exams when time for examination approaches; athletes engage in more
training as the games approach, and car owners queue up at petrol stations
when price increases are imminent. When success depends on performing
activities within a time limit and time is too short for political behaviour,
conflict may be less intense. Thus, if under time pressure decision-maker's
activities tend to be more functional in terms of concentration of attention
on important issues, it may be formulated that:
Hypothesis 10; The greater the time pressure, the less the
conflict and the shorter the decision duration.
Because the decision process then tends to be more goal oriented than political
and since success under time pressure depends on the rapidity of the organi-
zation response, (as has been suggested above) it may also be predicted
that:
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Hypothesis 11: The greater the time pressure and the shorter
the decision duration, the more proactivity and closure. •
On the other hand, when there is urgency a tendency to act on pre-
conceptions and to simplify the alternatives may occur. The coalition may
be tempted to rely on 'previously successful courses of action (Wilensky 1967),
and problems which do not appear to have an immediate and clear relevance
are not given full consideration, as Weiner (1976) notes about the "garbage
ejection effect". Similarly, Katz and Kahn (1966) have noted that maladap-
tative responses may occur when events change the rhythm of activity within
an organization. Organizations may cope with the overload created by the
interruption to their usual activities by filtering information, neglecting
information, and by ignoring some normally necessary tasks. So there may
be a failure in processing critical inputs which can magnify problems rather
than help with them. Thus under time pressure the full foreseeable conse-
quences of a decision may not be examined and interest units which have a
critical role in implementation may not be consulted. As liompson and Tuden
(1976) point out, urgency may lead decision-makers to force issues which
are clearly inappropriate and to carry through implementation without agree-
ment being reached. In an attempt to buy time, decision activities tend also
to move in parallel rather than in sequences. This can even lead to a decision
being implemented with the process of deciding still going on, without
authorization or even before knowing what the problem is about.
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In short, under time constraints a coalition may be able to process
a quick decision which attains proactivity and closure, but in doing sä exis-
ting problems may be magnified, or new ones may be created (disturbance
as a consequence of skipping stages or lack of thorough examination of impor-
tant issues. Therefore, it may be assumed that
Hypothesis 12: The greater the time pressure and the shorter
the decision duration the more • the disturbance.
.4.7. Decision-Making Variables and Decision Outcomes 
The preceding sections have focused on the relationships among
constraints variables and modes of process activation. The exception was
section .4.6.
	
which has already explained how time pressure relates to
process pace and decision outcomes. The following sections therefore con-
centrate on how the other constraints variables are linked to process pace
and decision outcomes. Again, emphasis is given to conaltutive variables
Instead of paying attention to individual variables forming a . major concept.
.4.7.1. Discrepancies in the Distribution of Influence 
It has been said that in rational organizations, influence in decision-
making tends to be distributed according to the interest unit's ability to cope
with problematic areas. For example, when special knowledge is required
for a given decision, interest units which can provide relevant information
may have greater influence in determining outcomes. Thus, one should
expect a greater influence of a sales department in a decision to enter into
the export market, or the involvement of the production department in a
major dispute between management and Unions. However, there may be
occasions when marginal groups holding critical information may not be
involved, particularly when their possible contributions are not so clear.
How they are able to contribute is not apparent so that it may seem reasonable
to ignore them. Thus, a coalition may "forget" highly pertinent advice from
the production department or may not have time to consult legal opinion.
In such an eventuality, this lack of consultation may subsequently force a
coalition to interrupt a decision or to review the whole issue even after they
have already committed some resources. Hah and Lindquist (1975) provide the
notable example described earlier where a decision to seize steel plants by the President
of the United States was subsequently invalidated because it was constitution-
ally illegal. In this case the Justice Department was consulted only
after no alternatives were left except the seizure of the steel plants.
- There are other reasons why a given unit may not have its interests
represented in a decision process. A coalition may conveniently avoid con-
tact with interests that could raise problems or block the decision.
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) have drawn attention to situations where
groups able to participate do not have access to decision-making. Making
a decision behind closed doors may be a form of keeping issues out of exam-
ination and avoiding the expression of opposing views. Thus, units whose
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interests will be affected by the decision of groups in charge of implemen-
tation may not be invited to meetings, or express their opinion. Nonetheless,
whilst this lack of consultation may at the time seem to expedite matters, it
may have the effect later on of putting the successfulness of the decision at
risk. Lack of acceptability of the decision may lead to withholding infor-
mation, paralysing delays, or boycotting implementation. Studies both of
organization's experience with decentralization, and research on small group
behaviour, suggest that people are much likelier to accept a decision where
they have had opportunity to influence the outcomes (Utterer 1967, Katz
and Kahn 1966, Maier 1970, Heller 1976).
By comparing actual and desired distributions of influence this
research sheuld be. able to detect situations where interest units were not
involved in the decision-making but their participation was perceived as
desirable. It may be equally possible to identify the opposite situation,
where interest units were too influential in determining outcomes when
they should ideally have exercised less influence. It is plausible that lack
of representation of a given unit in a decision-making process when its par-
ticipation is perceived as critical and therefore an imbalance between actual
and desired levels of influence, may affect the pace at which a decision pro-
cess goes and its outcomes. When interest units able to contribute critical
resources and information are not in the process arena, many interruptions
may occur and so "re-cycles" (Mintzberg et al 1976) for redefinition of the
problem.
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In view of the arguments put forward in this section, a hypothesis
may be formulated:
Hypothesis 13: The greater the incongruence between actual
and desired levels of influence, the more delays, the less
proactivity, and the more the disturbances.
.4.7.2. Conflictfulness
Interpretations of how any forms of conflict come to affect organi-
zational life have moved away from a perspective where conflict was seen as
pathological in organizations (Barnard 1062) to a position where conflict is
seen as inevitable. Conceptions of organizations as an interdepartmental
systems (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) or as a coalition formed by interest
units having different goals (Cyert and March 1963) have introduced the notion
of conflict as a natural phenomenon. Attention has therefore been directed
to mechanisms whereby organizations come to handle "differences" and
manage to survive despite conflict.
Arguments as to how conflict . affects decision outcomes are contra-
dictory•, some writers see conflict as disfunctional, subverting organizational
goals (March and Simon 1958), but others view conflict as essential for
achieving better conditions if it is properly handled (Boulding 1964, Katz
1964).
March and Simon (1958) have argued that conflict is disruptive of
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the rational decision process. It impedes the selection of alternatives.
Conflict represents disequilibrium and attempts are made to resolve it.
As these authors state:
"As in the case of the individual, we assume that internal
conflict is not a stable condition for an organization and
that effort is consciously directed towards resolving both
Individual and intergroup conflict." (March and Simon 1958:129)
In their view, reaction to conflict involves either the use of analytic processes
or the use of bargaining. Political processes are seen as disruptive of
decision-making, and therefore they assume that the initial reaction of an
organization to conflict is problem solving and persuasion rather than bar-
gaining. Even when bargaining takes place there will be attempts to conceal
It in an analytical framework. This perspective contrasts with Cyert and
March's (1963) view of decision-making as a political process where bar-
gaining is a common measure to handle conflict within the coalition.
More recent research, in contrast to March and Simon (1958), sees
decision-making as a political process where outcomes are determined by
negotiation and power games rather than by a detached intellectual analysis
(Pettigrew 1973, Astley et al 1980, Wilson 1980). As has been said, this
thesis assumes that a strategic decision process provides an opportunity for
political behaviour. Outcomes may not be chosen as a solution to a problem
but are rather resultant from compromise, bargaining and competition among
Interest units which hold different views about the decision issues. Decision-
making is then more like a power game where a player attempts to gain the
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best advantages in a situation over another, and where possibilities of suc-
cess depend on the amount of power he has to control the game (Allison 1969).
In disputes, interest unit's parochial priorities mayprevent recognition of
overall needs and may confuse which alternatives are best to solve the
problem or to realize the opportunity. In this situation, conflict may be
settled only partially or a political impasse may occur; the decision process
may be interrupted to gain time or to allow arguments to die down. Medi-
ation may take a bureaucratic form, so that committees to conciliate diver-
gent views may be appointed, as Baldridge (1971) points out. As a result,
the process will slow down and to the extent to which a settlement is prevented
by antagonistic interests, the decision will take longer.
If conflict persists, outcomes are more likely to be a result of
compromises which reflect give and take. Outcomes may be incremental
In Lindblom's (1959) terms in the sense that little is changed so as to reduce
the pressures imposed by antagonistic interests. In these circumstances, a
decision will drag on and not arrive at a lasting conclusion (i.e. low closure)
and disturbances may interfere with implementation. The real problem will
not be solved. Dissatisfied interests may then block implementation if they
have power to do so. It may also be that if parochialism, information dis-
tortion and misperception occur in bargaining as Allison (1969) suggests,
the full implications of the decision may not be properly examined. As a
result it may create more problems than are solved. These ideas may be
summarized as follows:
Hypothesis 14: The greater the conflict, and the more delays, the .
less proactivity and closure and the more disturbances.
Although within this view, conflict is seen as disturbing the decision-
making process, it is believed that it may also be functional to decision-
making if effectively handled (Litterer 1967, George 1972, Argyris 1976).
George (1972) has argued that conflict is potentially healthy for policy making.
Disagreements between interest units may improve quality of search and
analysis of alternatives. Competition between groups may lead rivals to
Intensify search and present all available evidence to support their views,
and outcomes may therefore be a result of a thorough examination of the
implications. As March and Simon (1958) point out, there can be situations
In which conflict may be settled by analytical processes which involve en-
larging resources and discovering new alternatives. Should conflict be
associated with generation of more information in a decision, proactivity
and closure may not necessarily be low. The hypothesis is therefore a most
tentative statement.
While the views presented above may apply to both business and non- .
business organizations it is worthy of note that because of some peculiar
characteristics of the decision-makingsystem in universities, the strength
of relationships among variables may differ for those two kinds of organi-
zations. Baldridge (1971) for example, has noted that in universities the
decision-making process is eminently political. Politics determines the
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decision outcomes from the very beginning; attention to issues depends
on the interests of powerful interest units and allocation of decision-making
to a particular group is a result of power manipulation and struggles between
Internal units. Political controversy dominates until a compromise is even-
tually reached, or until mediation by another unit formed specially to handle
the conflict. In a similar view, Butler and associates (1978) point out that
in universities decision-making processes are characterized by internal
contention and jostling for power. Although not emphasizing the political
aspects, Olsen (1976:83) has suggested that in universities outcomes are a
result of poor comprehension of the problems and fluid participation. "The
outcome is seen as an unintended product of certain processes having dynamics
of their own". These features, therefore, indicate that partial settlement of
conflict, or no settlement at all, may be more frequent in decision-making in
universities as compared to other organizations. Conflict is likely to influence
decision-making outcomes to an even greater extent.
•4•7•3• Centralization 
As Wilensky (1967) points out, arguments about the impact of central-
ization - decentralization upon effectiveness of organization processes are
contradictory. The dilemma between the advantages and disadvantages as-
sociated with decentralization often confronts decision-makers. If decision-
making is concentrated at top level, information may be inaccurate and insuf-
ficient for the process to work efficiently. Moreover, top managers may be
109
too busy with other problems to pay the necessary attention to the decision.
They may not have information on the decision background and therefore
information may be loose or fragmented and, without specialist support,
search may not be properly conducted. With centralization managers may
take on unnecessary responsibility and if views are more or less uniform
this may foster the illusion of security and reliable intelligence. Such con-
ditions may lead to mistaken policies (Wilensky 1967)
Decentralization on the other hand, has its own advantages and draw-
backs. Apart from the opportunity for more democratic forms of decision-
making (Katz and Kahn 1966), flexibility and a full examination of alternatives
have also been associated with it (Litterer 1967, Wilensky 1967). Neverthe-
less, as more interests are involved in a given arena, the greater the num-
ber of issues raised and so the longer the decision time (Olsen 1976).
Another difficulty is the tendency of subunits to present options which are
a result of their internal bargaining; consensus is reached at a subunit level
so that only a narrow range of options is presented to top management
(George 1972).
While decentralization implies diversification of views and the slowing
down of the decision process, centralization represents the other side of the
coin; a small number of individuals are involved in making the decision
(Mintzberg 1979) and there may be a narrower range of views and preferences,
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and so less delays (Wilensky 1967). Studies of decision-making in groups
provides evidence that the speed of solutions tends to be higher for smaller
groups (Maier 1970).
Although the arguments look contradictory, the question seems to
be entirely contextual. It has been mentioned before that in rational theory
Influence is concentrated at the level where knowledge is required, but also
that there is reluctance to transfer responsibility to lower levels when the
decision is strategic. In this case, the balance of participation may lead to
proactivity and closure. However, when there is pressure of time, decen-
tralization may be inappropriate since it gives the opportunity for conflict
and delays. Information distortion and blockage is more likely to occur when
too many interests are involved in a coalition, particularly if these are dif-
ferent specialists. Each interest unit becomes a guardian of its own standards
and skills, and therefore each one may restrict information that could advance
the interests of others (Wilensky 1967). Inter-unit rivalry and resultant
blocking of accurate information may lead to a decision failure. As Wilensky
(1967:57) points out:
1/
... the greater the number of ranks and the greater the
number of organizational units involved in a decision process,
the more the distorting influence of rank and jurisdiction and,
consequently, the greater the chance of an intelligence failure.
It is likely that staff experts communicate most freely with
colleagues in the same speciality, second with colleagues in
the same workplace, than to subordinates, and last - with
greatest blockage and distortion - to superiors and rival
agencies."
Therefore, it may follow that:
Hypothesis 15: The greater the influence exercised by
specialists and the more conflict, the more
tardy the decision process
As mentioned above, the type of outcomes which may result from
the combination of these variables may depend on other conditions such as
urgency of the decision.
There are also indications that organizations vary in how the degree
of centralization affects decision-making. Wilensky (1967) argues that where it
is possible to maintain loyalty to organizatibn goals, the tendency would be
towards decentralization.. In a single purpose organization where goals
tend to be clear and stable, decentralization may present few problems.
This situation and an effective inculcation of values secure a smooth flow of
reasonably accurate information to top management. On the other hand,
when goals are ambiguous and diversified decentralization may result in
blockage of information, and the decision-making may be characterized by
interruptions and decentralization on the whole may be disfunctional.
Baldridge (1971:190) has noted that in universities where decision-makers
have varied ex-pertize, "decision-making is likely to be diffuse segmentalized
• and decentralized". Universities and other government organizations are
portrayed as organized anarchies, where internal units have different stan-
dards, preferences are inconsistent and ill-defined (Cohen et al 1972,
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Weiner, 1976). Thus, it is possible that decentralization will be more
problematic for these organizations.
.4.7.4. Constraints
It has been suggested that because information and resources are
scarce and their acquisition is problematic both are considered sources of
uncertainty which organizations have to deal with. In consequence, perfor-
mance in organizations is viewed as dependent upon success in reducing these
areas of uncertainty.
If information/resources are scarce; they both impose constraints
to the successfulness of outcomes. Scarcity of resources and lack of infor-
mation may slow down the decision process. For example, authorization
for a decision may be postponed until the minimum amount of resources
necessary to implementation is obtained. An opportunity for acquiring
new equipment will have to wait until the next budget when money will be
available. As Mintzberg and associates (1E..76) point out, organizations
wait for better conditions until they canproceed with the decisions. On the
other hand a decision may be speeded up by an earlier commitment of re-
sources or a greater volume of resources. Thus, a possibility of a new
business abroad may lead organizations to increase volume output before
the decision is concretized by authorization.
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. Hence, munificence of resources and availability of information may
permit the organization to have a better control of the external/internal
environment and to obtain advantages over competitors (Yuchtman and
Seashore 1967). As Benson (1975) notes, by having control over resources
the organization can establish the rules of the negotiation and force parties
accept its terms. Thus, it is apparent that more resources allow the organ-
ization to grasp new opportunities (proactivity), to obtain gains and benefits
not initially planned (propitiousness) and to resolve problems (closure).
Scarcity on the other hand, limits the degree of success independently
of what happens in the activation of the decision process. Although a powerful
coalition may be able to obtain the relevant resources for a decision (Pfeffer
and Salancik 1974), external competition constraints decision-making
(Thompson and McEwen 1958). At this point, a hypothesis can be formulated:
Hypothesis 16: The more available resources/information
are, the more proactivity, propitiousness and
closure.
Some organizations, nevertheless, may have less flexibility on the
control of resources. For example, U.S.A. Public Universities, when com-
pared to other types of organizations, have less discretion over the resources,
since State legislature controls distribution of resources they count with
(Pfeffer 1972). Harvey and Mills (1970) have suggested that dezision-making
may be different in non-profit organizations since resources exchanges do not
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follow the same pattern as far as profit organizations. While in profit firms
internal resources are exchanged for external resources in a competitive
market, non-profit organizations are less dependent from market competition
but more dependent on a same organization which supplies their financial
resources. Thus, the impact of resources availability in decision-making
may vary depending on the organization discretion in controlling the flow of
resources. In organizations highly controlled by external source where
resources exchanges with environment are made by external coalition, by
supplies, by governments, such as the electricity firm reported by Butler
and associates (1977), the impact of resources availability on decision-
making may be less significant. The same may apply to organizations
where resources allocation is determined by law, strongly held norms or
by government.
.4.8.	 Process Pace and Decision Outcomes 
As has been suggested throughout this chapter, outcomes which
emerge from the "garbage can" depend on the combination of variables
Influencing the decision pace or may result from the impact of each set of
variables separately. For example, it has been mentioned that under con-
ditions of time pressure longer delays may lead to lower decision closure.
On the other hand, the probability of delays to impose a slow pace on a
decision depends on the resources and information available and on the degree
of conflict during the activation of the process. For example, organizations
may need time to solve problems, particularly if they are of political nature.
115
Quinn (1978) has argued that decisions which threaten power bases require
low promptness; until more information is gained and the situation under-
stood, options should remain open and the decision delayed.
Although there are circumstances in which a slow down may be
appropriate for solving problems within the decision coalition, a late decision
may prevent an organization from grasping opportunities. For example,
development product decisions may often confront a situation where market
changes have taken place during the making of the decision. Some of those
decisions may take so long a time to reach the point of implementation that the
product may have already been overtaken by a new technology or environ-
mental changes may have turned it out of date. The Ford Edzel decision,
mentioned in Chapter I is an example of a long build up. The initial Edzel
plan went as far back as 1948. Then, the project was interrupted by the
Korean War, to be restarted in 1955 when market research had shown that
• medium price cars had 6070 of the market. The main reasons for sales
failure have been attributed to inappropriateness of the time when the car
was launched and ineffectiveness of search activities. These events were
described as follows:
11
_ the Edzel was a classic case of the wrong car for the
wrong market at the wrong time. It was also a prime example
of the limitations of market research, with its "depth inter-
views" and "motivational mumbo-jumbo"... the flow in all the
research was that by 1957, when Edzel appeared, the boom
was gone from the medium price field, and a new boom was
starting in the compact field, an area Edzel research had
overlooked completely" (Time, Nov. 30 1959, Deutsh Ed. 1976:43).
116
	 x.
Of considerable importance in opportunity situations is the rapidity
of reaction to environmental changes. Ansoff (1975) has emphasized the
importance of awareness and quick response in cases of sudden changes in
the environment. Speed, boldness, making "dramatic gains" and proactivity
appear together in Mintzberg's (1973a:45) entrepreneurial mode. Thus, it
may be assumed that a tardy decision process results in low proactivity and
propitiousness.
Arguments as to sources of decision success and unsuccess have
been presented throughout this chapter. Although constraints imposed on a
decision and forms of process activation may by themselves determine the
sort of outcomes which emerge from a decision process, they are also seen
as affecting the decision outcomes through mediation of process pace. Pro-
cess pace in its turn is directly able to produce an impact on the degree of
proactivity and closure achieved by a decision. Unanticipated outcomes such
as propitiousness and disturbances may also emerge from a given combination
of those variables. As earlier assumed, successfulness of a decision will,
therefore, depend on the contribution of scores each decision attains on the
four aspects of outcomes. Table 4.1 lists the hypotheses formulated in this
chapter.
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TABLE 4.1 LIST OF THE HYPOTHESES IN THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWOR
Hypothesis
Number Hypotheses
1 The more critical the resources/information, the more
Influential the interests involved.
2 The less resources are available, the greater the discrepancies
perceived between actual and desired distribution of influence.
3
•
The less resources are available, the more the number of
Interests involved in the decision process.
4 The greater the criticality of resources, the greater discrepancies
perceived between actual and desired distribution of influence.
5 The less resources/information are available, the more
conflict in the decision process.
6 The greater the criticality of resources/information the
	
.
more conflict in the decision process.
7 The greater the criticality of resources, the more centralized
the process (i.e. the greater the influence of higher manage-
ment levels).
.8 The more technical the relevant information the more de-
centralized the process (i.e. the less the influence of
higher management levels).
9 The greater the time pressure the greater the centralization
(i.e. the greater the influence of higher levels).
10 The greater the time pressure, the less conflict and the
shorter the decision duration.
11 The greater the time pressure and the shorter the decision
duration, the more proactivity and closure.
12 The greater the time pressure and the shorter the decision
duration the more disturbances.
13 The greater incongruence between actual and desired levels
of influence, the less proactivity, and the more disturbances.
14 The greater the conflict and the more delays, the less
proactivity and closure and the more disturbances.
15 The greater the influence exercised by specialists and the
more conflict, the more tardy the decision process.
16 The more available resources/information, the more pro-
activity, propitiousness and closure.
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CHAPTER V
THE RESEARCH STRATEGY
Whatever the level of analysis a researcher may be interested in,
he has to face the embarrassments of sampling organizations. It is in fact a
multifold problem, since the researcher faces the situation of having to satisfy
the requirements of adequate statistical sampling and theoretical demands
within the feasibility of access to organizations and constraints in time and
money. In reality, as Udy (1965: 682) notes, in organizational analysis "one
Is never able to choose freely the organizations to be studied and hence is
always open to the charge of failing to employ an unbiased sample of any
meaningful population".
Because this study is interested in comparing conditions associated
with successful and unsuccessful decisions in different organizational settings
and its major concern is in establishing comparisons between those two types
of decisions, problems of sample seemed to be twice as complicated and dif-
ficult to control. Discussions on the form taken by the sample, difficulties
in selecting a homogeneous sample, and methodological implications, have
therefore been considered separately in this chapter for each level of analysis.
Data collection methods and the instruments used to gather infor-
mation are discussed in the last section of this chapter.
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.5.1. Sampling Organizations
As already mentioned, the aim of the conceptual model is to capture
those aspects of the decision process which might explain decision-making
outcomes and then success. Variables were selected and devised with the
primary aim of maximising the chances of differences showing up between .
decisions rather than between organizations, in contrast to previous work
*(Horvath and McMillan 1979, Astley et al 1980). Therefore when sampling
choices came to be made, the principle would be to choose organizations as a
means to selecting decisions, though clearly sufficient variation between
organizations would be likely to occur in any case to afford some potential
explanatory power in terms of the features of organizations themselves. Cer-
tain decisional characteristics might be salient in certain types of organization,
and there might be differences in how success was defined.
The selection of organizations which diverge in the goals to which they
give primacy would provide probable further variation in the components of the
conceptual model. There is evidence that organizations diverging in goals may
also differ in the decision-making process and how decision outcomes are evalu-
ated. Organization goals set limits upon decision-making for they determine
where resources are allocated (Hall 1974) and provide the parameters to the
analysis of the effectiveness of organization activities (Thompson and McEwen,
1958).
So there was a case for diversifying the organizations to be studied
such that they would include both manufacturing and service units and, most
obviously, business and non-business organizations. It has long been thought
that these two types, business and non-business, differ in goals (Blau and
Scott 1963, Anthony and Herzlinger 1975), in the criteria used to evaluate
activities (Simon 1976) and in their processes of decision-making (Butler et
at 1979).
Blau and Scott distinguish organizations by "prime beneficiary", that
is, by those whose interests determine the problems and issues which should
be dealt with. The prime beneficiaries of business concerns are the financially
Interested owners and so the dominant problem of these organizations is effici-
ency. As Blau and Scott point out
"The dominant problem of business concerns is that of
operating efficiency - the achievement of maximum
gain at minimum cost in order to further survival and
growth in competition with other organizations"
(Blau and Scott 1963:49)
The prime beneficiaries of service organizations, on the other hand, are mem-
bers of the public in direct contact with the organization, and so the main con-
-
cern of such organizations is the provision of effective professional services.
Similarly, Anthony and Herzlinger (1975) distinguish between public
and business organizations, in that the former are oriented towards providing
better services within the resources available, whilst the latter are oriented
towards maximization of profits. This raises a question extensively discussed
by organization theorists. Traditionally, business organizations have been
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viewed as striving to maximize profits. Economists and those following
rational assumptions tend to emphasize profit maximization. Yet, some
studies have opened the question of whether to speak of improving profits
Is a sufficient description of the aims of business organizations (Dill 1965,
Stagner 1969, Perrow 1969, Miller and Friesen 1978). It has been suggested
that goals other than profits are also important tobusiness organizations, such
as stability and growth. Nevertheless, authors appear to agree that in these
organizations, profit making is an overriding goal to which other goals are
subservient. As Dill (1965) points out, profit provides a basic index by
which activities of a business firm are judged and it is undoubtedly used more
universally in these organizations than in any other type.
As Simon (1976) suggests the primacy given to profits in business
organizations makes it possible to evaluate decisions by a relatively simple
criterion indicating efficiency. Money is a common denominator. On the
other hand, it is more complicated to evaluate activities in public organizations
where objectives are stated in terms of values and vary with the opinion of
those who have a stake in the decision process.
While Simon (1976) has pointed to the difficulties in finding a monetary
parameter in public organizations, other studies have provided some hints on
how these organizations may differ from the btisiness type in the decision-making
process itself. Peabody and Rourke (1965), for example, have made the point
that a private entrepreneur enjoys a greater freedom in decision-making than
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do officials of a governmental agency. Public bureaucracies differ from
private organizations in that their goals are externally determined by a legis-
lative enactment. In these organizations decisions are usually made centrally
and may be constrained by law.
It has been suggested, in effect, that public organizations often have
less autonomy in decision-making to the extent to which they have less dis-
cretion to control the amount of resources needed for operation. Pfeffer
(1972) has taken as examples American universities whose resources are
largely controlled by State legislatures or by other outside organizations.
Decision-making in hospitals appears to be similarly constrained by those
who sponsor their resources (Perrow 1969). While then non-business organi-
zations obtain resources from such sources but are less affected by market
competitions, their business counterparts. share contrasting characteristics.
In their cases internal resources are exchanged for external resources in a
.supply and demand relationship. Resources are controlled by the rules of
competition (Harvey and Mills 1970) rather than by political powers beyond
them and success depends on the organization's ability to realize transactional
advantages (Williamson 1975).
While business and non-business organizations differ in the ways in
which choice behaviour is constrained by external factors, it seems that these
organizations also vary in the process of making decisions and in the pace at
which activities are developed. Butler et al (1979) have suggested that a
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business firm and a university may differ in the manner decisions are made.
They provide some hints that business firms' decisions may be more rapid,
centralized and more oriented towards rational values. In public organizations
by contrast, decisions may be decentralized, more political and lengthy.
Nevertheless, as they point out, empirical evidence as to whether and how
these organizations differ in the process of making decisions has yet to be
provided.
The most recent research results have concerned non-business or-
ganizations only, so lacking a comparative dimension. But they are consistent
in indicating the political nature of decision-making in these organizations.
In general, little evidence has been found for a style of rational decision-making
where alternatives are chosen as appropriate to desired ends. Lindblom (1970)
has argued that the rational model of decision-making based on the limited
problems of industrial firms does not apply to decisions in public administration,
which are widely remedial in character and must consider the concerns of in-
dependent groups whose values are conflicting. Instead, the essence of
decision-making in government organizations can be found in bargaining and
conflict. In this kind of setting important decisions are made by negotiation
rather than being settled through more detached intellectual analysis (George
1972).
Characteristics of decision-making in universities appear to be not
much different from those of public administration. Research in these
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organizations has drawn attention to the predominance of political activities
In university decision-makings who decides and what is decided is a matter
of struggle among internal units (Baldridge 1971). The image of university
decision-making provided by Butler et at (1977) is similar; jostling for power
to influence decisions is a major feature of processes of making decisions in
these organizations. The caricature of universities as "garbage cans" suggests
other interesting features. Often the process of making decisions in these or-
ganizations does not appear to be concerned with actually making a decision.
It may look anarchical. As March and Olsen (1976) describe it :
"Intention does not control behaviour precisely. Participation
is not a stable consequence of properties of the choice situ-
ation or individual preferences. Outcomes are not a direct
consequence of process. Environmental response is not al-
ways attributable to organizational action. Belief is not
always a result of experience".
(March and Olsen 1976:21)
Hence although direct comparative data are so far lacking in the
literature, the presumed contrast between business and non-business organi-
zations is clear, and certainly sufficient to warrant the inclusion of both in
any sample in the hope that variation in decision processes will be detected.
A broad description of the sample is presented in the following section, and
a detailed description of the characteristics of each organization can be found
In Appendix D.
.5.1.1. A Description of the Sample
In an attempt to obtain variation and to detect any salient features of a
given type of organization, the sample eventually consisted of two universities,
a health district and five business firms in Northwest and Northeast England
as shown in Table 5.1. Ideally, such a sample should have included an equal
number of business and non-business organizations, for example, and care-
fully balanced constrasts of service and manufacturing. More care should
have been taken to control for extraneous variables such as size and owner-
ship and precise business. But in research perfect designs, and samples
to perfectly test them, are elusive ideals. They are worthwhile as ideals
for they indicate the direction of striving, what ought to be aimed at, but if
failure to attain them forbade research then how little research there would
be. The most that could be achieved here was an oddly assorted selection
of organizations but as later chapters show even this served to produce
interesting results which may be a basis from which others may proceed.
Various,influences and obstacles haped the eventual sample.
To begin with there were hopes of a comparative study between British
and Brazilian firms, and then came difficulties in gaining access to organi-
zations in Britain, which are elaborated in the next section.
The unequal numbers in each type of organization were not intended
and were a result of a series of decisions taken to improve the possibilities
of a sufficient number of organizations participating in the research.
-
Alternatives had to be tried when gaining collaboration proved to be difficult.
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TABLE 5.1 ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE
Organizations Size(No. employees)
Business
Area
Business Firm 1 800 Engineering
Business Firm 2 • 12,000 Electrics & Electronic
Business Firm 3 100 Chemical
Business Firm 4 1,500 Engineering
Business Firm 5 600 Confectionery
University 4 4,402
University 2 4,223
• .
Health District 7,850
Since the prime purpose was to make comparisons among deci-
sions, this had to take precedence over the composition of the sample of
organizations.
While the reasons for accumulating such a sample should be better
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understood as the reader goes through the following sections, one must not
forget the fact that although the variations in sizes of the units in the business
firms group may enable conclusions to be applicable to organizations of vari-
ous sizes, and may favour variations in dependent variables, they may never-
theless leave extraneous variables uncontrolled when comparisons between
decisions in different types of organizations are made.
As far as the number of organizations is concerned, there is al-
ways a trade-off as Blau (1970) points out. Since organizations are too com-
plex systems to study many at a time, with small samples the possibilities
of generalization from findings diminishes, but against this there is always
the possibility of gaining in details from a more in depth investigation.
Thus, whilst conclusions on the organization level may not be confidently
attributed to the population, this study may be able to grasp some character-
istics of the decision process which otherwise would not be possible.
One must bear in mind three things: firstly, in the comparative
organizational literature, people are still frying to define and establish method-
ological approaches (Heydebrand 1973, Udy 1965). As Udy (1965) states
/I
.. . widely divergent methods are often used to attack essentially similar
problems. Some researchers compare two organizations; others compare
200. Some use statistical techniques; others do not. And frequently no par-
ticular reasons are given for preferring one approach over other possible
129
alternatives". (p.689) "This variety of procedures stems partly from the
lack of knowledge of the nature of exploratory research" (Tidy 1965:686).
Secondly, and on the other hand, this study as most in this area
does not claim to be hypothesis testing and as such it does not pursue a
strict methodological rationale. Burns (1968) considers the comparative
method to be a method of generating questions, and Udy (1965:683) points
out that the most important problem with classical hypothesis testing in com-
parative organizations research is not the problem of sampling, but rather
the lack of theory from which the hypothesis can be deduced. Perhaps then
the present study can in some way contribute to that theory.
Finally, because organizations are such complex systems a study
In depth of a large number is too costly in'time and money. But to be able
to test propositions and go as far as attempting generalizations, a researcher
-must go beyond a single case. This is what this study did.
.5.1.2.  Access to Organizations
I tend to see the getting of access to organizations as a very personal
experience (which is why I have permitted myself to write in a more personal
form in this section). Getting acceptance does not depend only on the research
theme nor on the time and trouble demanded from the organization by the re-
search but also on the amount of time and money a researcher is prepared and
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able to devote to gaining approval for the study so as to ensure the desirable
homogenity and variation in a sample.
For a long time the attempts by the associated Bradford staff
project team to gain access for their study on Power and Decision Making
had disappointing results, as later reported by Wilson (1980:99).
"Organizations seemed unwilling to allow research in to
such topics. At this time the rejection rate from all
companies who were approached was running close to
90%".
Perrow (1970) too, reports a high rate of rejection in his study on
distribution of power in American firms and Blau (1964) had to change his
Initial plans and compare two government agencies in his study of work
groups in bureaucracy because he did not succeed in obtaining permission
from a large private firm.
. Much can be said about this, but a detailed description of difficulties
in gaining access can be found in a study by Platt (1976:187) of British socio-
logical research. Like some of the researchers who had been the subject of
her study, she did not want to appear "out of the blue". As she comments:
"the prime reason the sample initially took the form it did was my fear of
being refused if I approached people out of the blue. The way I started, there-
fore was to place my appeal in "Sociology" and write to a few friends and ac-
quaintances."
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Such difficulties however are far from being unique to British and
American researchers. In my own research on the distribution of power in
Brazilian steel and textile companies, permission for the study was granted
only after gaining the support of the State Service for Industrial Training
(Rodrigues, 1977).
I do not wish, on the other hand, to overstate the difficulties. One
should also bear in mind successful cases. Astley (1978) did not report any
special obstacle. From 30 initial requests for approval for research 28 had
been successful. Hinings et al (1974) also studied 28 sub-units in 7 organi-
zations in Canada and the United States. Apparently, they did not have dif-
ficulties, or at least no difficulties were mentioned. In depth case studies,
access has also been granted but at infarmant level as studies by Blau (1964),
Dalton (1964), Pettigrew (1973) and Wilson (1980) report. However, in these
It was first necessary to overcome suspicion and resistance by a long period
of informal contact with informants.
In fact, and taking the simplest view, it appears that organizations
are more willing to cooperate: firstly, when the research requires only super-
ficial information about what is going on in the organization; secondly when
It does not demand too much involvement from their senior people; and thirdly,
If it does not investigate sensitive areas such as financial performance or
development of technology and also does not approach certain behavioural
areas like decision making or concentration of power.
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Nevertheless, there are reasons why organizations help in research.
Business firms in the same way as universities or other government organi-
zations, show a sense of social responsibility towards helping in scientific
research. A hope that research will uncover problems which may be correc-
ted or an interest in the possibilities that the research can be of use to them
have also been pointed to as motives (Scott 1965).
Although this section may have given a pessimistic impression,
this is not what was intended. The aim was rather to make clear quite frankly
that principles of statistical sampling cannot easily be followed in a context in
which researchers are chosen rather than that they choose. Though difficulties
In gaining approval for conducting research often impose changes in the initial
plan and therefore in the criteria for sample selection, to adapt to the realities,
this is rarely if ever mentioned by most authors. This could lead an unaware
and inexperienced researcher to think that samples are nicely and smoothly
selected. This can be so only when the researcher does not need to obtain the
permission of anybody else to conduct research.
.5.1.3. How Access was Gained
A number of considerations governed the selection of organizations.
Initially, it was the intention to attempt a cross national comparison between
Britain and Brazil, to increase the chances of managements co-operating
because of their interest in the research and to obtain introductions from
1
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organizations in Britain to organizations in Brazil, firms were sought which
had commercial and/or ownership links with Brazilian firms. Enquiries
at the Brazilian Embassy in Britain and also consultation of library sources
such as the Kompass register of British Industry and Commerce (1978)
yielded a list of such firms, and later others which did not have commercial
links with Brazilian firms but were eventually included in the research.
Therefore, four out of the five of the business firms in Table 5.1 maintained
at least a commercial trade with Brazilian firms.
Pressure of time eventually forced the abandonment of the intended
research in Brazil as far as this thesis is concerned, although such research
continues to be planned once this thesis is completed. However, approaching
firms with Brazilian contacts rendered another advantage. At a time in the
project when there was a considerable fear that access to firms might be
Impossible, it did mean that the managers approached knew something of the
country from which I came and had some sympathy with my aims.
An introductory letter was sent to 20 organizations; 2 universities,
2 health districts and 16 business firms. Of these 16, half had commercial
links with Brazilian companies or had subsidiaries in Brazil. The letter
mentioned the intended comparison with Brazilian firms which I thought at
the time would be part of this research, and this apparently succeeded as
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"my introduction". Only one firm declined to participate without giving
the researcher a chance to explain the study in an interview. From the
remaining seven, one failed to respond to follow-up phone calls, two agreed
to participate only partially and hence were dropped out.
As far as the firms which did not trade with Brazil were concerned,
one turned out to be only a branch not involved in the company's decision-
making and therefore was too small to be included in the study, four were
not interested in this kind of study and refused to participate, and another
one was too late in expressing willingness, doing so after I had already
finished data collection. From the first group of companies, four (50%)
agreed to participate in the study, and from the second only two (25%). As
mentioned above, choosing companies with commercial links with Brazil
apparently worked.
Another factor appeared later on as being equally important. In
none of the companies which refused to participate either wholly or partially
had I provided them with a reason why they were included in the sample.
When there was an opportunity for this question to be raised I said that I had
picked the name of the company from the Kompass List. All firms for which
I could give a reason why they had been included in the study agreed to par-
ticipate even if merely partially.
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Something similar happened in a university which initially declined
to participate. When in a follow-up phone call I explained to the Vice Chan-
cellor why co-operation from this university was important he changed his
mind and gave his permission to start the interviews. The other university
and one health district, on the other hand, immediately agreed. The second
health district refused to co-operate on the basis that they were already in-
volved with other researchers.
Apart from briefly presenting the research, the letter of introduc-
tion requested co-operation and an opportunity to explain personally to the
chief executive if he thought he would be willing to co-operate in principle.
In this way interviews were arranged with the top executive first to provide
more information about the research purposes, what was being required
from the organization and possible contributions. These interviews also
had the function of gaining information about the organization in general and
obtaining a list of successful and unsuccessful strategic decisions which had
been made. The chief executive also usually provided a list of senior people
•who had been involved in the making of those decisions and whom I could sub- .
sequently interview.
After having collected data in a few organizations, this introductory
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interview turned out to be more easily handled since I could mention a number
of examples of other organizations co-operating (obviously without breaking
confidentiality) and also be more confident in identifying decision cases which
would be interesting to study as compared to others which would not be worth
pursuing. I also was able to be more precise about duration of my interviews.
In this interview the questionnaire was presented to the chief executive so that
he would know exactly what was being required from the organization in terms
of information and time.
.52 Sampling Decisions
To select decisions which have been successful and others which
have failed, one has to start from somewhere. From nowhere else could
this information be found except in the organization with the decision makers.
In a project such as this one, particularly because of its interest in conditions
which lead to success, the best move appeared to be to approach top manage-
ment. Since the purpose was to study major decisions for which the effects
were already known, top management would be in the best position to provide
Information. They might not know the whole story but they would know more
than anyone else and enough for the purpose.
Each chief or senior executive was therefore asked to suggest for
study an equal number of successful and unsuccessful decisions ranging from
three to five of each type. If possible, decisions should vary in content; in
other words, the sample should include examples emphasizing Marketing,
Personnel, Product Development and so forth and their equivalents in ser-
vice organizations. Top management was also asked to include in the list
only important decisions which involved commitment of substantial 'resources
or were organization wide in effects. Table 5.2 shows that the distribution of
decisions in terms of content is not far from what had been planned. The division o
the sample of decisions in the groups below was based on the list of all the decisions
included in this research as presented in Appendix A.
TABLE 5.2 DISTRIBUTION OF DECISIONS BY CONTENT
Decision
Content
Number of
Decisions
Personnel 11
Finance 8
Marketing 8
Expansion 8
Product Development 8
Reorganization 10
TOTAL 53
,
Figure 5.1 indicates ideally how the decisions shoild "Lave been dis-
tributed across a five point success scale. Since the aim was tr. contrast deci-
sions which had produced different outcomes, a high number of f:ecisions at both
extremes had been hoped for. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the ac...al sample
Number of Decisions Number of Decisions
6
5
4
12
10
8
6.
4
2
FIGURE 5.1 DESIRED DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE OF DECISIONS
Number of Decisions
1	 2
unsuccessful
4	 5
successful
FIGURE 5.2 DISTRIBUTION OF
DECISIONS ACROSS A 5 PONT
SCALE OF SUCCESS OBTAINED
. FOR NON-BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
FIGURE 5.3 DISTRIBUTION OF
DECISIONS ACROSS A 5 POINT
SCALE OF SUCCESS OBTAINED
FOR BUSINESS ORGANIZA TIONS
7
'
L
i
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
unsuccessful	 successful
,
1	 2	 3	 4'	5
unsuccessful
	 successful
of decisions across a five point success scale for business and non-business
organizations respectively (ratings obtained by the questionnaire to be dis-
cussed in the next section). It is clear that the distribution resembles the
desired bi-polar pattern but falls short of it at the less successful end.
Various reasons may explain why the sample took the form it did.
In general, chief executives seemed to hesitate to place a decision at either
extreme of the scale. In the universities and in the health district the top
manager preferred not to divide the list between more and less successful
decisions. There were so many arguments which justified actions taken at
the time whatever the results later, and different views concerning how "good"-
or "bad" the outcome was, that they refused to be categoric in this respect.
Even in business firms executives found difficulties in selecting decisions for
the two categories. Usually they asked for a week to think it over or to dis-
cuss with other people involved in the decision before presenting a list. In
- some cases, other senior people attended the introductory interview and
helped to find suitable examples. In some firms where they were not present
when the interview began they were laterlarought in.
The distributions in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 reflect ratings given subse-
quently by decision-makers who were more deeply involved in the making of the
decisions investigated than were the chief executives. Thus their judgements pro-
duced a wider scatter than the original chief executive selection appeared to have done
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and whilst unsuccessful cases are under-represented there is a variation
across the complete range. Given the reluctance of managers to see decisions
as unsuccessful - and perhaps the rarity of thoroughly unsuccessful decisions
anyway - the distribution is a positive achievement.
Even so, as the criterion for selecting decisions was no more than
the decision maker's judgement, it would have been desirable to have obtained
more examples. As Glazer and Strauss (1968) note in studies intended for
theory generation as this one is, overall sample size is not crucial but rather
what is important is the saturation of categories by maximizing differences
between groups of cases. In practice this was not possible. As discussed
In Chapter III, the complications concerning decision making consequences
are too many and diverse, and it may have been unrealistic to hope for as in
Figure 6.1.
-
Another important problem in the sampling of decisions is the dif-
ficulty of identifying and isolating any social process. Because of their
diachronic characteristics and the dynamic features of strategic decision
making, single decisions are difficult to isolate from the stream of events.
Therefore, to pick the right one "piecemeal" to study was a complicated task
not only for the decision makers but also for the researcher. Boundaries of
decisions have been defined abstractly (Mintzberg et al 1976) i but it appeared
that this is not so clear in managers' minds. For example, in a decision
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process compounded of two main sets of decisions it often appeared that the
second set was taken to correct a situation produced by an unsuccessful
earlier choice. Are these sets then to be treated as two decisions or as
one? In such a case process and outcome will be somewhat nebulous and
the selection of the "slice" for analysis would be important in terms of
sample structure.
The following example may illustrate how easily both the resear-
cher and the decision maker can be misled by the complexity of a situation:
In one of the business firms, the stopping of a development program for high
technology equipment was presented to the researcher as being an unsuccess-
ful decision. The 'decision had been taken because the product was no longer
competitive in the market. However, after interviewing one of the decision
makers it turned out that this decision could also be regarded as successful,
in the sense that stopping development had avoided major investments in what
could have been a "white elephant". What happened, therefore, was that I was
collecting information on a successful case instead of on an example of failure
as initially intended. The unsuccessful bit was instead the earlier initiation
of the development programme.
Difficulties in selecting appropriate "bits" of decisions occurred
sometimes at the beginning of the field work. This was not easy to avoid
since in some instances the list of decisions was mailed to me and I did not
know the background of the situation in advance. Only after some experience
and being aware of pitfalls, was I better able to control the type of example I
was offered for study. Furthermore, intentionally or not, the respondents
tended to concentrate on positive aspects of what happened, either because
of the "social desirability" effect described by Phillips (1973:56) which af-
fects studies in general, or because individuals tend to rationalize their own
failures (Staw and Ross 1978).
As far as the sample of decisions and organizations is concerned,
Blau (1964) and Dalton (1964) call attention to the problems that obtaining per-
mission from the top management to conduct the research can create, such
as identification with management, and so becoming unaware of restrictions
to the exploration of 'sensitive areas.
Blau (1964)also warns researchers about the bias that self-selection
procedures may introduce. He reported that permission to study in old estab-
lished bureaucracies was refused and access was gained disproportionately in
organizations in which bureaucratic rigidities were less accentuated.
Similarly, there is no way in which I could know whether an organ-
ization included in this study had relatively few decision making problems
and therefore had few decisions at the unsuccessful end (points 1 and 2 of the
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success scale) or whether such decisions were being overlooked or even
concealed. However, this is only speculation, and it is Blau's (1964)
opinion that controlling the bias of self-selection procedures is not easy
in a context in which the needs of the organization not those of the observer
n
determine what should be studied.
To finalize the section it should be noticed that whatever the
drawbacks this sample may have, it is probably the first time a sample
of as many as 53 decisions (19 for non-business and 34 for business organ-
izations) has been achieved using these techniques of data collection.
•
The study by Mintzberg and associates (1976) of 25 diverse
examples of strategic decisions in various types of organizations was
the first leap forward in terms of comparative research on decision making.
"Though some other studies have used a larger sample, their date referred
either to one type of organization or to a type of decision. Pfiffner (1960)
reported Nicolaudis' study (1960) of a sample of 332 decisions. However,
the cases were Mostly based on the public sector, and apparently decisions
had been sub-divided into smaller ones. Witte (1972) reported a large sample,
233 decisions, but they concerned only the purchase of electronic equipment,
and data was collected from sellers of the equipment, which gives only partial
account of the decision process by the buying firms.
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.5.3. Data Collection Methods
"Types of methods employed like types of research
approaches must be selected in the light of the aims
and objectives of the research and the kinds of organ-
izations to be examined." (Scott, 1965:299)
Because of this research's purpose of testing a model, and simul-
taneously exploring interrelationships between variables, the use of multiple
measurement techniques would be ideal. Employment of interview and ques-
tionnaire, for example, would then help in the attainment of this two fold ob-
jective since It would combine techniques each of which is pertinent to one
objective rather than the other. For instance, studies employing unstructured
interviews are more often based on small nonprobability samples and the data
sometimes does not lend itself to quantitative statistical analysis.
Williamson,  et al. , 1977, take the view that open-ended interviews
are appropriate for exploratory studies where the researcher can obtain a
more complete and in-depth picture of what he is investigating. Questionnaires
on the other hand, structured in rating scales, lend themselves more readily
to statistical analysis.
Therefore, in the present study, it was decided to use both methods,
to obtain the advantages of each. The questionnaire was mostly designed to
measure variables included from prior theoretical analysis in the research
conceptual framework, and the interview to detect variables which were not
foreseen, to explore new avenues.
Another reason for using more than one data collection method is,
as Williamson eta! (1977) and Madge (1965) suggest, as a means to improve
validity. The data obtained from one can be checked against the data obtained
from the other. However, in this research it has not been possible to analyse
validity by comparing interview and questionnaire data. If the interview is
being used with the purpose of creating an opportunity of finding new explana-
tions beyond the conceptual model, then they cannot both comprise similar
questions. Nevertheless, as it will be seen later, some procedures to increase
the probability of obtaining more reliable information in the interview have
been adopted.
.5.3.1. The Interviews 
As mentioned before, interview informants were indicated by the
chief executive. For a research project interested in past events and there-
fore requiring people who were somehow observers of those events, a random
sampling of informants was obviously inadequate. As in Zeldith's (1962:576)
opinion:
"to demand that every piece of information be obtained by a
probability sample is to commit the research to grossly in-
efficient procedure and to ignore fundamental differences
among various kinds of information".
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With duration ranging from 1 hour to 11 hours, interviews had
mostly the purpose of gathering general information on the background of
the decision to understand the situation in which it was made. As Blau
(1970) suggests, the analysis of any social process requires investigation
of links between an earlier state and a system or structure which occurs
subsequently. A questionnaire would not be able to grasp the full sequence
of events and context in which the decision occurred.
Initially, interviews were less structured. Informants were
requested to describe why the focal decision had been taken and how it
was taken and by whom. The idea was to improve the study's conceptual
framework and consequently to arrive at a more structured form of inter-
view. Unstructured interviews have been recommended when the purpose
Is exploration and the development of new ideas about the phenomenon
under investigation (Kerlinger, 1979; Phillips, 1966; Williamson eta!.
•
1977).
On the other hand, it was thought that use of a semi-structured
Interview would be ideal since it not only would enable the collection of
more uniform data in all organizations, but would make it easier to control
the conversation. Furthermore, despite employing standardized items the
researcher could still go beyond the questions in a flexible manner and
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obtain information to clarify previous assumptions. A semi-structured
Interview schedule was therefore designed and summary of topics it
covered is shown in Appendix C.
In an attempt to test for reliability, the chief executive was
requested to nominate two people closely involved in the making of each
decision, to be interviewed. Nevertheless, it soon became apparent
that interviewing two people per decision would not be possible in all or-
ganizations, apart from being costly in time and money. First attempts
In the field showed that sometimes either the second infcirmant had no
knowledge of what happened in the focal decision at all, or had been in-
volved in different stages of its making. Interviewing people who had a
secondary role on the decision would introduce another source of bias
resulting in low reliability. This was the case in one small size organ-
ization, BF5, where just an interview was done on each decision topic.
Secondly, it was rather difficult to get hold of some of the second infor-
mants since many of the decisions investigated occurred in the sixties or
early seventies. Some of them had already retired or had moved to another
organization. Thirdly, in some organizations there were only a small group
of people who participate in the making of decisions. This meant that two
Interviews or more had to be done with the same informant about different
subjects, and this would also have required from him filling in two or more
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questionnaires. Informants would hardly have welcomed this possibility.
Despite these difficulties, interviews for cross-checking purposes
were done for every organization as shown in Table 5.3. The reason for just
TABLE 5.3	 DATA COLLECTION INTERVIEWS
INTERVIEWS HELD
ORGANIZA TIONS Having also
a Question-
naire
Having a
Missing
Questionnaire
For
Cross-
Checking
Non-
Pertinent
Cases
Total
Business Firm 1 6 2 3 0 11
Business Firm 2 9 0 5 0 14
Business Firm 3 7 0 2 0 9
Business Firm 4 6 0 2 0 8
Business Firm 5 6 0 1 0 7
University	 1 5 1 2 2 10
University 2 7 2 4 10 23
Health	 District 7 0 5 0 12
TOTAL 53 5 24 12 94
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one cross-checking interview in BF5 is given above.
Examination of the interview material showed nevertheless that
there were not many disagreements between respondents reporting about a
decision process. Rather, differences were mostly in how superficially or
deeply people described events. In any case, those discrepancies which did
appear were checked on the spot, during the second interview.
As shown in Table 3, the number of interviews amounted to a total
of 94: of these only 12 could not be used in the data analysis. Unfortunately,
time was lost with inappropriate informants and inappropriate examples of
decisions. These data had to be eliminated from the analysis because they
were non-pertinent to research purposes of investigating strategic decisions.
Either the example consisted of reviewing a procedure or the informant had
only a minor role in the making of the decision and did not know how it was
arrived at.
Such difficulties were mostly enCountered in Ul. In an introductory
interview with the Vice-Chancellor of the University, he suggested some
general topics for study and introduced the researcher to the Planning Depart-
ment staff who, she understood from him should help with the list of decisions.
The Planning Department people then made, again, some general suggestions
about decisions which she coukl possibly study. They also indicated people
who were likely to help. Unfortunately, when the researcher went to see those
potential informants either the decision was too minor concerning merely
procedures repeated each year or the suggested informant was not involved
at all in it. Interviews did not progress until further help was requested
from the University's Registrar who made a more specific list of decisions
and required collaboration of the University staff.
However, another important point to note is that Ul was the re-
searcher's first experience in the field. Sle learned that approval from the
organization top level is necessary, but even more important is to secure
their further commitment and involvement.
Non-pertinent cases in the health district consisted mainly of
Inadequate examples of routine decisions which were of no direct use as
far as this thesis is concerned.
After these experiences, chief executives were asked to indicate
only senior executives mostly involved in the decision process. This was
apparently the most likely way to guarantee that informants would have the
necessary knowledge to describe the decision process.
.5.3.1.1. Procedures to Deal with some Possible Sources of Information Distortions
From Madge's (1965) point of view, in the interview process fal-
sification by respondents may occur at any stage, deliberately or not. By
. ,
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concentrating on the investigation of actions taken in the past, both question-
naire and interview items in the present study were in some ways exposed to
distortion from memory failures and lack of knowledge about events which .
occurred at a distant point in time.
The literature in social sciences methodology, e. g. Madge (1965),
Zeldith (1962), Kerlinger (1979), Cannell and Kahn (1965) and Phillips (1966),
forewarns researchers of insufficient knowledge on the part of respondents
as a source of bias on topics the research intends to investigate. As Zeldith
(1962) states, there are certain events which very few people know about and
therefore, in this case, it is useless to choose respondents arbitrarily, or
for that matter randomly.
As already mentioned, chief executives were asked to indicate those
senior executives mostly involved in the decision process. However, some
informants were only partially involved in the making of the decision. The
best way around this, seemed to be simply to eliminate their interview data
from the analysis. Double interviews permitted some flexibility in including
for analysis only those cases where respondents had a more thorough partici-
pation in the process.
Moreover, measures to minimise problems of distortion have been taken
in this study. In each organization a list with the interview topics was given to
the chief executive to pass to all informants, or was mailed directly to them
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before the interview took place. As a result, many had prepared themselves
for the interview. In most instances, when the interview started, informants
already had at hand minutes of meetings, memoranda ,letters and other docu-
ments in case consulting them were necessary. Moreover, many of them made
phone calls or sent for other people to help when in doubt of the exactness of
the information. Confidentiality was, of course, assured and the importance
of the research had been explained to the informant, before conversation on
the decision process started.
.5.3.2. The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire consisted mostly of items to measure those vari-
ables in the analytical framework which describe conditions associated with
the degree of success of decisions taken. Each independent and dependent
variable was operationalized into questionnaire measures which were either
scores derived from ordinal scales or time dimension scores.
The questionnaire was elaborated and tested on a sample of 13 MBA
students at the University of Bradford Management Centre. It soon became
apparent that the questionnaire was too long having too many open questions,
wording errors and other inadequacies. This small pilot study indicated where
and what changes should be made to increase the probability of responses.
First interviews and applications of questionnaires in organizations
led to changes in the conceptual framework and also in the technical aspects
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of the latter. Non-response rates and over-simplified answers obtained by
some items showed that the questionnaire was still too long. Further changes
had then to be made which led to elimination of some open questions from the
survey altogether or their transference from the questionnaire to the interview
schedule.
Therefore, as can be seen in Appendix B, the questionnaire was
mostly fixed choice items, but required also specification of the time in which
certain events happened and specific short answers to some few open questions.
The content of the questionnaire was not of the attitudinal type.
Informants were used in this research in the sense defined by Scott (1965)
and Zelditch (1962) is "observers". In other words, informants were used
to report events and activities which could not have been directly observed
by the researcher. Therefore, all items were perceptions of external events
and not of self.
. There had to be a tailored questionnaire for each type of organiza-
tion. The structure of the questionnaires and questions remained unchanged,
but items which involved questions about information and resources had to
suit the organization's ranges of activities and their internal structures.
In Williamson's (1977 : 149) opinion, the rate of response to self
administered questionnaires is very low compared with other methods. As
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he notes: "Even if all means for increasing the return rate of self administered
questionnaires are employed successfully, it is unlikely that more than 70% of
the questionnaires will be returned". He recommends a 50% return rate as a
minimum acceptable level for surveys employing self administered question-
naires. Contrary to this pessimistic view, the return rate obtained in this
project was not low, being 91%. The rate of response is calculated from the
data in Table 5.1.
Rate of response = cases having a questionnaire x 100
number of questionnaires distributed
Rate of response = 53 = 91%
58
.	
.
The number of questionnaires distributed does not include the ones for cross-
checking purposes.
As shown in Table 5.3, for the decision examples for which interview
- material has already been collected, two questionnaires were never returned
from 1.11 and BF1, and one from HD. Certain factors may have helped obtain
a high rate of return. Personal contact and opportunity to explain the research
was probably most important. At the end of each interview, the researcher
explained to the interviewee why questionnaire information was important in
terms of research purposes and how to fill it in.
_
In the field work initial stages, questionnaires took a long time to
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return and some never came back. Phone calls had been made to the respon-
dents requesting co-operation, but too much time had elapsed since the inter-
view and interest had waned. Experience showed that a follow up phone call
within a fortnight following the interview was much more effective in securing
the return of questionnaires. Astley (1978) came to the same conclusion in
his attempts to have his questionnaires returned from the heads of departments
of American firms.
Additionally, as the data collection phase progressed, informants
were requested to fix a possible date by which the questionnaire would be back.
If the questionnaire was not returned within a maximum of five days the resear-
cher then called the informant directly inquiring whether he had experienced
any difficulties in filling in the form and whether it needed further clarification.
As Scott (1965) and Astley (1978) point out, there are few standard-
ized and validated measurement instruments in organizational research. There-
fore, new measures had to be devised in this research with risks to reliability
and validity since in a single project with severe time limits they could not be
perfected. On the other hand one can argue that because fixed choice question-
naires guarantee uniformity of stimuli they are therefore less liable to the kind
of response bias which affects reliability and validity (Kerlinger, 1964).
Unfortunately, methods to test for reliability suggested by social
scientists such as Kerlinger (1979), Phillips (1966), Williamson (1977) were
not applicable to this research. To retest a respondent several times would
not have been acceptable either from the respondent's point of view nor from
that of the organization's management. Some respondents even expressed
their rejection of any type of questionnaire. Examining reliability by an
analysis of variance test as suggested by Kerlinger would not be appropriate
either, considering the level of measurement of the research data.
The split-half method or the examination of correlations between
items as Phillips (1966) and Williamson recommend, could not be considered
since there were no items in the questionnaire measuring the same thing:
Its length had to be too short to permit duplication. Items to test for reliability
were not included in the questionnaire. Despite being short it already required
more than enough effort from the respondent who in many instances had to con-
sult archives to complete it properly. It was not an attitude-type questionnaire
In which respondents tick answers almost automatically.
. Validity as indicated by internal consistency was therefore tested
not within measures but between measures, in the sense that factory analysis
was used to expose what different measures might have in common. Chapter
VI returns to this question in dPtail.
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CHAPTER VI 
DECISION-MAKING VARIABLES : OPERATIONALIZATION
This chapter deals with the definition of the variables of the concep-
tual framework, elaborating those given when formulating hypotheses in Chapter
IV. The constitutive and operational definitions of each variable are presented
first. The great number of variables, and the alternative measures provided
by the measurement instruments, have required the use of statistical variables
In a meaningiul form. Based on these data analysis techniques, variables
which also showed conceptual affinities were combined. The resultant com-
binations then have gained a constitutive meaning, that is, they have become
defined by the variables which comprise them. Therefore, a second part of
the chapter deals mainly with the use of factor analysis and the constitutive
meaning of the factor variables. The final part discusses the theoretical
implications of the empirical results focussing particularly on the success
variables.
.6.1. Definitions of Decision-Making Variables 
The variables of the conceptual framework are those of constraints,
modes of process activation, process pace and decision-making success, as
In Figure 4.1, Chapter IV. As suggested in that Chapter, constraints
variables are of an instrumental type, that is, they are necessary con-
ditions to carry the decision through, and as such, they set the limits
undcr which it may succeed. Variables of process activation, on the other
hand, capture the behavioural aspect of the decision process, while process
pace variables depict its time dimensions. Decision-making success vari-
ables describe the outcomes which may result from the decision process.
.6.1.1. Constraint Variables 
As shown in Figure 4.1 chapter IV, the constraints variables are
those of resources, information and time pressure. Resources comprise a
set of variables which are primarily concerned with the availability and im-
portance of resources for a decision. Yuchtman and Seashore (1967:900)
have defined resources as "more or less generalized means or facilities
that are potentially controllable by social organizations and are potentially
usable - however indirectly - in the relationships between the organization
and its environment". They assume that some resources such as personnel,
physical facilities, technology and money are universal. In other words, all
organizations must be capable of acquiring them, though with different
capacities to do so.
As mentioned previously, the type of resources this research
examines are of a universal kind (see questionl4a, appendix B). Criticality
of resources examines which of these resources are important for making the
decision. The mean of the scores for each resource represents the overall
importance of the resources committed. This variable is taken as an indica-
tor of how strategic the decision is. By definition strategic decisions are
those which involve critical resources.
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Additionally, each decision has a score on the amount of money,
Lime, special knowledge and three other resources in question 143. Appendix
B. The mean of these scores represents the overall quantity of resources
available. However, the necessary resources for a decision may not be
disposable at the time a decision is made. As earlier mentioned, resources
are the reason for the dependence of the organization; their availability
depends on competition and on the existence of alternative sources of supply
(Thompson and McE wen 1958; Blau 1964; Thompson 1967). Thus, re-
sources may be readily available for some decisions but not for others.
Timeliness measures this i.e. whether resources were available at the ap-
propriate time. As shown in question 15a(Appendix B), response categories
vary from well in time to very late, on a five point scale.
A second set of constraint variables are those of information.
For a new product development decision information about competitor's
. strategies may be critical, whereas this may not be relevant for a decision
related to settlement of an internal conflict. Criticality of information 
of information measures which information is important for a given decision.
Each decision therefore, has a score on each information topic indicated in
question 7.a (Appendix 13). The mean of these scores represents the rele-
vance of information in general. Quantity of information  on the other hand,
measures how much information there is in a decision process independently
of its sources. Similarly, each decision has a score on the amount of each
type of information that is available, (question 7b, Appendix B).
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For the reasons given in Chapter IV, availability of information
is also problematic; even if sources of information are within the organi-
zation, they may not easily release it, or a more intensive search may be
required in order to clarify the initial situation. Thus, timeliness measures
if information is available in time (question 810 Appendix B) and generation of 
information  measures whether search activities succeeded in getting the
necessary information (see item 10Appendix C). This variable then takes
search as a formal information seeking activity. Aguilar (1967:21) defines
search as "a deliberate effort - usually following a pre-established plan,
procedure or methodology - to secure specific information or information
relating to a specific issue".
Accuracy of information concerns its quality, reliability and cer-
tainty. Following Churchman (1961:101), "accuracy entails information
about the possible deviations from reality". Response categories to ac-
curacy ranges from 'very inaccurate' to 'very accurate' as question 9
(Appendix C) shows.
While these variables concern the limits set by resources and
Information, time pressure, as the name indicates, refers to limits of time
under which decision has to be taken. Pressure of time therefore, measures
the extent to which time for arriving at a decision is perceived as short (see
question 13 Appendix B).
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The list of all constraints variables and a summary of their
definitions is presented in table 6.1.
TABLE 6.1 CONSTRAINTS VARIABLES
VARIABLES Del inition
RESOURCES
Criticality
Availability: Quantity
Availability: Timeliness
The importance of the resources committed
In the decision
The extent to which resources were
available to implement the decision
The extent to which resources became
available in time or later
EN FORMA TION.
Criticality
Availability: Quantity
Availability: Timeliness
Availability: Generation of
Information
Availability: Accuracy of
Information
The importance of the inform-.
ation required for making the decision
The extent to which information was
available for making the decision
The extent to which information became
available in time or later
The degree to which search activities
brought out the necessary information
The extent to which information was
correct
TIME PRESSLTRE The extent to which there was urgency to
Implement the decision
* See Appendix E for details.
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.6.1.2. Process Activation Variables 
As mentioned before, process activation variables concern the
behavioural aspects of the decision process. Some of these variables cap-
ture aspects of conflict in the decision-making process. The word conflict
may denote a quite different phenomenon according to whether it is used in
Psychology or Sociology. While in Psychology it has been defined in terms
of a response to different patterns of stimuli (Berlyne 1960),
in Sociology, conflict and power theorists emphasize the fragmentation of
interests and divergence of values within social systems (Boulding 1964,
Baldridge 1970, Pettigrew 1973). Boulding (1964:138) suggests that the
conflict situation comprises four elements: the parties involved in the con-
flict; "the field of conflict" which consists of the possible conditions which
a conflict could move; the dynamics of conflict which consists of adjust-
ments of a party's position according to that of his opponent, and finally
'the management and control of conflict.
The variables used here do -not capture all these dimensions
neither describe how it has occurred in the decision process. Rather,
they examine conflict in terms of divergent interests, and instead of con-
centrating on how conflict occurs the interest lies in the degrees of con-
flict.and in a specific form of conflict resolution - by compromise. Since
these variables only examine some aspects of a conflict situation and do
not depict its processual nature, the term conflictfulness has been adopted
to refer to them.
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Disagreement  represents the overall degree of conflict
over views. It is a summation of scores on the four five-point scales in
question 11. All four scales might not be scored by the respondent. If for
example divergence over views occurred in three levels, within departments,
between departments and within top management, the first to a little degree,
the second quite a bit and the third very much, then the sum of scores would
be 1 + 3 + 4 = 8. The possible amount of disagreement would be 3 x 4 = 12
and the intensity score would be 8 = 2 . Hence, scores vary from zero to
12 3
one. A score of zero means that there was no disagreement of views at any
level. The closer a score approaches to one, the greater intensity of dis-
agreement.
Compromise measures the degree to which divergence is conciliated
by compromise. Compromise is pointed out as one of the principal mechanisms
to arrive at decisions in modern democracies (Shepard 1964, Katz and Kahn
. 1966, Gergen 1969). Compromise is an outcome of bargaining, persuasion
and debate. The final result may not reflect completely what each interest
wanted, but each may have partially achieved its objective or may have ob-
tained a form of compensation. The degree of compromise is measured by
question 12 (Appendix B). A ratio is calculated by the same process as for
Intensity of disagreement.
A second set of variables of process activation are those of influ-
ence. Based on Hickson and associates' (1971) concept of power in the
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organizational context, influence in this project has been defined as the
ability of an interest unit to determine decision-making outcomes by con-
trolling strategic conditions. Power sharing patterns in the decision process
are represented by the distribution of influence. (The terms power and influ-
ence are used interchangeably, since the distinction between them is not
Important for the objectives of this present study.) Actual distribution of
influence measures the amount of influence each interest unit had in deter-
mining decision outcomes, whereas desired influence measures how much
influence each desirably should have had.
Several other measures have been extracted from question 10a
(Appendix B). Total influence corresponds to Tannenbaum's (1968) measure
of total control and indicates the overall influence exercised by all sources
in the decision process. The mean of scores of all groups on each part of
this question, which follows the format developed by Tannenbaum (1968),
Is used to indicate the average amount of influence. This, and the overall
score, range and skewness will be utilized to describe the distribution.
A fourth measure is computed from this question -  diversity of 
Interests - which is the number of interests represented in the decision-
making process. It follows Astley and associates' (1980) concept of plurality
which indicates the range of interests involved in a decision. A score on
diversity of interests has been obtained by counting the number of different
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units which have exercised influence in the decision process. Based on
Hickson and associates' (1978) idea, interest units are defined as internal
and external collectivities which have claims in the decision process.
Related to these variables there is no other group of variables
also focussing on influence patterns - centralization of influence - this time
with emphasis on the vertical components of influence dispersion. Two
aspects of centralization of influence are examined: higher management
Influence and specialists' influence.
As the name indicates,  higher management influence compares
the degree of influence exercised in the decision process by interest units
located at the top of the hierarchical pyramid with the amount of influence
mobilized by other levels within the organization. A ratio to express the
'concentration of influence at this level has been computed. First, the
interest units cited in question 10a (Appendix B) were classified into four
organizational levels. Table 6.2 shows examples of the groups mentioned
. ' and in which level they were classified for business and non-business organ-
izations. The classification of an interest unit at one level or another followed
the pattern indicated in this table, varying with their level in the organization.
For example, some committees in the university were classified at top
management level, such as the Academic Advisory Committee and the Uni-
versity Planning Committee, whereas others such as the Catering Committee
were included at middle management level.
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By using these categories, each decision obtained a score on
parent organization influence, top management influence, and upper middle
management and middle management influence, within a scale ranging from
"little influence" to "a very great deal". An index for higher management
Influence was calculated using the following ratio:
higher management
	 Parent influence + top management influence 
influence	 Upper middle management influence + Middle
management influence
In contrast, specialist's influence measures the proportion of
influence exercised by specialists as opposed to higher management. An
Index representing specialist's influence was calculated from the number
of specialized functions which participated in the making of the decision.
This resembles Pugh and associates' (1968) measure of specialization where
the number of specialisms is given by counting those functions which are
performed by specialists. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that this
study is not concerned with a measure of specialisms per se but rather with
the specialist's power share in the process of making the decision. The
index on specialist's influence was given by:
Specialist's influence 	 Number of specialized functions involved in
the decision-making 
Number of interests at higher management level
The calculation of this index is based on data from question loa
(A PPendix B) and on information provided by table 6.2.
- Deputy Registrar
- Professors
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TABLE 6.2 SOME EXAMPLES OF INTEREST UNITS
AND THEIR CLASSIFICATION INTO
ORGANIZATIONAL LEVELS
NON-BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS
BUSINESSLEVEL
PARENT
ORGANIZA TION
- Head Offices
- Holding Company
- Corporation
- Area Health Authority
(A. H.A .)
- University Grants
- Committee (U. G. C. )
TOP .
MA NA GE NIENT
- Company Board
- Divisional Director
- Overseas Director
- Subsidiary Director
- District Management Team
- Council
- Senate
- Vice Chancellor
- Deans of Faculty
- Registrar
- Bursar
- Academic Advisory
Committee
UPPER
MIDDLE
MANA GEMENT
- Department Heads
MIDDLE
MANAGEMENT
- Assistant heads of
departments
- Head Officers
- Heads of Sections
- Committees
- Sub-committees
- Working Parties
- Officers
- Services
168
A summary of the process activation variables and their definitions
Is shown in table 6.3.
The process pace variables have been broadly described in
chapter IV.
	 As mentioned there, the variables duration and tardiness
are conceptually based on the work of Mintzberg and associates (1976). They
suggested that a decision process begins when management recognizes the
need for a decision and then commits resources for the making of it, and it
ends with implementation. Duration  is therefore the period of time between
the recognition of the strategic stimuli and the commencement of implemen-
tation. It encompases any initial latency period, during which the idea is
around but nothing specific is done about it, and the period during which
identifiable decision-making activities take place, until authorization for
implementing is given. Duration, as a variable which indicates the length
of a decision from first actions to implementation, has already been used by
• others, namely Witte 1972 and A stley et al 1980. Two operational variables
together - promptness and length  - give an indication of duration.
,
Returning to figure 4.2 (Chapter IV), promptness represents the
time interval between the first recognition of a need for a decision and the
first specific action towards taking a decision, such as the formation of a
special committee to deal with it. It denotes the initial period of inactivity
in the decision process. Promptness is expressed in terms of number of
months and is measured by comparing replies to question 5a and to question
6a (Appendix B).
Actual distribution of
Influence
Desired distribution
influence
Total influence
TABLE 6.3 PROCESS ACTIVATION VARIABLES
VARIABLES DEFINITION
CONFLICTFULNESS
Disagreement
Compromise
The degree to which there were expressed dif-
ferences among interest groups as to the decision
issues
The extent to which conflict was settled by compromise
CENTRA LIZA TION
OF INFLUENCE
Higher management
Influence
Specialists influence
The amount of influence exercised by interests
at higher hierarchical levels
The amount of influence exercised by specialists
DISTRIBUTION OF
INFLUENCE
Diversity of interests
The amount of influence each interest had on the
decision process
The amount of influence each interest desirably
should have had on the decision process
The total amount of influence exercised by all
interests on the decision process
The number of interest units, internal and external
to the organization, which exercised influence on the
decision process
* See Appendix E for details.
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Process length, on the other hand, refers to the total period
during which there was activity in the decision process, no matter bow
Intermittently. Question 17a (Appendix B) measures the process length.
Tardiness comprises a set of variables which attempt to capture
how late the decision activities were, by means of a subjective assessment
about when they should ideally have occurred. Delays in the recognition of
the strategic stimuli  is an extension of the idea of promptness, since it
adds to the measure of time elapsed between recognition and action, a (sub-
jective) assessment of how late in the day the importance of making a deci-
sion was recognized. It is measured by question 5d (Appendix B). Delays 
In process is again a subjective assessment of how slowly the decision pro-
cess evolved. In other words, it denotes how much quicker the decision
could have been taken if delays which occurred along the way had been
_avoided. These two component variables give an idea of how far it might
have been possible for the organization to have acted quicker than it actually
did. A summarized definition of these variables and those capturing the
duration of the decision process are presented in table 6.4.
.6.1.3. Dependent Variables - Decision Success 
It has been mentioned earlier that the degree of success a decision
•
has achieved is measured in two forms. A first measure consists of a sub-
jective assessment, perceived success. Decision-makers were asked to
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TA BLE G . 4 PROCESS PA CE VARIABLES
DEFINITIONVARIABLES
DURATION
Promptness
Length
The extent to which the response to the
decision stimuli was immediate
The period of identifiable decision-making
activity culminating in the decision to
impleMent
TARDINESS
Delay in recognition
Delays in process
The extent to which the commencement of
specific decision-making action was later
than it ideally might have been
The extant to which the decision-making
process was protracted beyond the time
It ideally might have taken
* See Appendix E for details.
Indicate how successful the decision was, with response categories ranging
from "unsuccessful" to "very successful" (see question 4a, Appendix B).
An alternative form of measuring success involved the use of more
objective criteria: closure, proactivity, propitiousness and disturbance.
Closure measures the degree to which the problems that initiate the deci-
sion were dealt with. It resembles the concept of problem solving where
the solution means the removal of the difference between actual performance
and objectives, or the reduction of differences between existing and desirable
situations (Pounds 1969 , Ansoff 1971). Thus, closure compares a problem
situation which prevailed before the making of the decision with the situation
after it was taken. Question 2b (Appendix B) shows the response categories
used to assess the decision closure. The mean of the scores obtained in
this question represents the degree of closure a decision achieved.
Proactivity indicates the degree to which opportunities which
evoked the decision were realized/taken. Proactivity is a term which has
been associated with the ability to anticipate situations and actively search
for new opportunities (Mintzberg 1973a) question 3b (Appendix B) assess the
degree of proactivity a decision may achieve with response categories on a
three point scale.
Propitiousness denotes the degree of serendipity of a decision
process. It measures whether the making of the decision brought unforeseen
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TABLE 6.5 SUCCESS VARIABLES - LIST AND DEFINITION
VARIABLES DEFINITION
SUCCESS
Perceived success
Closure
Proactivity
Propitiousness
Disturbance
The extent to which the decision was
successful in the opinion of decision-
makers
The degree to which the problem(s)
which evoked the decision was (were)
solved by the making of the decision
The degree to which the opportunity(ies)
which evoked the decision was (were)
realized! taken
The extent to which unforeseen advan-
tages were exposed by the decision
process
The éxttnt to which unforeseen problems
were exposed by the decision process
* See Appendix E for details.
opportunities or fresh advantages. Each decision therefore was given a
score which represents the number of opportunities exposed by the decision
process (see item 13 Appendix C).
While propitiousness is associated with encountering circum-
stances which improve a situation or which enable the organization to achieve
better performance, disturbance indicates situations which threaten the at-
tainment of intended outcomes or may interfere in the negative sense. It is
Indicated by the number of additional problems encountered (see items 13, 14
Appendix C).
Table6 .5 presents a list of the success
	 variables and their
corresponding definitions.
..6.2. Combiniog Variables 
The conceptual model described in Chapter IV served as a guideline
.
to group the variables in the manner presented in the previous section. How-
ever, the many variables involved in the framework and the need to find also
an empirical justification to include a variable on one group rather than in
another, required the use of a statistical technique which would serve these
purposes. Factor analysis which provides data reduction facilities and indi-
cates whether variables may belong together seemed initially ideal for the
type of data obtained. However, as will be seen later, its use did not prove
to be completely adequate for all groups of variables employed in this research.
.6. 2.1. Factor Analysis
In research with a large exploratory element such as this, rep-
resentation of concepts by more than one measure is important for reliance
upon the results. As linings and associates (1974:25) state, "In a project
working with new variables exploratory operationalization of multiple sets
of data: and multiple representations of variables derived from close acquain-
tance with particular organizations gives confidence in the empirical basis
of the study". Employing many variables most of which comprised multiple
measures, this project required the use of a data analysis technique capable
of providing a parsimonious description of the results. Furthermore, ex-
ploratory studies in general require ex post facto analysis to secure a plaus-
ible interpretation of the findings (Katz 1965).
Factor analysis has been recommended as a technique ideal for
research where it is necessary to reduce or simplify the data, as well as
for research designed for hypothesis testing and purporting to discover and
explore underlying dimensions of a given set of data (Bennet and Bowers
1976, Child 1978, Kim and Mueller 1978a). In fact, the objective in using
factor analysis in this research was three fold. Apart from the intent to
represent a set of variables in terms of a smaller number of variables, and
testing the assumptions about the structure of concepts, new clusters of vari-
ables could be uncovered and then aid interpretation.
Based on the conceptual model and results of the correlation
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matrix, three sets of variables were separately factor analysed. The first
set consisted of all constraints variables with the exception of pressure of
time. Pressure of time was not included because it was not composed of
sub-variables and because of its distinctive theoretical importance. A
second set of variables comprised those of process activation and a third
set consisted of the decision success variables.
Process pace variables were not subjected to factor analysis
because of the interest in the relationships between them, especially between
duration and tardiness. Recent research in decision-making by Mintzberg
et al (1976) has found that duration and delays vary together. As factor
analysis is designed to minimize correlations between factors of the same
set, it was therefore decided that process pace variables should not be factor
analysed to avoid any restrictions upon the emerging of intercorrelations
among them. Nothing would be gained by combining them in any way. Thus
these variables have been grouped according to theoretical interest and cor-
relations between them.
A correlation of .50 between length and promptness justified
the combination of their scores into a common index. Duration is by virtue
of the combination of these two variables represented bSr a score resultant
from the sum of the standardized scores of each. Tardiness is represented
by a score resultant from the sum of the standardized scores of delays in
recognition and delays in process. It represents the overall degree to which
the decision is later than it might have been. A correlation coefficient of
0.51 supported summing these scores to represent the new variable.
Returning to the factoranalysis results, this technique proved to be
of no assistance when applied to some preliminary process activation measures. It ju:
reproduced the separate variables, that is, the results did not provide data
reduction. In view of these results no factor analysis has been attempted for
the variables shown in Table 6.3.
Although for these reasons factor analysis was not appropriate for
the duration and activation sets of variables, it was possible to use it to build
up scales for constraints and success. The scales constructed for constraints
are factor score based, i. e. they use all variables subjected to this technique,
.whilst the scores for success are factor analysis based, that is, a scale has
been built summing scores only of those variables with substantial loadings,
ignoring the remaining variables with minor loadings (see Kimm and Mueller
1978b).
The method of factor analysis used was principal components analysis
which permits an analysis of the total variance of each variable (Weiss 1971).
The rotation method used was varimax because it is possible with this method
to achieve what Thurstone (1947) describes as a simple structure. Approxi-
mation to a simple structure is attained when a variable which loads highly
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on one factor does not load highly on another. A simple structure is said
to have been achieved when for each factor the loads for some variables
are near to zero and the others are relatively large. The use of varimax
rotation is also recommended when the aim of the factor analysis is the
understanding of the nature of underlying dimensions (Weiss 1971).
The construction of constraints and success scores is now des-
cribed in detail.
.6.2.2. The Construction of Factor Score Scales for Constraints Variables 
As mentioned before, from the constraints group the resources
and information variables were subjected to factor analysis, excluding time
pressure. The number of variables they comprise required finding a con-
struct which could summarize these variables in meaningful form. For
criticality and quantity variables, only the mean was entered for factor
analysis, instead of using the separate scores of each type of information
or resources.
The first output of factor analysis is the correlation matrix which
Is automatically released by the SPSS Factor Programme by choosing the
appropriate option (Nie et al 1975). The matrix is presented in table 6.6.
With exception of criticality of resources and criticality of information, the
variables of each group are moderately intercorrelated. On the other hand,
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the two variables mentioned above are only low correlated with the rest and
are moderately correlated among themselves. The correlation matrix seems
to indicate two clusters of variables, one for criticality in general and another
• for remaining variables. However, the underlying dimensions only become
evident after factor analysis.
The Initial Factor Matrix is presented in Table 6.7. The
results show that an extremely simple structure has been obtained for the
constraints group. All variables which load high on the first factor do not •
load high on the second and vice-versa. Most variables load from moderately
to high on the first factor, with exception of variables measuring the impor-
tance of resources or information. Resources and information did not appear
as separate factors but seem to have a common element. These same under-
lying factors emerged in the Varimax Rotated Matrix, Table 6.8, which
confirms the factors structure obtained in the first matrix. The results
suggest two main factors: a first representing resources availability in
general and a second which has been named resources criticality. The fact
r	 41.that resources availability and criticality appear s_e_hi 	 ttier.4440 factorS
kis not too surprising. ipA Diany studies in organizational theory, in effect,
prefer to treat information as a scarce resource (e. g. Burns and Stalker
1951, Wilensky 1967, Pettigrew 1973).
As Table 6.8 indicates, the percentages of variance accounted
for by factor 1 and factor 2 are 75% and 24% respectively. However, rotated
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TABLE 6•7 INITIAL FACTOR MATRIX:
RESOURCES AND INFORMATION VARIABLES
Resources and Information
Variables
Factor 1
Availability of
Resources
Factor 2
Criticality of
Resources
Est.
Communality
Criticality of Resources .06 .60 .22
Quantity of Resources .53 .25 .38
Timeliness of Resources -.44 .18 .30
Criticality of Information -.06 .54 .17
Quantity of Information .74 .12 .56
Timeliness of Information -.49 .15 .31
Accuracy of Information .87 -.06 .61
Generation of Information .65	 . -.02 .40
Eigen Value .	 2.95 1.46
% of Variance 36.9% 18.3%
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TABLE 6.8 VARIMAX ROTATED MATRIX:
RESOURCES AND INFORMATION VARIABLES
Resources and Information
Variables
Factor 1
Availability of
Resources
Factor 2
Criticality of
Resources
Est.
Communality
Criticality of Resources .05 .60 .37
Quantity of Resources .53 .27 .35
Timeliness of Resources	 . -.44 .17 .23
Criticality of Information -.08	 . .54 .30
Quantity of Information .74 .14 •	 .57
Timeliness of Information -.49 .14 .26
Accuracy of Information .87 -.04 .76
Generation of Information .66 -.00 .43
Eigen Value 2.45 .79
% of Variance 75.6% 24.4%
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solutions, though ideal for the understanding of underlying dimensions,
are not really appropriate for the analysis of the variance composition
(Weiss 1971, Nie et al 1975). The amount of variance accounted for can be
better obtained from the eigen values yielded by the initial factor matrix
before rotation. Here the first factor explains 37% of the total variance
and the second explains 18% (Table 6.7). In general, the criterion for
accepting or rejecting a factor varies on an arbitrary basis, and it has
been suggested that factors accounting for less than 15% should be rejected
and given no further attention. Quantity of resources just passes such a
criterion. Pugh and associates (1968) have considered a factor (concen-
tration of authority) with 18.47% percentage of variance as potentially valid.
The degree of validity and nominal reliability of availability
of resources and criticality of resources as constructs can also be obtained
from this table. As Kerlinger (1979:47) points out, validity "is that portion
of the total variance of a measure that shares variance with other measures".
Hence valid variance does not include variance due to the unique factor.
Reliability on the other hand, is the proportion of variance which is true
variance, that is, the variance which is common or specific but not due to
errors. Following Nie et al (1975) the calculation of common variance of
a factor is given by:
Proportion of common variance
accounted for by Factor 1
---- (eigen value Factor 1)
(eigen value Factor 1 +
eigen value Factor 2)
Hence, from Table 6.8,
Proportion of common variance accounted = 
	
2. 95 
	
_ 66%
for by availability of resources:
	 2.95 + 1.46
Proportion of common variance accounted =
for by criticality of resources:
1.46 	
_ 32%
2.95 + 1.46
The validity of the scale for availability of resources is 66%,
whilst the validity of criticality of resources is 32%. Because the reliability
of a variable includes unique variance as well as common variance, relia-
bility values can be no less than its correspondent validity (see Weiss 1971,
Kerlinger 1979). Thus, the minimal reliability rate is again 67% and 32%
respectively for each variable. This indicates the probability of rep-
lication of the factors in a similar sample of decisions measuring the same
variables.
Based on these results two factor score scales for availability
. of resources and criticality of resources were built up using the SPSS Factor
Programme, options 7 and 11. Using these and statistics 7, a factor score
coefficient matrix is produced consisting of regression weights used to
yield a scale score for each individual case. Each decision therefore ob-
tains a score for availability of resources and another for criticality of
resources.
.6.2.3. The Construction of Factor Analysis Based Scales for Success Variable
The varimax factor matrix for the success variables is presented
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In Table 6.9. The results appear to satisfy the principle of simple structure,
since with exception of proactivity the variables which load high on one factor
do not load high on the other and vice-versa. The underlying dimension in
the first factor appears to be success, whilst closure which was assumed
to be a dimension of success, appears as a separate variable.
The proportion of common variance accounted by each variable
is moderate, although the high load presented by perceived success on factor
1 is not common in factor analysis. A variable loading 1.0 on a factor may
be a problem for scale construction and is an extreme case from a statistical
viewpoint. As Kim and Mueller (1978b) have noted, it is inappropriate to
build a scale when one of them is cotermincius. On the other hand, the dif-
ficulty with this set of variables could not be overcome by the exclusion of
perceived success from factor analysis. In the opinion of these authors,
entering just a few variables for factoring is not acceptable either.
Because results were not fully satisfactory from the statistical
point of view, it was decided not to build a single scale from the scores of all
variables loaded on factor 1. Moreover, there was an interest in comparing
relationships between perceived success and the other measures. Hence the
score on success was given by summing scores on proactivity, propitiousness
and disturbance, according to the regression weights indicated by the factor
scores coefficient matrix, but excluding perceived success. Successfulness,
therefore, became the following combination:
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TABLE 6 . 9 ROTA TED _MATRIX - SUCCESSFULNESS VARIABLES
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 COMMUNA LITY
3uccessfulness Closure (112)
Closure • 08 .68 .47
Proactivity .46 -.43 .40
Propitiousness .60 .21 .40
Disturbance -.55 .10 .31
Perceived Success 1.02 -.04 1.04
Eigen Value 1.93 I	 .70
Percentage of
Variance 73.5 I	 26.5
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Successfulness = Proactivity + Propitiousness - Disturbance.
Operationally, success became defined as the degree to which a decision
realizes opportunities and discovers new advantages without bringing any
further difficulties to the organization. Thus there came to be two measures
of decision success: successfulness  and perceived success. 
The degree of relationship between the successfulness scale and
perceived success was taken as an indicator of its validity. Figure 6.1
shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the success variables.
The high correlation between the composite successfulness variable and per-
ceived success (0.84, sig. 0.05) suggests that the created measure has some
validity. At least there is indication that they are both measuring similar
things. But as expected, the correlation between closure and perceived suc-
cess is negligible (0.05, sig. 0.01) and its correlation with other variables
is also negligible, except with proactivity (-0.30).
Dividing the sample of decisions into those from business and
non-business organizations produces consistent results. As Table 6.10
shows, the correlation between success and perceived success was virtually
the same again (0.85) for business and non-business organizations. Similar-
ly, the correlation between closure and perceived success is very small,
and it is not related to any of the separate variables, except proactivity.
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1.00 -20 -.72 -70
•
	 CLOSURE 1.00 .02 -.03
. 1.00 .14 -.03
•	 PERCEIVED SUCCESS 1.00 .84
1.00 .85
SUCCESS FULNESS (scores on van- 1.00
ables I , 2, and 3 summated) 1.00
1
2
3
4
5
TABLE 6.10	 PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
DEPENDENT VARIABLES, DISTINGUISHING BUSINESS
AND NON-BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS*
*COEFFICIENTS OF NON-BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS PLACED BENEATH.
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The correlational results in general indicate that some out-
comes tend to appear together, for example proactivity and propitiousness.
This suggests that when a decision leads to realization of opportunities
other unexpected benefits are also revealed. Either for the sample taken
as a whole, or for the sub-samples taken separately, both of these variables
appeared positively related to success or perceived success. Proactive
and propitious outcomes mean that a decision is perceived as successful.
On the other hand, disturbance appears negatively correlated to any of the
variables, more even strongly with success variables so that the more suc-
cessful a decision is, the less disturbances there are.
Considering closure, the negative correlation between it and
proactivity raises an interesting point. It may be possible that decisions
are either problem or opportunity oriented, or that a decision does not com-
pletely succeed in attaining multiple objectives at the same time.
Contrary to what has been expected, closure appeared as a
dimension on its own, having little in common with the other measures.
This raises some interesting questions. For example, it may not be pos-
sible to really solve some problems by a single decision. Although there
are some authors who tend to identify decision-mak-ing with problem solving
(Taylor 1974, Tuggle et al 1975, Tracy and Peterson 1977), others define
It as an entirely separate activity (Kogan and Wallach 1964, Cohen et al
1972). In Cohen and associates' (1972) view even if problems in the
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"garbage can" seem to be solved this is rarely so at least with the first
decision purporting to deal with them. So a possible reason for the lack
of association between closure and perceived success may be found in the
nature of the problems a decision purports to deal with. A decision which
apparently solves a problem and gives "closure" may not in fact do so and
problems reappear so that merely bringing things to a conclusion is not
necessarily successful. The need to find a more clear explanation of the
correlational findings led to the examination of the nature of the problems
and opportunities which motivated the decision.
.5.3. Content Analysis of Problems and Opportunities: An Empirical
Definition of Successfulness
Responses to questions 2a and 3a for each of the 53 sample
decisions were inspected. These showed various problems and opportunities
as being the source of decisions, and these were categorized as shown in
. Tables 6.11 and 6.12. There may be some ambiguity and overlap, inevit-
ably so, for these are not sharply defined in exclusive categories but merely
an aid to the comprehension of the nature-of the problems which stimulated
the decisions studied. Any one decision may deal with more than one category
of problem or opportunity. The division into categories does not imply that
all the problems or opportunities a decision deals with are of the same cate-
gory; a decision may deal with problems or opportunities of different cate-
gories.
Problems were grouped into the six categories in Table 6.11.
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TABLE 6.11 RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS - TYPES OF PROB-
LEMS WHICH MOTIVATED THE DECISION STUDIED
PROBL
TEGOR
EM
IESCA TYPES OF PROBLEMS
INEFFICIENCY OF
INFORMATION PROCESSING
To reduce time to process information •
To improve information channels
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
To terminate a strike
A breakdown of relationships between 2 parties
Non-cooperation with a new recruit
Competition between 2 unions
Complaints from users/staff/customers
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES
Deficit on the budget
Shortage of funds
Overspending
Cost increase
Profit loss
Excess of personnel costs
•
WORK INEFFICIENCY
Underutilization of space
Costs of excess of space
Undercapacity of outdated machines
Dealing with large scale clerical work
Inefficiency of work organization
Low labour production
Late delivery of products
Inefficiency of material flow
MARKET THREATS
Sales reduction
Lack of growth of the home market
Diminish influx of importers into home market
Cut back in main customers orders
Replace products overtaken by new technology
Suppliers would not be capable to support
further developments
Reduce product variety
Increase product variety
COPING WITH GROWTH
Increase of size and complexity
Coordination difficulties after acquisition
Replace old buildings
Capacity problems due to merger
Excess of personnel after adoption of a
new technology
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An examination of the type of problems mentioned shows that they differ
according to whether they occur inside or outside the organization boun-
daries, and consequently, according to whether they are more or less con-
trollable by the organization's own decisions. For example, by making an
appropriate decision an organization can directly alter the utilization of
space, inefficiency of material flow or the modernization of equipment.
However, unless the organization is monopolistic or Is very large, it is
only partially able to stop a foreign influx into the home markets. In a
decision where the problem is lack of growth in the home market any single
decision taken is likely to marginally shape the environment rather than to
control it. In fact, control over some market problems will depend on a
response from the industry as a whole or from government. In these cir-
cumstances, the organization manages to make adjustments to the situation
rather than 'remove the problems with final "closure" of the matter. It
would be more realistic to try to describe how far the impact of certain
problems upon the organization was buffered by a particular decision.
While a reason for the lack of association between problem
solving (closure) and perceived success may be found in the degree of con-
trol of problems, an alternative explanation relies on the nature of those
listed in Table 6.11. Most of the problems are of a nature that managers
want to get rid of or to diminish their effects, such as reducing the time to
process information, reducing overspending, removing a conflict, or
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terminating a strike. Thus, the types of problems mentioned are negative
In character. They constitute in some way undesirable situations which
Interfere with the organizational goals. Merely solving a problem that is
already there is not seen as success because it gives nothing more, no gain,
only removal of difficulties.
These findings can be compared to the characteristics of
opportunity decisions (as measured by proactivity obtained by inspecting
answers to question 3a (Appendix B).
The examples in Table 6 .12 show that opportunity oriented
. decisions have some definite characteristics. The content of the examples
suggests that opportunities decisions are taken to improve a situation
(Mintzberg et al 1976, Proctor 1977) or to raise the organization's objec- -
tives to better levels (Ansoff 1971). Thus, whilst problem decisions may
• be characterized as reactive and adaptative, opportunities decisions are
better described as proactive, and entrepreneurial. If, on the one hand,
problems are described as events which have already happened, opportunities
on the other hand are described in terms of expected positive outcomes from
certain actions. For example, an organization may decide to reduce inven-
tory, expecting an improvement of cash flow and better profitability. Alter-
natively, it may decide to introduce a profit sharing scheme to raise produc-
tivity or to improve management-worker relationships. Atkinson (1957) has
noted that motivation for a decision comes from expected utilities associated
TABLE 6.12 RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS: TYPES OF OPPOR-
TUNITIES WHICH MOTIVA TED THE DECISIONS STUDIED
OPPORTUNITIES
CATEGORIES TYPES OF OPPORTUNITIES
IMPROVE FINANCE
CONDITIONS
.	 ,To save money
To improve cash flow
To improve profitability
Provide for cost reduction
Reduce expenditure
Spread sales risk
EXPAND ACTIVITIES:
(NEW PRODUCTS /
NEW BUSINESS /
NEW CONTRACTS)
Introduction of a new technology
Expand business abroad
Further entry in a broad market
To tie a major competitor to a subsidiary product
To increase the company market share
To ensure a new contract with firms
. IMPROVE INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS
Improve relationships with unions
Better management work relationship
IMPROVE STAFF
EFFICIENCY /
STAFF DEVELOPMENT
Better utilization of manpower resources
Attain better productivity
Gain a greater flexibility in training
programmes
Develop staff computer experience
RATIONALIZATION OF
WORK / NEW METHODS
OF WORK
•
Establish new administrative methods
Improve operational systems
Improve material flow
Improve manufacture layout
IMPROVE CAPACITY
OF THE INFORMATION
SYSTEM
Improve statistical information for decisions
Improve information for stock control
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with a course of action. He defines an expectancy as a cognitive anticipation
that an action will be followed by particular consequences. Following
Atkinson's ideas, an opportunity as a stimulus for a decision can be defined
as an anticipation that positive outcomes will follow the making of decisions,
usually as a result of cues in a situation.
Thus, apart from being associated with pins, with positive
outcomes, opportunities as they appear in Table 6.11 concern more specific
situations which perhaps are more liable to organization control.
In summary, with a basis in the content of those problems
- and opportunities which served as a motivation for a decision, two tentative
hypotheses have been raised to explain the correlational results. First, it
appears that some problems which strategic decisions concern are very _
broad in character and unlikely to be controlled by a single organization
response. Hence, it appears that whilst closure may be a criterion ideal
for evaluating a routine decision, or the type of decision which normative
theories and small group theories deal with, it is an inapi5ropriate indicator
of the successfulness of strategic decisions. For decisions dealing with
complex problems, whose dimensions depend on environmental changes not
immediately predictable, or problems of a political nature which may only
be solved by a step by step approach, another criterion capturing the organ-
ization's re-adjustment, or the ability to handle uncertainties and convert
the situation into more manageable form, would be more appropriate. Such
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a criterion of decision success would correspond to Thompson's idea of
organization intelligence behaviour, where rationality is associated to
the ability of the organization to anticipate environmental contingencies and
to adapt to influences that cannot be "buffered" or "levelled". (Thompson
1967:21)
Secondly, success in general is seen predominantly in positive
terms. A successful decision is the one which seizes opportunities (pro-
activity) where pins  from unexpected advantages do not bring further dif-
ficulties which the organization has to cope with (undisturbed smooth deci-
sions). Lack of success, on the other hand, is clearly associated with the
appearance of further difficulties and unforeseen obstacles (disturbed
decisions). Solving a problem which is already there is not seen as a
success because there is no gain, no feeling of having done something more,
apart from the reduction or termination of an existing difficulty. In short,
. to be successful a decision has to give a net benefit over what was already
there before.
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CHAPTER VII 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL:
NON-BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
This chapter comprises an analysis of the relationships between
the independent variables of the conceptual framework and decision-making
success, It concerns particularly the results for non-business organizations.
Initially, however, the results for the whole sample are briefly discussed.
The second section of the chapter discusses the correlational results in
relation to the hypotheses formulated in Chapter IV, and the third section
deals with some theoretical implications of the findings for non-business
organizations.
.7.1. Some Procedures Adopted in the Data Analysis
As reported in the previous chapter, the scores of most of the
variables in the conceptual framework have been combined either with a
basis in factor analysis results or with a basis in direct correlational
affinities. Thus, resources and information variables are now represented
by availability of resources and criticality of resources, and the variables
of process pace became those of duration and tardiness. The remaining
Independent variables were not combined either because of their theoretical
relevance or because they did not prove appropriate for factor analysis.
Therefore, where it is desirable to present a concise portrait of the results,
the discussion concentrates on the variables of major theoretical relevance
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and on the composed variables rather than on the constituent variables which
form each of them.
As regards data analysis, two other procedures have been adopted.
First, all data have been standardized to avoid difficulties of comparability
between variables which have been measured in different ways: some vari-
ables were measured in terms of frequency of events, others by a five or
three point scale, and yet others involved units of time.
Secondly, a significance test for the correlational results has been
adopted, but only when the whole sample is analysed. Although the test of
significance used may be applied to small samples (Freund and Williams
1970) it has been considered that the coefficient yielded for the subsamples
would have little meaning. In cases where the sample size was 53 a test of
significance has been used based on Freund and Williams, by which the null
hypothesis of no correlation can be rejected when:
r> 1.96 
.7.2. Some Preliminary Results: Business and Non-Business Organizations 
The interrelationships among independent variables are shown in
Table 7.1. In general, correlation coefficients are disappointingly low,
with the exception of a few variables which are moderately correlated to
others of their own group. For example, disagreements is correlated to
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TABLE 7.1 INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
(PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENT) BUSINESS AND
NON-BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
a
a
k
.1 .10* .30* .30* .30* -.20 .31 -13 .30 -.11* -.2C4
.22* .20* .25* .20* .30 -00 00 -.35 -.30
.11* -.14* .00* .11 .14 .42* -.24* -28*
.23* .08 .30* -75* 7 08 .01 -244
.40* .07* -20 -30* .14* .264
\ .
.20 -.00 -.10 .06* .144
-.10 .02 -.14* -304
.33* .00 -.05
n .
.54*
1 . , 1
N53
LEGEND
a	 Availability of Resources
Criticality of Resources
Time Pressure
Higher Management Influence
Disagreement
Compromise
Amount of Influence
Specialists Influence
Duration
Tardiness
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compromise settlement and tardiness appears correlated to duration by 0.54*.
Most of the variables appear to be Inversely correlated to tardiness and duration,
with the exception of disagreements. Within the limits of the small magnitude
of the coefficients, these results suggest that resources availability, resources
criticality, time pressure and higher management influences are associated
with decisions of longer duration. Perhaps the availability of critical resources
and shortage of time spur a quicker central *decision.
An examination of the interrelationships between independent and depen-
dent variables does not add much. As Table 7.2 indicates, relationships among
variables are weak, which appears to suggest that the variables of the Conceptual
model explain a very small proportion of variation in decision success. The
• question is why this may be so. It has been assumed in Chapters IV and V,
that the variables of the conceptual model-would portray decision-making pro-
cess and outcomes in various types of organizations. In this, this research
-has followed Pugh et al's (1968) methodology which compares across organi-
zations of whatever kind. The assumption in designing the conceptual model
was that statements linking the independent component to the dependent com-
ponent would apply to various types of decisions in both business and non-business
organizations and would.show a meaningful relationship. Thus, by using those
concepts developed in the previous chapters, decision-making success could be
ex-plained simultaneously in both types of organizations. No provision was,
therefore, made in the model for different profiles in different organizations,
although variations in the support for some hypotheses were expected for a given
type of organization.
Dependent Variables
Closure
Proactivity
Propitiousness
Disturbance
Successfulness
Perceived success
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TABLE 7.2 INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG INDEPENDENT AND
DEPENDENT VARIABLES (PEARSON CORRELATION
COEFFICIENTS) BUSINES AND NON-BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS
a
.204 .11* .10* .01 01* .05 -02* -.11 .07 .20* .22*
•324 .03 .05* -.01 -.20* -.04* .24 .20 .44 -. 06* -.30*
.09'4 -.21.44 -.03* -.02 -32* -.11* .20 -.03 .22 .30* -.09*
-.13* -. or .02 . 09 4 .30* -13* .02* -.13 -.05 -.07* -.06*
/ •
.30*-.10* -00 -06K -.40* -.00* •.20* .14 .33 .20* -.21*
-.30 -..20 .20* -.14 -.40* -00* .00 .14 .30 .11 -.04
N53
LEGEND.
a
Independent Variables
Availability of Resources
Criticality of Resources
Time pressure
Higher Management Influence
Disagreement
Compromise
Amount of influence
Specialists influence
Diversity of interests
Duration .
Tardiness
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As the results presented above indicate, the analysis of both kinds of
organizations together produces no useful result, for no clear relationship
among the variables has been identified . Some control for the variation in
the type and importance of decisions appears to be gained by dividing the sample
Into two sub-sets of business and non-business organizations. As will be shown
In this chapter and the next, the division in sub-samples makes it possible to
Identify some principal features of decision-making success in each type of
organization. The outcome of sub-dividing the sample contrasts with Pugh et al
(1068)who defend a general theory of organizations, where the relationship
between context and structure would be maintained across a variety of organi-
zations. It seems that process may differ more strikingly between sub-types
of organization as the analysis of the data have suggested. Therefore, instead
of attempting a rather fruitless interpretation of weak correlations for the
sample as a whole, the analysis of the results is focused on the findings for
the two types of organization separately. Interpretation of the results and
analysis of the hypotheses for non-business organizations follow in this chapter,
and Chapter VIII describes the results for business organizations.
'
.7.3. The Analysis of the Conceptual Model: Non-business Organizations 
The analysis of results concerning non-business organizations involves
data on 19 decisions from two universities and the Health District. These are
the 19 first decisions listed in Appendix A.
Because of the complex relationships among the variables of the
-
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conceptual framework, the analysis of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter
IV will be built up "incrementally", beginning with independent variables.
.7.3.1. Interrelationships A mong Independent Variables: Non-business 
Organizations
. Interrelationships among independent variables are shown in Table
7.3. The correlation coefficients are not high but, nevertheless, some sup-
port may be found for some of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter IV. The
moderate correlation between resources availability and time pressure (0.40)
suggests that a greater amount of resources is committed when it is urgent
to make the decision, so as to speed up the decision process. If the corre-
. lation between time pressure and tardiness is then examined (-:38) it can be
seen that the greater the time pressure, the less tardy a decision is, and the
shorter the decision duration (Hypothesis 10). These findings support the view
that quicker decisions tend to be made when a deadline is superimposed
.(Wilensky 1967, Olsen 1976, Weiner 1976).
The correlation coefficient between availability of resources and the
degree of disagreements (0.35) is again not ideal, but nevertheless it lends
some support for Hypothesis 5, which postulates that  the less available resources
are, the more conflict in the decision. It provides some support for the bargain-
ing view of conflict which sees scarcity of resources as a motive for competition
betwecn diverse interests (Pondy 1967, Pettigrew 1973, Salancik and Pfeffer
1974). On the other hand, it can be noticed that resources availability
ab
g
h
i
j
k
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TABLE 7.3  INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
(PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS) NON-BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS
a
	 b	 C	 d	 e	 I
	
h	 i	 k
C
d'
e
f
1 .09 .40 05 .35 07 .23 •	 .3.3 . 30 -20 -24
.40 .23 03 . 11 .24 -04 -40 -61 -40
•
-.02 -32 -52 -.33 .20 .40 07 -38
—
.51 I	 .35 .40 -45 -40 -03 .09
.05 .08 -.50 -.50 00 .30
-.40 -36 -36 .15 .34
-.15 -.25 -23 -35
.50 -.35 -31
.23 -04
• .62
' 1
N = 34
LEGEND
a	 Availability of Resources
b	 Criticality of Resources
c	 Time pressure
d Higher Management Influence
-e	 Disagreement
I	 Compromise
g Amount of Influence
h Specialists Influence
i	 Diversity of Interests
j	 Duration
k	 Tardiness
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is positively related to the amount of influence in the decision process.
Here, the correlation coefficient is small (.23), and therefore little support
is provided for the assumption that where a large amount of resources is in-
volved, so is power, or to the alternative argument that powerful interest
units tend to be more able to obtain relevant resources (Pfeffer and Salancik
1974). Availability of resources is inversely correlated to tardiness and
duration, but hardly to a satisfactory degree. The decision process does not
seem to be held back by lack of resources or activities to gather information.
It may be that the type of decisions made in these organizations do not need
much scanning or a special kind of resource which the organization does not
have immediately available.
Like availability of resources, criticality of resources is moderately
correlated to pressure of time (0.40) which suggests two possibilities: first,
it may be that under time pressure, more valuable resources are mobilized
to meet the time requirements (Wilensity 1967). On the other hand, it may be
that in non-business organizations decisions involving important resources tend
to be subjected to a deadline and taken more hierarchically, because, of what is
at stake. In this there is some support for Hypothesis 7, which postulates that
the greater the criticality of resources involved in the decision the greater the
influence of higher hierarchical levels in the decision process. Nevertheless,
evidence for this hypothesis is weak, since the correlation between criticality
of resources and higher management influence is low (0.23). However, neither
specialists or their interests are more highly involved in these decisions.
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Contrary to what had been expected, criticality of resources and the
degree of disagreement are not related. The lack of correlation between these
variables provides no support for the assumption that co-ifflibrnds to be-higher
In decisions involving important resources. On the —Other-lia:nd',- criticality of
resources is inversely correlated to tardiness (-0.40) and to duration (-0.61).
These correlations seem to reinforce the argument that decisions involving
commitment of critical resources are shorter in duration.
^
.	 .	 .
Hypothesis 9 postulated that under conditions of time pressure, the
more the tendency towards centralization. However, as far as non-business
organizations are concerned, there is little support for this hypothesis. As
shown in Table 7.3, there is *practically no correlation between time pressure
and centralization of influence. On the contrary, it seems that urgency draws
in various interests from different parts of hierarchy (see coefficients with
different parts of hierarchy (see coefficients with specialists and diversity of
interests .20, .40 respectively).
Hypothesis 10 is more complex, involving relationships among three
variables. It postulated that the greater the time pressure, the less conflict
there is in a decision and the shorter the process duration._ Selecting the rele-
vant correlations from Table 7.3, it can be seen that the results tend to support
this hypothesis. Figure 7.1 summarizes these relationships._
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FIGURE 7.1	 ILLUSTRATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
TIME PRESSURE, DISAGREEMENT, AND DURATION
Continuing the analysis of results on Table 7.3 it can be noticed
that higher management influence is moderately related to disagreement,
compromise settlement and amount of influence. Following Wilensky (1967),
It was expected that decentralization would be associated with a high degree
of conflict, assuming that it implies diverse views and disparate preferences.
Instead, these results provide evidence that the more influence from higher
hierarchical levels, the more conflict not less. Nevertheless, the results
lend support to the assumption that conflia.slows down the decision process.
As for the complete sample, the correlation coefficient of.(0.34) between com-
promise settlement and tardiness lends some support to the literature findings
that political activities cause delays (Huntington 1961, Wilensky 1967, Mintzberg
et al 1976). As in decisions where higher management exert more influence,
_
there is more disagreement, there is no way to speed things up when they are
involved (correlation coefficient between higher management influence and
tardiness = .09).
	 •
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It can be seen from Table 7.3 that the amount of influence is inversely
correlated to tardiness and duration. Results seem to indicate that a greater
amount of influence in the coalition may speed up the decision process I. e.
influence can be used to push ahead with the decision rather than to delay it
by political activity.
Similarly to the results obtained from the complete sample, tardiness •
and duration are correlated (0.62). However, the results do not repeat for
disagreements and compromise settlement, which here are not interrelated.
The lack of correlation between these two variables seems to suggest that
compromise does not occur in the same proportion as conflict. In other
words, it cannot be assumed that in a decision where there is a high degree
of conflict there is an equivalent amount of compromise.
Hypothesis 15 postulated that the greater the influence of specialists
in a decision process the more conflict and delays. Here, emphasis has been
given to divergent values and goals of different groups as a source of conflict
following the concern with the pluralistic aspects of decision-making shown by
some recent studies in this field (Baldridge 1971, Pettigrew 1973, Abell 1975,
Astley et al 1980). Two measures described in the previous chapter can in fact
capture the pluralistic aspects of decision-making: specialists influence and
diversity of interests. The correlation coefficient between these two variables
Is 0.50 (Table 7.3) which seems to suggest that they may be tapping similar
dimensions. The more specialists there are influencing the decision the more
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the diversity of interests involved, an obvious but reassuring result. Yet as
Table 7.3 shows, and contrary to what had been expected, neither specialists
influence nor diversity of interests appears positively associated with conflict
or duration. Indeed, the opposite. The more interests involved in a decision,
the less conflict and the faster the decision process. Again we see interests,
as influence, seeming to push things along. Perhaps there is a need to hasten
before conflict can arise? The findings of the present research, so far, do
not provide support for the assumption so widely made that fragmentation of
goals and interests is a source of conflict. Similarly, there is no evidence
that many interests in a coalition slow down the decision process as some
studies seem to suggest (Olsen 1976, Weiner 1976, Astley et al 1980).
Thus with the results in Table 7.3 it is possible to examine whether
the data provides support for many of the hypotheses formulated in Chapter
IV, except those involving base variables which have been combined to rep-
resent a wider concept such as resources availability. By examining the first
row in this table it can be seen that resources availability appears only weakly
and erratically correlated to the other independent variables. The examination
of each resource variable separately is not warranted for non-business organi-
zations because resources are not shown to be of such importance to decision-
making as in businesses (as the following chapter indicates).
_
The analysis of the independent variables of the conceptual model,
has shown that some support has been gained for some of the hypotheses
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formulated in Chapter IV. Some interesting relationships among variables,
not anticipated, are also revealed. Before drawing major conclusions on
these findings it is interesting to see what the analysis of the interrelation-
ships among the independent and dependent variables can add to interpretation.
.7.3.2. Interrelationships Among Independent and Dependent Variables -
Factors Associated with Decision-making Success 
Table 7.4 presents the zero order correlation coefficients between
some of the variables in Table 7.3 and success variables (successfulness and
perceived success). The results pick out certain variables as affecting the
degree of success and decision outcomes. Higher management influence, for
example, is inversely related to proactivity and propitiousness and positively
related to disturbances. This suggests that when higher management has a
stronger voice in the decision process, opportunities may not be seized, there
may be no unforeseen gains and new difficulties may appear as a result of the
-decision! It prompts the thought that in hospitals and universities more equal
participation pays off.
Another variable which seems to have an impact on decision success
is intensity of disagreement. The more disagreement the less successful the
decision is. According to the correlations in Table 7.5 the greater conflict,
the more delays, the less proactive and propitious the decision is and the more
disturbances are brought in (Hypothesis 14). These findings apparently suggest
that conflict is disfunctional to decision-making in the sense that it may impede
TABLE 7.4 INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AND
DEPENDENT VARIABLES (PEARSON CORRELATION
COEFFICIENTS) FOR NON-BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
a
Li -.20 .08 .11 .00 -.01 .33 .30 .20 -.20
.30 -.04
4
-.22 -.32 -.44 -.30 .04 .00 -.40
1
i
-.08 -.30
I
-.23 -.35
•
-.32 .07 .31 .13 -.32
-.20
i
7
.13
1
i
.20 .45 .70 -.23 .04 .21 .02
.20 -.20
I
-.05 . -.51 -.65 -.07 .20 -.01 -.40
•
.00 -.23 -.04 -.70 -.60 -.07 -.02 -.09 -.33
N = 19
LEGEND
a
	 Availability of Resources
Criticality of Resources
Time Pressure
d'	 Higher Management Influence
Disagreement
Compromise
Amount of Influence
Duration
Tardiness
• Closure
3 Proactivity
w	 Propitiousness
• Disturbances
y	 Successfulness (composite measur(
• Perceived success
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attainment of desired outcomes and even bring further difficulties which were
not predicted. However, care must be exercised in Interpreting these findings
while some appear to believe that conflict may be an obstacle to attainment of
the organization's goals as March and Simon (1958) appear to suggest. It
appears that this depends very much on forms of conflict resolution, and on
the persistence of conflict over time (Assael 1969, Pondy 1967).
It can be seen from Table 7.4 that compromise settlement is not
directly related to the success variables. It is, on the other hand, correlated
to closure (0.33) and to proactivity (-0.30). Despite the small correlation co-
efficients, these results appear highly consistent. Conflict theorists have em-
phasized the muddling through and undoing characteristics of compromise settle-
ment Moulding 1964, Pondy 1967, Baldridge 1971). Referring back to Table
7.3 for a moment, it can be observed that compromise settlement is positively
related to tardiness, which in turn is inversely related to proactivity (Table 7.4).
Thus, when time is spent in negotiations and political activities to conciliate dif-
ferent interests there is a certain cost in proactivity when a quick response is
essential.
Indeed, the correlation between tardiness and proactivity and between
the former and propitiousness suggests that time is an important variable to
seizing opportunities and to the guarantee of propitious benefits. Nevertheless,
time is important only in the sense of delays because duration simply does not
have an effect on success (successfulness and perceived success). Speed is not
necessarily success, though it may be. Quick decisions, however, seem to
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favour proactivity which provides some support for recent studies in business
policy emphasizing the speed of response of organizations as an important
factor to seizing opportunities (Mintzberg 1973; Ansoff 1975).
Whilst process activation variables seem to be of some importance to
the degree of success a decision achieves, constraints variables are merely
weakly associated with it. Resources availability is correlated to closure by
no more than -0.20, which is striking considering the important role Liven to
resources acquisition as a source of organization effectiveness in the literature
(Thompson 1967, Yuchtman and Seashore 1967). Resources availability is
slightly related to proactivity (0.30), which suggests that success in seizing
opportunities does sometimes depend on whether resources are more or less
available; Yet criticality of resources(and time pressure) seem to have little
direct impact on decision success (successfulness perceived success) in these
universities and health district.
.7.3.3. SomeResults of Partial Correlation 
The analysis of the zero order correlation coefficients has indicated
that whilst some variables had a direct association with the degree of success-
fulness, correlations were not large. To see how far these relationships might
be dependent on third variables, and might be seen to be greater if the effects
of these were allowed for, partial correlations were calculated.
Initially, the relationships of the principal independent variables were
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examined, first by holding duration constant, and secondly by holding tardiness
constant. Table 7.5 shows the first order partial coefficients of constraints and
process activation variables. Comparing these results to the ones obtained in
Table 7.4, one can see that holding duration constant virtually does not change
the size of the correlation coefficients relating independent variables to success.
If tardiness is held constant, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients with
intensity of disagreement and success is reduced a little. Possibly some of the
effects of these variables in decision successfulness is mediated by tardiness.
TABLE 7.5 FIRST ORDER PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND DECISION SUCCESSFULNESS
Independent
Variables
Controlling for
Duration
Controlling for
Tardiness
Availability of
Resources .20 , .10
Criticality of
Resources	 .
-.30
•
-.44
_
Time Pressure .05 -.21
Higher Management
Influence
-	 -.51 -.60
Disagreement -.65 -.61
Compromise -.07 .03
A mount of
. Influence
•	 .20
_
.05
N = 19
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However, the impact of criticality of resources and higher management
influence is greater when controlling for the effects of tardiness. The partial
coefficient (-.44) between criticality of resources and successfulness seems to
indicate that decisions involving important resources tend to be less successful,
but as the magnitude of this correlation is reduced to (-.22) if availability of
resources is held constant, the indication is that availability matters more
than how important the resources are, though neither is very significant.
A further set of partial correlations was attempted, relating duration,
tardiness and success to resources availability and resources criticality, but
this time holding three variables constant: intensity of disagreement, higher
management influence and total amount of influence. The third order partials
are presented in Table 7.6. The magnitude of the correlation coefficients with
resources availability are reduced in comparison with the zero order coefficients.
These results confirm that this variable has little direct effect in decision suc-
cessfulness. Most of the effects resources availability have is by mediating
Intensity of disagreements and amount of influence.
There is no major change in the criticality coefficients when process
activation variables are held constant. However, the impact of time pressure
_ -
on tardiness is greater here, compared with the zero order correlation coef-
ficients.
A final set of partials examines the effect of duration and tardiness on
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success when each of them is held constant. These first order partial cor-
relation are presented in Table 7.7, which shows that when tardiness is held
constant duration becomes correlated to successfulness (0.30) and indicates
that the relationship between duration and successfulness is stronger than at
first appeared.
.7.3.4. A Synthesis: An Empirical Basis for the Conceptual Model 
Figure 7.2 presents a synthesis of the correlational results. Due to
the need to present the main interrelationships among variables clearly and
concisely, only the variables of major theoretical relevance are indicated in
this figure. Duration is not indicated here because it related with just a few
variables-of the conceptual model and is of less importance to success. The
first order correlation coefficients are presented between brackets and the
partials outside. Yet, on the details about the construction of this figure, it
Is important to mention that only the relationships having a correlation co-
efficient above .20 are there represented. The interrelationships indicated
by the correlation coefficients should really be indicated by two-headed arrows.
The one-headed arrows just indicate the emphasis of interpretation given by this
project. Partials were not computed for all variables because the idea was just
to control for mediating variables. Hence, it was of interest to examine the
effects of all variables on success by first controlling for duration and tardi-
ness. Secondly, there was an interest to discover if constraints variables were
related directly to success by holding constant the possible intervening activation
variables such as disagreement, higher management influence and total amount
of influence.
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TABLE 7.6 THIRD ORDER PARTIAL CORRELATIONS CONSTRAINT
VARIABLES - WITH DURATION TARDINESS AND SUCCESSFULNESS
Constraint Variables Duration Tardiness Successfulness
Availability of Resources
(controlling for process
activation variables
--.12 -.05 .15
Criticality of Resources	 .
(controlling for process
activation variables
-60 -.41 -.24
Pressure of time
(controlling for process
activation variables)
.09 -.43 .03
N = 19
TABLE 7.7 FIRST ORDER PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS:
•	 PACE VARIABLES AND DECISION SUCCESSFULNESS
SuccessfulnessIndependentVariables
Duration
(controlling for
Tardiness)
Tardiness
_
(controlling for
Duration)
N - 19
.30
-.50
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As shown in this figure, the constraints variables are only weakly
linked to the modes of process activation, whilst those are more strongly
related among themselves and to tardiness and success. However, although
the correlation coefficients linking constraints to modes of process activation
are not strong, these results lend some support to some of the hypotheses
formulated in Chapter IV. For example,  the less available resources are.,
the more conflict in the decision process  (Hypothesis 5); the more critical 
the resources, the greater the influence of higher hierarchical levels in the 
decision-making process (Hypothesis 7). Also, as expected, the more time 
pressure the less conflict in the decision process and the less tardy it is 
Hypothesis 10). It is also interesting to note that decisions involving more
critical resources tend to be made under time pressure, may be centralized 
and  tend to have a less tardy decision process. 
The results also suggest that the greater the influence of higher hier-
archical levels, the greater disagreement there is, and the greater the total
influence in the decision process. The results confirm that tardiness is a very
Important variable in the conceptual model. They suggest that a decision process
Is less late and slow when it involves critical resources, when the decision is
made under time constraints and when there are more powerful interests in the
decision process. Nevertheless, conflict tends to slow down the process of .
decision-making, so that powerful interests are more likely to achieve a suc-
cessful decision if they are in agreement.
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From Figure 7.2 two groups of effects on decision-making success
appear most evident. First, some factors appear to influence the degree of
successfulness indirectly, such as those which may reduce the tardiness of
a decision. Secondly, the form in which the decision has been made - for
example, whether there has been agreement with the alternatives and solutions
proposed by those on the top of the hierarchy - is directly related to the degree
of success achieved. It would appear that outcomes are less successful when
there is disagreement with the proposals of those on the top. Thus, it can be
suggested that in non-business organizations how the decision has been poli-
tically conducted appears to be of major relevance to decision-making success
in these organizations. However, this finding is not much of a surprise, since
most of the literature in non-business organizations emphasize the point that
In this kind of setting effectiveness is defined in terms of quality of service •
and political criteria (Lindblom 1959, Simon 1976, Heydebrand 1973, Kerr
1976). But nevertheless, this does not mean to say that in these organizations
decision-making is only behaviour predominating. The presence of both be-
havioural and instrumental aspects is quite evident from Figure 7.2. Rational-
bounded behaviour appears to manifest when there is pressure for a quick deci-
sion. A certain degree of control of the decision process seems to be achieved
by mobilization of more important resources and reduction of conflict. On the
other hand, one can see the political side of the process when conflict seems
to increase as a result of who has more influence in the coalition. As is clear
from this figure, the blending of instrumental and behavioural aspects deter-
mines the pace of the decision process. A more tardy or rapid process depends
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on the importance of the resources involved in the decision-making, and on
the involvement of more powerful interests. Conflict by contrast slows down
the process.
The correlational results have indicated on the other hand that the
Impact of resources availability on the way a decision is made in non-business•
organizations is not that significant, neither is resources availability Instru-
mental for decision success. The first reaction of surprise at this result is
tempered when it is recalled that it was suggested in Chapter IV that the im-
pact of resources availability would be lower in organizations having less dis-
cretion over resources allocations. Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) have noted
that variation in the level of resources available provides an occasion for power
mobilization and conflict only where the organization has a relative flexibility
In controlling resources allocation. There is a cake and it can be sliced up.
In universities slices are predetermined by the size of the cake which is usually
controlled by external organizations. Recent research comparing patterns of
influence in British and American universities has suggested that the former
have less discretion than their American counterparts since they rely almost
entirely on just one national source of financial support (Beyer and Lodahl 1976).
It was mentioned in Chapter VI that universities' resources are mostly controlled
by the University Grants Committee (UGC). This has control over buildings
budgets, salary levels, research funds and so on.
In the Health District, resources are also state controlled, being
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allocated to the District by the Area Health Authority (AHA). Thus, it appears
that the non-business organizations in this study have little power to control
their own resources. It might be this that explains the small relationship
between resource constraints and forms of process activation and lack of as-
sociation between the first and successfulness in these organizations.
So far the findings of this research support the perspective which sees
decision-making in non-business organizations as politically ivld. (Lindblom
1959, Wilensky 1967, Baldridge 1971). Studies which see decision-making as
a political process, in particular, tend to emphasize divergence of goals and
power imbalance as a source of conflict (Kahn 1964, Assael 1969, Wilensky
1967). These aspects seem to be of particular importance to decision-making
success in non-busin'ess organizations. However, it is power imbalance rather
than conflicting values introduced by the diversity of groups participating in the
decision process which appears to be the most probable source of conflict in
non-business organizations. This can be observed by examining Figure 7.3.
It suggests that in these organizations success is a result of conflicting forces.
Two arguments can be put forward, represented respectively by the variables
in the boxes on the left and the right of Figure 7.3, success variables being
placed in the centre. On the one hand,the greater the number of different
interests and the greater the influence of specialists, the more successful 'a
decision is, in that more opportunities are seized (proactivity), more unfore-
seen benefits are gained (propitiousness) and less difficulties are created
(disturbance .). On the other hand, if higher hierarchical levels have the
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greatest share of influence and there is conflict, the less proactive, the less
propitious and more disturbed outcomes are. In consequence, the less suc-
cessful the decision is.
.7.4. Some Theoretical Implications of the Non-Business Organizations Findings
• In the last section it became evident that distribution of influence,
diversity of interests and disagreement have an impact on decision processes
and outcomes in non-business organizations. Diversity of interests does not
seem to be a source of conflict for the decision studied, which contrasts with
the findings of much of the literature emphasizing diversification of values and
goals as a basis for friction among different groups (Wilensky 1967, Pettigrew
1973). However, an explanation for these findings may be found in the charac-
teristics of the organization structure.
Universities have been portrayed as loosely coupled systems (Blau
1973, Baldridge 1971). A characteristic of a loosely coupled system is that
parts of the system may be relatively insulated from one another, so that adap-
tations taking place in one part do not affect other parts (Aldrich 1979).
Glassman (1973) argues that loose coupling allows local adaptation of subunits
facing conflicting demands. University subunits are loosely coupled in the sense
that they have independent concerns and have different sets of interactions.
As Baldridge (1971:108) points out, in universities "there is an insulating and
segregating phenomenon, for the different parts of the system are often protected
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from direct conflict because they are concerned with the same issues. To use
a sociological jargon, a highly differentiated system may have low degrees of
conflict because the various units are highly independent and highly insulated
from one another". These structural characteristics of the universities may
be a reason why in this research an increase in number of interests or in the
number of specialists in a decision process does notnecessarily imply more
conflict.
On the other hand, any tilting of influence towards higher management -
centralization of influence - was clearly revealed as a source of conflict. Here
the research findings come together with views which emphasize conflict as an
inevitable consequence of imbalance of power (Kahn 1964, Gamson 1968, Assael
1969). Perhaps by examining the influence distribution in the decision processes
of these organizations some light may be shed on these findings.
.7.4.1. Distribution of Influence 
- As the findings have suggested, disagreement with and influence by
those on the top are both associated with less successful decisions. Comparing
less successful decisions with those which are more successful in the distribution
of influence would perhaps add to these findings and help to clarify the linking
between influence imbalance and conflict. Five less successful decisions and
five more successful decisions were picked out (according to their score on
perceived success variable) for closer investigation to check this assumption.
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Figure 7.4 presents the curves of influence distribution for these decisions
following Tannenbaum's (1968) control-graph method. The less successful
decisions are presented on the left hand side, whilstihe_mare_successful ones
occupy the right hand side. The interest groups involved in-each decision vary
and there are also differences in groups which have a voice in decision-making
in these organizations (according to replies to question 10a Appendix B). For
example, the four decisions at the bottom of the page are Health District deci-
sions. In comparison to universities these organizations have less autonomy
In decision-making. As mentioned in Appendix D, .Districts have to submit a
-
yearly plan to the Area Health Authority which reviews and may challenge the
.	 .	 .
plans. Area Team Officers accountable to the MIA have the specific function
of ensuring that the District fulfils its plans. The AHA and Area Team Officers
comprise the Parent Level in the influence curves. •
Universities' decisions comprise the first six curves. Although the
UGC would correspond to the Parent level; this organ did not influence directly
the decisions studied in this research. Despite the fact that universities depend
on the state's finance resources, UGC interference in decision-making is in
general kept to a minimum (Eustace and Moddie 1974). Thus, in the univer-
sities' decisions presented in the figure there is no level correspondent to
'Parent". Top management level, upper middle management and middle
management are classified in this figure according to Table 6.2. in Chapter
VI. In the universities "users" comprises the students and groups who use a
given service. In the Health 'district users are the consumers of the health ser-
vices.
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FIGURE 7.4 DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL AND DESIRED INFLUENCE IN SOME
LESS SUCCESSFUL DECISIONS AND MORE SUCCESSFUL DECISIONS
LESS SUCCESSFUL DECISIONS	 I MORE SUCCESSFUL DECISIONS
LEGEND
Ul : University 1	 HD:Health District — : Actual influence
U2 : University 2	 : Desired influence
SEE Appendix A for decisions represented by D1, D2, etc.
Irrespective of the kinds of interests involved in decision-making in
these organizations, it can be seen that the pattern of influence sharing and
the discrepancies between actual and desirable influence are different for less
successful and more successful decisions. Thus in the former, either the
parent organization and/or top management are felt to have had too loud a
voice in the decision process in four out of five cases. In two cases, (decision
7 and decision 15), middle management should have its voice heard more. It
is interesting to note that in decision 15, the distribution of influence should
- ideally be reversed. In other words, those who had the most influence should
have had the least and vice-versa. For the more successful decisions, there
are two cases in which there are no discrepancies between actual and desired
distribution of influence - decision 17 and decision 18 from the Health District.
In the other cases, the size of discrepancies is smaller than in less successful
decisions. So less successful decisions have a greater disparity between actual
and desired influence, especially for top management, users, or parent organi-
zation, in which may lie the seeds of discontent.
These findings may suggest that the roots of conflict in less successful
decisions lie in the distribution of influence. Is there any evidence that this does
lead to conflict? When the intensity of conflict which occurred in these decision
processes is compared, it becomes evident that in less successful decisions
the degree of conflict is indeed higher, as Figure 7.5 indicates. Here, the
-
decisions are represented in the horizontal axis. The vertical axis corresponds
to intensity of disagreement which varies from zero to 1.00, according to the
measure devised in Chapter VI. So in less successful decisions influence
imbalance and conflict appear together. In more successful decisions im-
balance of influence is not so frequent and there is less conflict.
However, imbalance of influence by itself may not be sufficient to
cause conflict. In this case, what imbalance means is more important. In
a decision what counts is that powerful subunits are in a position to make
their views prevail against the interests of others. As Kahn (1964) points
out, power is necessarily connected to conflict if it means changing the be-
haviour of a group of persons against their own wishes. Thus, as will be
seen further in decisions where the influence of higher hierarchical levels
is perceived as greater than desired, conflict probably takes the form of pres-
sure from groups whose interests may be affected by the decision outcomes:
It may well be related to the mobilization of the "have not" groups and the
pressure they are capable of imposing in the decision-making arena for the
production of different outcomes (Gamson 1968:8). This will become more
evident if some characteristics of conflict in non-business organizations are
examined. For this purpose the examination of questionnaire and interview
data together may aid interpretation.
.7.4.2. Some Characteristics of Conflict in Less Successful Decisions
Both correlational results and the curves of distribution of influence
and of conflict (or disagreement) have suggested that imbalance of influence
cn
.
Z
0
1	 FL1
Coo
W W
t r:1
O 4
14
P4 44
En
U3Z w
O o
f61 0
C.)
4.1 En
A w
f:4
CII 0
E-1
4 nz
. <
El
Z cn
4.1 Z
X 0
w 4
w 0
t4 w
O A
<
if4 a
A
r...
fx4 u)
O rx./
>-,	 c-;	 co
E-4
•-•	
C
0
W W
Z	 --CO
ill rn	 0
1-1	wEr)	 a.)A4 a	
....
=t.
In
to
a)	 .,..,
c..)	 c
c.)	 a)
=	 Ecn	 0.)
to	 a)
_
4	 ta
co
....
A
t.-4
o
.-..
to
c0
.1
230
odd. 	  d • •c,	 0 0•ri O o0
231
and conflict appear together in less successful decisions.. It seems that hier-
archical conflict is at the heart of the matter. It is possible that the analysis
of interview data would contribute, so that the nature of conflict in non-business wou
be more dearly understood, and in consequence the reasons why disagreement
and higher management influence are associated with less successful outcomes.
As shown in Appendix D, the structure of British universities is
characterized by a parallel system of authority. First, there is the bureau-
cratic network, and second the professional authority whose voice is expressed
by means of the representative bodies of the university, such as senate, council
and committees. A consequence of the parallel structure in universities is the
overlapping between bureaucratic and professional influence patterns (Baldridge
1071). As this author notes, lines of influence between the various university
bodies are ambiguous and . shifting. Although Baldridge's study focuses on .
American universities, their British counterparts are little different, as can
be observed from Appendix D. Clashes may occur in the redefinition of areas
of concern, or when there is interference in an area which a subunit sees as
its traditional area of influence. For example, in decision 10 (U2) in Figure
:
7.5 the centralization of administration in the halls of residence provoked a
strong reaction from the wardens, who so far had been entirely responsible
for the administration of the halls. The justification for the decision was said
to be continuous friction within the hall's administration and consecutive finan-
cial losses. A committee was appointed to collect information and suggest
solutions to these problems. A recommendation to create a separate
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administration for the halls, accountable to the Registrar's department, gained
support in the university administration but encountered resistance from the
wardens who saw their traditional area of authority threatened.
In another decision, the centralization of examination timetables in U2
provoked a great deal of controversy, for this has been traditionally under the
responsibility of heads of departments. Whilst the change would alleviate the
burden on some departments which had a complex timetable, it meant a reduc-
tion of control and extra work for other departments that had a simple timetable.
This decision, however, was classified as a successful one (decision 14 in Figure
7.5). An interesting difference between this decision and the previous one, is
that while in the first decision wardens felt that they were not fairly heard and,
therefore,- were not ready or willing to co-operate on the new scheme, in the
timetable case, negotiations took place with the departments opposing the deci-
sion. A compromise was achieved around a solution which would lessen the
extra work that would be caused for these departments.
In the Health District, a similar type of conflict between levels is
commonplace for the areas of responsibility of each level are ill-defined and
overlapping. Thus, types of conflict in such non-business organizations may be
not too different. In decision 19 (Figure 7.E), for example, the centralization
by the Al-IA of stores, which had traditionally operated under District super-
-
vision, raised resentment at District level, where people felt they had not been
properly consulted. It seems that in both types of organizations, lines of
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responsibility may be ill-defined creating conditions for conflict when they are
challenged.
The overlapping of areas of bureaucratic and professional influence is
another structural characteristic which creates conditions for conflict in both
universities and Health services. The different prientations and perspectives
of professionals and bureaucrats receives a detailed treatment in Etzioni (1964)
and in Blau and Scott (1964). Baldridge (1971:158) has described the type of
tension which develops between bureaucrats and professionals in university
decision-making. While the bureaucrat has a strong identity with the organi-
zation, the professional loyalty is to his own speciality. For the bureaucrat,
the source of discipline is the hierarchical structure, while for the professional
it is the judgement of his own colleagues. .
In the health services, the heterogeneous composition of the district
creates conditions for clashes between these two perspectives. Whilst doctors
and nurses orientations are based on their oval profession, administrators are
responsible for the provision of a rational and efficient health service. In these
•
circumstances the type of conflict which develops in the coalition may be "sub-
stantive" using Rhenman and associates' (1970:78) terms. In other words,
interest units do not reach agreement because their views differ about which
decision is the right one. Although decision by consensus is a form of protection
against clashes between groups which have contrasting values, it may not prevent
sharp conflicts when the interests of a given group are threatened. For example,
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in decision 15 (Figure 7.4) the A HA had urged the District to take some economy
measures so as to control overspending. The treasurer's office then looked for
areas where economies could be made. At that time the efficiency of the Gynae-
cology ward was low. Bed occupancy was low and there had been a decline in
the waiting list. The closure of the ward was, therefore, suggested as part of
a package of economy measures. A proposal to close the 20 beds of this ward
and use it for decanting purposes was put forward in the District Management
Team. A sharp reaction came from the Gynaecology department which argued
that the ward was important in order to ensure the viability of the teaching unit
and maintenance of teaching standards. Cuts would be detrimental to teaching
standards and to research the department had planned to undertake in the near
future. A great deal of negotiating went on between the I3MT and the Gynaecology
department, and other teaching units became involved and expressed their reser-
vations. In this case, the DMT was not able to achieve a compromise and the
matter was referred to the AHA for a decision. Conflict was substantive, but
was aggravated and persisted because a group had its interests threatened. The
arguments of the administration were based on the quantitative information
about the Gynaecology ward and on the need to balance the budget. But primarily,
the administration was suffering pressure from the Area to proceed with economy
measures. As Suderland (1977) notes, in the NHS the district autonomy to make
decisions is restricted in such a way that in many circumstances the district has
no power to satisfy demands of other groups which report to it, even when it agrees
-	 _
with their revindications.
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In this example, the need for consensus did not prevent conflict but
In many circumstances it does tend to maintain the status quo. Conflict can
be anticipated, and topics which are not likely to end up in a compromise settle-
ment are not even raised or may be shelved after initial attempts.
Not only the impossibility of a compromise among the District members
makes a decision topic go "into limbo", but also the anticipation of a reaction
to the policy by parties affected. Authorities avoid policies likely to generate
resistance (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Baldridge (1971:165) has noted that a
common tactic used by organization authorities to test reaction to a policy is
the "trial balloon". Before making the decision, hints are leaked about the
. project to judge whether reaction(s) would be favourable or not. For instance,
the possibility of clo g ing a workers club at lunch time in one of the District's
hospitals was raised in the District Management Team. Some supervisors •
were having staff problems of late return from lunch and drinking during working
lime. However, initial soundings of the possible reaction to closure led to the
abandonment of the idea at least for the time being. The decision would have
affected other interests like those of the junior doctors who also had their
social club open at lunch time. There would have been obstacles in closing
clubs in other hospitals which did not have problems with drinking in working
time. Furthermore, the union had threatened a strong reaction if the decision
went ahead.
In this case, conflict was avoided by the withdrawal of the topic from
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the coalition agenda. In contrast with preceding example, in this case the
groups which would have their interests affected by the decision outcome were
not formally involved in the decision-making. They were in the position of
partisans. Partisans are people who may be affected by the decision outcomes
in a significant way (Gamson 1968, Baldridge 1971). As Baldridge (1971:131)
points out, "Partisans have to live with decisions the authorities make and
must function within the limits set by their policies". A characteristic of
partisans is that they are continuously revindicating the right to participate
in decision-making and to resist decisions which affect them. Conflict between
partisans and the decision-making coalition is common both in universities
(Baldridge 1971) and in the health service (Klein and Lewis 1976).
When partisans resist decisions of a coalition it may yield to their.
demands so as to relieve tension. The decision to increase the fees of resi-
dence halls in Ul met great resistance from the students union (decision 7, -
Figure 7.5). A strike was called and members were asked to make their
payments direct to the union. It was a period of great turmoil in the univer-
sity and strong feelings arose in the students who wanted to keep to their duties
with the university, but were willing to give their support for the strike. Con-
flict was relieved only after the students union had compromised by agreeing
to pay the university in return for freezing the charges of the halls of residence
for the next year.
The decision to transfer the luncheon service during vacation periods
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from the main refectory to the Communal Building in Ul • involved a similar
situation. As can be observed from Figure 7.4, decision 1, the users of the
refectory had little influence on this decision, but even so an immediate re-
action arose from the students, academic staff and administrative personnel
who had to travel across to the Communal Building for lunch. A petition urging
a review of the decision was signed by 250 students and staff. The result was
the reopening of the refectory for the next vacation.
These examples have illustrated types of conflict which arise in some
of the less successful decisions studied by this research. In the decisions
described, conflict involved units at a higher hierarchical level who were in
a position to make their views prevail despite opposition, and other groups
which would have their interests threatened by the decision outcomes. There
are cases where the outcomes of decisions have been modified and, in some,
topics were withdrawn from the agenda as a result of pressure from group
affected. In some cases, conflict arose within the coalition when the decision
Implied disadvantages for one of the parties. In other circumstances, conflict
arose from pressure of units external to the coalition wanting to protect their own
interests. It seems that even when conflict appeared to be a question of diver-
gence of orientation between bureaucrats and professionals, as in the case of
the Gynaecology ward, other factors appeared significant in not reaching a com-
promise. For example, there was pressure from the Area Health Authority to
balance the budget. Here again, sources of conflict were similar: conflict
intensified as those affected attempted to protect their own interests against
f
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what they felt had already been decided further up in the hierarchy.
.7.5. Some Preliminary Conclusions : Non-business Organizations
It has been suggested in the theory chapters IV and V that the decision-
making process would have elements of both instrumental and behavioural as-
pects and, in consequence, success would result from an interplay between
these aspects. As an instrumental process, decision-making would contain
elements of rationality and efficiency in using resources to attain desired ends.
In this case, outcomes would be a result of a goal-directed behaviour. On the
other hand, slow pace determined by attempts to conciliate divergent interests
would describe some characteristics of a behavioural process. Here, outcomes
would be a result of conflict and strength of power of divergent interest groups.
The results in this chapter have, In fact, revealed some characteristics
of the decision process which are instrumental and others which are behavioural.
Manifestations of a goal-directed process can be observed when the decision is
made under time constraints: a greater amount of more critical resources and
more powerful interests are mobilized and disagreements avoided, so that a
final decision could be achieved quickly with the avoidance of major delays.
When there is no need for a rapid decision, the process appears to be predom-
inantly political. The process gets behind schedule, as interest groups try to
push the decision in opposite directions.
Although the decision pace may be a result of both aspects, it appears
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that resources only weakly influence the dynamics of the process. Also,
resources availability does not seem to have an instrumental importance in
decision-making success. An explanation proposed was that non-business
organizations usually have little discretion in controlling the amount of re-
sources available. In this case, interests seem to contend more in order to
keep their already conquered resources than to contend for the resources neces-
sary to carry the decision through.
In Chapter VI, successfulness becomes defined in terms of expected
benefits (proactivity) and unforeseen gains (propitiousness), together with lack
of disturbance. Table 7.8 summarizes some common elements in the process
and outcomes of less and more successful decisions. Some conclusions can be
drawn from these results which apply to non-business organizations, particularly
to universities and hospitals.
It becomes evident that time is important to success; it is of particular
relevance to proactivity and propitiousness. Seizing opportunities and gaining
propitious benefits depends on a rapid reaction. However, it has been shown
that time in non-business organizations is often consumed in political activities,
in negotiations to arrive at some form of compromise between interests which
do not agree with outcomes of a decision. A decision process then, cannot be
•
quick and grasp opportunities while time is spent in attempts to resolve conflict
among interests. The findings of this research suggest that engaging in political
activities and being proactive are somehow incompatible, since rapid decisions
are a requirement for the attaining of this type of outcome.
Process
elements
Outcomes
elements
2401,
TABLE 7.8 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECISION PROCESS AND
OUTCOMES OF LESS AND MORE SUCCESSFUL DECISIONS
,
Less successful	 More successful
decisions	 . decisions
Tardiness
Higher Management Influence
Influence imbalance
disagreement	
•
Diversity of interests
Specialists influence
Less proactivity
Less propitiousness
More disturbance
More proactivity
More propitiousness
Less disturbance
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As conflict between groups diminishes the chances of a proactive and
propitious decision, it also implies more disturbance. As argued in the previous
section, conflict arise as those up in the hierarchy attempt to influence the
decision in a given direction which affect other groups interests. In cases
where the decision proceeded despite their opposition, pressure became higher
during implementation. The groups affected organized themselves and pressure
became formalized. As reported, after the vacation catering decision was
taken, in the university, various departments expressed their opposition and
requested a review of the decision. In the health service decision to close the
Gynaecology ward, the negotiations did not stop there. The further difficulties
of the department with teaching and with growing waiting lists were brought into
the District agenda. A new professor arrived bringing new methods of research,
and the number of beds which the Gynaecology Department could count on ap-
peared even more insufficient. The department gained the support of the CHC
and pressure in the District grew until finally a compromise was achieved.
By contrast, involvement of a variety of interests in the process itself
does not necessarily lead to conflict. Instead, it is related to less conflict,
and results in more proactivity, more propitiousness and less disturbance.
These findings suggest that participation is of primary importance to decision-
making in non-business organizations and is closely attached to the concept of
success. Before pursuing this point, it is interesting to summarize these
_ 	 .
political characteristics which looked salient in the non-business organizations
studied in this research.
SUCCESS
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The results appear to suggest that successfulness results from incom-
patible political forces working in opposite directions. This can be better ob-
served in Figure 7.6 which summarizes the results presented in Figure 7.3.
FIGURE 7.6 ILLUSTRATION OF NON-BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
POLITICAL THEORY
Participation
A greement
Centralization
Disagreement UNSUCCESS
Here the decision political characteristics and success operate as a "see-saw".
It may be suggested that successfulness is a function of an alteration in the
balance of the "see-saw" represented in this figure. As participation goes
high so does agreement. As higher management influence is higher and, in
consequence, disagreement, this brings unsuccess with it. The two kinds
of forces are of course incompatible; higher values of one result in low
values of the other and vice-versa.
Going a step forward, it seems that success is defined according
to political characteristics of the process. The notions of participation and
agreement seem attached to the concept of success in non-business organizations.
As Braybrooke and Lindblom (1970) have noted, agreement is highly valued am.
 ong those whcl
have a stake in decision-making in public organizations. Agreement appears to
act as a substitute for scientific truth and may represent a political virtue. It
even seems that if people do not agree on values, policies, rules and procedures,
agreement on any basis appears to be important, since agreement in itself is
socially valued and therefore may establish parameters for comparison where
one does not exist. In this case, LindblomandBraybrooke (1970) argue, agreement is thei;
only form of resolving social conflict.
The association of agreement and participation with success reflects
the dilemma which characterizes the goals of non-business organizations.
•
While there is pressure for a more democratic and decentralized system of
decision-making which is said to improve the standard of services, there is.
simultaneously pressure for retaining control (Klein and Lewis 1976, Baldridge
1971). The ambiguity in needs comes from divergence in goals and values of
groups in different hierarchical positions. Authorities may be interested in
stability, in containing influence, while those such as partisans may be con-
cerned with enlarging their spheres of influence. Thus, what is seen as leading
to more or less success in non-business organizations may be issues such as
agreement as opposed to disagreement, stability as opposed to change and lack
of control, participation as opposed to centralization.
Such findings appear to be quite consistent with the way effectiveness
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is analysed in these organizations. Here, processes in which activities develop
are more important than final results. The political climate in which a decision
is made is clearly of paramount importance.
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CHAPTER VIII 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
- BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS -
This chapter presents the analysis of the conceptual model for
business organizations. It examines whether the pattern of relationships
among the variables found for non-business organizations prevails in business
firms also and explores which factors may account for successful outcomes
in these organizations. In reporting the results for business organizations,
data on 34 decisions are examined (in Appendix A from number 20 onward).
. .8.1. Relationships among Independent Variables - An Analysis of Hypotheses 
Table 8.1 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for independent
variables. In this table all the variables representing the major concepts in
the framework are indicated. It can be seen that with few exceptions, the
majority of variables are at most only moderately correlated to each other.
As opposed to non-business organizations, resources availability appears
as the most important variable since it is moderately related to almost every
variable. Tardiness on the other hand seems to have less importance for
decision-making in business organizations, as the correlation coefficients
between this variable and the others indicate.
Based on the literature which explores the origins of distribution
of influence in organization decision-making (Hickson et al 1971, Salancik
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TABLE 8.1 INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
(PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS)
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
N = 34
LEGEND
a	 Availability of Resources
b	 Criticality of Resources
C	 Time Pressure
d	 Higher Management Influence
e	 Disagreement
f	 Compromise
g	 Amount of Influence
h	 Specialists Influence
i	 Diversity of Interests
j	 Duration
k	 Tardiness
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and Pfeffer 1974), it has been assumed that resources and influence would be
related, that is, more influential sub-units would be involved, in decisions
where important resources are at stake (Hypothesis 1). As Figure 8.1
shows, the results lend some support for this hypothesis (r. availability
of resources. amount of influence =50, and r. criticality of resources and
amount of influence 32). Evidence is, therefore provided for Abell's argu-
ment that a given bargaining zone will carry more power according to the
extent with which it is occupied with decisions involving more important
resources. It can be seen from this figure that in these decisions higher.
management has influence as well as other interests.
,
Following Olsen (1976), it has been suggested that as the level of
resources in the decision process appears to be insufficient, more interests
from various points in the hierarchy are called in, in an attempt to obtain •
the necessary resources for the decision. The results apparently provide
no support to hypothesis 3 specifically, which predicted that the less resources
available, the more the number of intere3ts in the decision process. Figure
8.1 appears to suggest that more interests are attracted to a given arena
when it carries more and various resources. However, there may be some
argument as to the meaning of the correlation coefficient between resources
availability and diversity of interests (.32). It may be that various interests
are pulled into the process because the decision requires various resources
which can only be obtained with the participation of various interests Alter-
natively, it may be that more interests are also involved where a greater
.42
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Management
Influence
A vailability
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A mount
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FIGURE 8.1 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RESOURCES
AVAILABILITY, CRITICALITY AND INFLUENCE
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amount of resources are at stake, so as to ensure that the decision goals can
be attained.
If, on the one hand, more interests are better able to manage a decision
involving various resources or even able to obtain the resources needed, those
on the top of the hierarchy on the other hand may.be less inclined to completely
delegate authority over those decisions. (See in Figure 8.1 correlation co-
efficient between resources availability and higher management influence
.
. 42.)
In general, higher management has influence where important resources are
at risk or in areas less specific but requiring critical information. As in-
dicated in Table 8.2, there is no relationship between higher management
influence and the resources of information (special knowledge) or technology.
When special expertize is crucial it may be that higher management has to play
second fiddle, even in the area of competitively managed business. Higher
management crucial role is to attend to finance and to relationships with external
powers such as Unions and Government. Some support therefore is found for
hypothesis 8 which assumes that higher management tends to have less influence
in decisions requiring technical information. (See Table 8.3, a more detailed
analysis of Information: coefficients with Information on Finance, Trade Unions,
Government Policies.)
ExaminingMble 8.2 and Table 8.3 it can be seen that areas requiring
top management attention are different when comparing business with non-
business organizations. In business firms the primary internal concern of
top management is with finance, while in non-business organizations, top
TABLE 8.2 PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
TYPES OF RESOURCES THE DECISION REQUIRED
AND HIGHER MANAGEMENT INFLUENCE
Types of
resources
required
Higher Management
Business
Influence
Non-business
Financial
.50 (N = 29) .28 (N =12)
Special Knowledge .14 (N = 31) -04 (N =14)
Customers/users .20 (N =27) .80 (N =7)
Labour
-
.11 (N = 21) .82 ' (N =7)
Technology .12 (N = 25) .99* (N = 2)
* Number of cases too small to calculate the correlation coefficient
(item not applicable to Non-business organizations).
	 •
TABLE 8.3 PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
TYPES OF INFORMATION THE DECISION REQUIRED
AND HIGHER MANAGEMENT INFLUENCE
Types of
Information
required
Higher Management
Business
Influence
Non-business
•
Financial .60 (N =30) -.12 (N =13)
Competitors .02 (N = 24) -.30 (N =12) .
Raw Material -.15 (N =16) -.30 (N = 6)
Labour/staff .32 (N .27) .84 (N.' 5)
Customers/users .30 (N =ft) .50 (N =7)
Trade Unions .	 .40 (N . = 22) .99* (N =3)
Technology -.05 (N =24) -.99* -	 (N =3)
Government
Policies .51 (N =19) -.15 (N =7)
Specific
Information .33 (N =12) -.20 (N =12)
* Number of cases too small to cdculate the correlation coefficient
(item not applicable to non-business).
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management has most influence in decisions involving material needs and staff.
In the first kind of organization higher management attention is required in
decisions involving unions and government; in their non-business counter-
parts, higher management attention is directed to establishing contacts with
similar organizations (other universities and health districts) and with those
able to influence the organization decisions, such as customers and users.
The (.99) correlation coefficient between resources technology and higher
management influence indicates rather that it was impossible to calculate
the correlation coefficient due to the reduced number of cases. It suggests
in fact that the item did not apply to non-business organizations. (Although
the list of resources presented in the questionnaire were of a universal type
as explained in Chapter VI, some specific information and resources items
could not apply to a kind of a decision in a given organization.)
Based on the notion that sees competition for scarce resources as a
source of conflict in decision-making (Pondy 1967, Pettigrew 1973, Olsen 1976)
it has been also assumed that the less resources, the more conflict in the
decision process (Hypothesis 5). In this instance, the results lend some sup-
port to this Hypothesis (Figure 8.2). It seems that there is indeed a tendency
for more disagreement when limited resources restrict room for manoeuvre
(disagreement is negatively related to resources). Compromise also is nega-
tively correlated to availability of resources which, surprisingly, seems to
suggest that conflict settlement is more difficult when resources are more
available. Perhaps when the means for a decision afe available, and the
-35)A vailability
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Disagreement
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FIGURE 8.2 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RESOURCES AVAILABILITY
CRITICALITY AND CONFLICTFULNESS
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situation not precarious, people feel secure enough to press their interests.
Alternatively, these results may reflect the degree of relationship between
disagreement and compromise. The correlation coefficient between these
two variables suggests that more disagreement is accompanied by more
compromise. Then, fewer resources would result in more compromise in
the sense that there is more disagreement to settle. Yet it may be suggested
that in business organizations compromise is the usual way of resolving con-
flict. This result contrasts with what has been obtained for non-business
organizations where no relationship between disagreement and compromise
was found: as case examples for these organizations suggested, conflict was
not always settled during the decision process.
If fewer resources result in more conflict, the criticality of the re-
sources committed in a given decision does not necessarily lead to more con-
flict. Support for hypothesis 6 - which postulated that the more critical the
• esources, the more conflict - is minimal, with a small correlation coef-
ficient (Figure 8 .2). There is no indication that there will be more disagree-
ments in the coalition because of the type of resources at risk in a decision.
Conflict may instead be concerned with the decision feasibility in view of
restriction in resources.
In Chapter IV, it was predicted that when there is urgency to make the
_
	
--
decision there is a tendency to limit participation and to restrain the decision
process to a few members who are able to carry the decision through without
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much delay (Wilensky 1967, Weiner 1976). Based on these assumptions, a
hypothesis was formulated that higher management tends to exercise more
Influence in these decisions. As with non-business organizations support
for this hypothesis is weak. As can be seen from Table 8.1, time pressure
Is instead more highly correlated to the number of interests in the decision
process. Contrary to what has been expected, urgency to make a decision
demands involvement of more interests. Possibly, they are drawn in to en-
sure more resources or to provide a greater diversity of technical inputs
so as to accelerate the process. As Slit-ley et al (1976) point out, an inc-
lusion of various functional specialities in a firm's decision-making coalition
ensures a diversity of expertize which could illuminate more subtle elements
of the decision. In fact, there is no suggestion in the data that participation
of various interests in the decision slows down the process. (See in Table
8.1 that the correlation coefficient between diversity of interests and tardi-
ness is = -0.0).
Hypothesis 10 relates urgency to make a decision to conflict and
duration of the decision process. From Table 8.1 it can be seen that time
pressure is related to less tardiness and shorter duration, but not to less con-
flict. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the arguments as to how conflict affects
the decision-making are contradictory. While many studies attribute para-
lyzing delays and blockage in implementation to political impasses (Hah and
Lindquist 1975, Thimm 1976), other studies argue that conflict fosters the
generation Of new ideas and encourages efforts in finding solutions (Blau and
Scott 1964, Bower 1965). The first seems tO be very common of decision-
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making in non-business organizations, as the findings in the last chapter
have suggested. By contrast, in business firms, conflict does not mean
a slow pace process. When there is urgency in the business setting, it could
be that open disagreement speeds things up, perhaps by exposing problems
or by bringing a diversity of inputs to the decision. Many of those who
theorize on business firms defend the view that conflict in decision-making
is healthy for it means assessment of alternatives from several value
perspectives (Bower 1965, Shirley et al 1976).
As far as isolated relationships between constraints, process
activation and pace are concerned, the results provide some support for
Hypothesis 1, indicating that the more critical the resources the more in-
fluential are the sub-units involved; for Hypothesis 5, which suggests that
the less available resources are, the more conflict; for the complementary
Hypothesis 6, which predicts that the more critical the resources, the
greater the conflict for Hypothesis 7, which postulates that the more critical
the resources the greater the influence of higher management; and for Hypo-
thesis 8, which suggests that higher management has less influence on deci-
.
siorsrequiring technical information. Drawing this together in a generalized
picture, which is probably going beyond that which the data directly supports
by the size of the correlation coefficients, in business it looks as if decisions
where resources are scarce and critical demand the efforts and influence of
both higher management and other interests from other parts of the hierarchy.
They become the nescus of influence and activity where disagreements are
likely but so too are compromises.
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If these findings are now examined either under an instrumental or
behavioural perspective, it seems that instrumental aspects override. Exam-
ining the decision pace, for example, it seems that by contrast with non-
business organizations, pace is not a result of an interplay among instrumental
and behavioural aspects. Pace depends primarily on the quantity and impor-
tance of resources mobilized. As can be seen from Table 8.1, relationships
between process activation variables and process pace are very weak. From
those interests involved in the decision process, only higher management ap-
pears to be able to speed things up. As already mentioned, influence of top
management appears to be decisive, primarily when the process is held up
by problems of finance, government and unions as the data in Tables 8.2 and
. 8.3 appear to suggest. The characteristics of an instrumental process never-
theless are more evident. As Figure 8.3 illustrates (using data from Table
8.1), when the decision is made under time constraints, more critical re-
sources are mobilized and also more interest units are drawn in and, possibly
also - depending on the problem - higher management, so that major delays
can be avoided. Manifestations of a goal directed process are evident in other
instances, for example, criticality and availability set constraints on who is
Involved, how much influence there will be on the process and whether different
parties are more likely to engage in conflict (see also correlations on Table
8.1).
As compared with non-business organizations, resources availability
and resources criticality have a greater impact on modes of process activation.
Availability
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FIGURE 8.3 SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOAL DIRECTED PROCESS
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It seems that more influential sub-uhits are involved in decisions where impor-
tant resources are at stake. In these decisions conflict is likely to arise, but
it appears that there are differences in the way in which conflict affects the
decision process in business organizations as compared with non-business
organizations. While, in the former, conflict is related to a more rapid
decision process, in the latter it slows down the decision. It may be that
characteristics of conflict differ between business firms and non-business
organizations, (universities and health district). This is discussed in greater
detail further on in the thesis.
.8.2. Relationships Between Independent and Dependent (Success) Variables
Table 8.4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between all
independent and dependent variables. It shows that just a few variables may
account for decision-making success in business organizations; resources
availability, the amount of influence, duration, and diversity of interests
involved. Following Yuchtman and Seashore (1967), it has been assumed that
organizational decision-makers are oriented towards the acquisition and supply
of resources to the organization. It has also been suggested that resourees/
information are instrumental to decision-making in the sense that more re-
sources fosters proactivity and propitiousness.
• Support is therefore found for Hypothesis 16: resources availability
Is positively related to propitiousness and proactivity (Table 8.4: 0.26 and 0.40).
Having the necessary resources to hand can allow opportunities to be taken at the
Closure
Proactivity
Propitiousness
Disturbance
Successfulness
Perceived Success
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TABLE 8.4 INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AND
DEPENDENT VARIABLES - (PEARSON CORRELATION
COEFFICIENTS FOR BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS)
a
	 j
-.20 -.00 .10 .03 .01 -.11 :00 -.30 -.02 .15 .40
.40
.
.08 -.02 .20 .08 .12 .51 .05 .45 .08 -.32
.26 -.20 -11 .13
.
-.30 -.20 .33 -.30
.
.31 .41
.
.33
-.10 -.08 .03 -.06 .13 -.09 .04 .14 r. 01 `-.20 .12
.32 -.00-.08 .20 -.20.02 .32 -.11 .32 .30 .14
.40 -.20
.( .13 .20
_
-.20 .03 .23 -30 .24 .24 .20
N = 34
LEGEND
a
	 Availability of Resources-
Criticality of Resources
Time Pressure
Centralization
Disagreements
Compromise Settlement
Amount of Influence
Specialists Influence
Diversity of Interests
Duration
Tardiness
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right time. As well as god timing, time (or speed) is important. Proactivity
has some association (-0.32) with a faster decision. • Thus support is again
found for theories which emphasize the advantage of rapid response in grasping
opportunities (Mintzberg 1973, Ansoff 1975). But a propitious decision process
once begun may take longer (r. Duration. Propitiousness _-.41, Table 8.4).
It may be that unexpected benefits in business organizations tend to be achieved
by means of incremental and careful movements. As Quinn (1978) has suggested,
perceptive firms, before taking the final step, purposely delay movements to
encourage a wider participation, to gain more information, or to build up
commitment to a solution.
Hypothesis 14 postulates that the greater the conflict and delays, the
less closure and more disturbance. Little•support appears for this. As men-
tioned in the previous section, more conflict is not necessarily related to a
tardy decision, which in its turn does not incur less closure for more distur-
bance. If compromise is not too problematic as has been suggested, and con-
flict is resolved during the decision process, then disturbances due to unresolved
disputes and intensification of conflict would also be less frequent in business
firms.
The results on Table 8.2 suggest that decision-making independent
,
variables do not relate consistently to success variables. They are related to
one success variable or another but not to all three: proactivity, propitiousness
and disturbance. This contrasts with the findings for non-business organizations,
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where conflict and tardiness together appeared to contribute to further dif-
ficulties and problems created with the decision-making. Because disturbance
is defined as an unintended outcome of the process it may be hypothetized that
disturbance may result from uncontrolled environmental events. However,
more insight can be gained by examining some characteristics of information
which was critical/available for making the decision. We should return to
this point further on in this chapter.
In view of the results reported above it appears that the conceptual
model as originally proposed does not fit business organizations. Most of
the process activation variables are not correlated to duration or tardiness
as expected. Here the results differ from these for non-business organiza-
tions where process activation variables affect the slowness and lateness of
the process. Thus, the use of partial correlation between the independent
variables and successfulness would not be warranted since pace does not
really act as a mediating variable between constraints, process activation
and success in business firms.
Nevertheless, the results do indicate which factors are important for
proactive and propitious outcomes. Figure 8.4 picks out those independent
variables which account for proactivity and propitiousness. Maintaining the
theoretical position that resources affect success, through interests, influence
and pace, and placing these variables centrally in the figure, the relative im-
portance of instrumental and behavioural variables can also be examined. It
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FIGURE 8.4  INDEPENDENT VARIABLES MOST IMPORTANT TO
PROA CTIVITY AND PROPITIOUSNESS
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is possible to trace instrumental and behavioural features, although character-
istics of a goal directed process appear to be more evident. The level of re-
sources availability, for example, set constraints involvement in the dominant
coalition in the first place. As suggested, perhaps those higher in the hier-
archy may be able to pull in more resources or solve some specific problems
which may be delaying the decision. On the other hand, it has been suggested
that a diversity of interests may be able to bring a variety of inputs to the
decision process.
The findings for business firms contrast with non-business organiza-
tion results where political characteristics have the primacy. The importance
of resources availability in setting the parameters for decision-making prompts
a more detailed examination of the relative importance of resources variables
to successful. outcomes, and an analysis of the distribution of influence in ex-
treme cases of success. The dominant coalition, therefore, may be in a position
to keep the process moving so that proactivity and propitiousness are achieved.
Proactivity and propitiousness depend on whether the coalition is able to fulfil
resources needs, which vary from finance to technical expertize. Here some
-
support is found for the view that a dominant coalition is not a random factor,
but instead a rational response to requirements of the organization. Further,
resources availability may directly raise proactivity and propitiousness
(.40, .26) which reinforces the argument that an adequate provision of re-
sources directly affects organization performance (Yuchtman and Seashore
1967).
.8.3. Other Factors Accounting for Successful Outcomes - A Further
Examination of Resources Variables 
It has been suggested that availability or scarcity of resources may
be crucial to decision-making in business. We have seen that resources
availability constrains the degree of proactivity and propitiousness that a
decision may achieve. In view of these findings; the analysis of how re-
sources constrain decision-making is carried a step further by looking to
separate resources characteristics other than amount and criticality in general.
This may reveal which specific aspects of resources are related to success
and thus may aid interpretation. Table 8.5 shows the Pearson correlation
coefficients between some of the variables making up the resources availa-
bility scale, and the success variables. Resources timeliness indicates when
the resources were available, that is, how late they became available. Availa-
bility and criticality of specific information refers to the information which is
respectively necessary and critical to a particular decision. Information
generation indicates whether search activities have produced the relevant
Information for making the decision, and accuracy shows whether information
corresponded to what has been expected after the decision has been made.
Such variables have already been described and more details on their definition
and measurement are provided in Chapter VI.
As can be seen, the individual resources variables are more consistently
related to success variables. The correlation coefficients between these variables
and success suggest that outcomes are more likely to be successful when
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procedures to gather information are effective and when a specific and critical
piece of information on the decision is available. Generating accurate infor-
mation is also pertinent (r -with successfulness z.35 and r with perceived
success .7..50). The examination of Table 8.5 also reveals the variables which
result in greater disturbance. It appears from the correlation coefficients of
resources variables with disturbance, that unexpected problems are created
when resources are available late and when a piece of critical information is
lacking. This result contrasts with findings for non-business where the way
In which the decision has been made seemed more important: unacceptable
levels of participation and influence could result in lack of cooperation and
blockage of implementation by groups affected by the outcome.
It is also noticeable that individual resources variables correlate more
strongly with disturbance than with any other decisiDn-making outcomes shown
In this table. The same can be observed from the results for non-business
organizations where variables which are negatively related to successfulness
(higher management and disagreement are positively correlated with disturbance
more strongly than with any other outcome variable (see Table 7.5 for details).
By contrast to what the data in Table 8.4 suggested, disturbance appears now
as an important dimension of success. Since disturbance indicates those un-
expected and undesired outcomes, those independent variables which account
for more disturbance and low success indicates the areas in which the organi-
zation loses control. While in non-business organizations . these might be the
"politics" of the process, in businesses, these might be readiness of resources
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and generation of relevant and accurate information. These findings provide
support for the assumption that resources and information are areas of uncer-
tainty which constrain goal directed behaviour in business organizations.
The analysis of the importance of individual variables to decision
success have confirmed the primacy of the instrumental aspects of decision-
making in these organizations. However, before more definite conclusions
can be drawn from this, the next section examines some behavioural aspects
In more detail. It examines whether unacceptarrce of distribution of influence
and disagreement are traits of less successful decisions as has been found for
non-business organizations.
_
.8.4. Some Characteristics of the Distribution of Influence and of Conflict in 
Business Organizations 
The correlational results have suggested that the amount of influence
in the process affect decision-making outcomes; more proactive and propitious
outcomes result from the participation and influence of diverse interest units.
Conflict nevertheless, does not appear to affect decision-making outcomes
(Table 8.4). It has been suggested that compromise may be a mediating factor,
that is, the impact of conflict is lessened when compromise is achieved during
the decision process. This comes into contrast with what has been found for
non-business organizations where conflict did seem to make for less successful
decisions. A comparison between extreme cases of successfulness (successful
and less so) in these organizations revealed that in less successful decisions
there is more dissatisfaction in relation to the distribution of influence, as
well as more conflict in the decision process. It would be interesting there-
fore, to see whether in business organizations more and less successful deci-
sions could be distinguished by discrepancies in the distribution of influence
and conflict in the same way.
Following the same procedure employed in the examination of the
distribution of influence in non-business organizations, five less successful
decisions and five more successful decisions were picked as examples, accor-
ding to their score on the perceived success measure. Figure 8.5 shows the
distribution of actual and desired influence for these two groups of decisions.
.	 -
The curves of distribution of influence have also been constructed following
the same procedure as in Figure 7.4 for non-business organizations. The
curves have been constructed following Tannenbaum's (1968) control graph
Method so that the central axis indicates the amount of influence and the groups
Involved in the decision-making are placed in the horizontal axis. (Groups
were classified according to categories presented in Table 6.2 Chapter VI)
What is striking, by comparison to the universities and health district, is the
relative concordance of actual and desirable curves. In business the existing
pattern of influence is more acceptable. There are, however, some discrepancies
between actual and desirable, and these as anticipated are more evident among
less successful decisions. An unquestioned distribution of influence goes with
better decisions. Perhaps other issues of feasibility of alternatives distract
those concerned and issues of influence do not interfere with the course of
action adopted.
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FIGURE 8.5 DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL AND DESIRED INFLUENCE
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In line with this thinking, an analysis of the degree of conflict in
these same decisions was made. Figure 8.6 presents the intensity of dis-
agreement which occurred in the process of decision-making. Here, the
same decisions presented in Figure 8.5 are represented in the horizontal
axis. The vertical axis corresponds to the intensity of disagreement which
varies from zero to 1.00, according to this variable operational definition
presented in Appendix E. As can be seen from this figure, disagreement
in views occurs in both more and less successful decisions. In fact, these
results are consistent with what has been found by examining Table 8.4.
Disagreement is only weakly correlated to success variables. Although
disagreement occurs in the same way in businesses decision-making, a corn-
•
promise can still be reached, and a commitment gained during the process, so
that it is still possible to achieve intended outcomes (in Table 8.4, the cor-
relation coefficient between disagreement and compromise = .73). Is it
possible, therefore,that the nature of conflict is different in the types of or-
ganizations studied so that it may be less problematic to reach a compromise
in business organizations? Could dissatisfaction with distribution of influence
be a source of conflict as found for non-business organizations? The data do
not appear to suggest that this may be so, at least as far as decisions whose
distribution of influence were examined in detail for both sub-samples. Exam-
ining the curves in Figure 8.5 and 8.6, it can be seen that those decisions
which have a questionned distribution of influence do not necessarily present
more conflict. For example, in decision 38 (in the less successful decisions
group), influence by middle management appears to be less than ideal; the
degree of disagreement, however, is not high. Distribution of influence in
0)
C
0
m
T.;
0En
Z c'l
R -5
....
• u)
En U 01a)En	 PI	 C.)
41 CI 0
U zO
• 
En
g	 a)
1:14 	 P4r,	 c)
▪
	....,
f/5 •4
1,--4	 C
CL)
Z
g U	
E
CD
cl 41
U	 ;-4
a)
U td)
PI En	 es(I)
A w	 ..... --.
c) q
41 c4	 >,
x
o
	.....
El	 caC
Z ,o--,C
C)
4 P
rn <
P
n
.z
PI 4
w cd
M 44
O A
<
• cn	 1-1
A P
44
P4 En
O EnPI
C)
P-1 0
E-4 P
[73 in
Z
41 cn
E-1	
tn
., PI
PI r-1
272 •
Lc)
00
A
CD
aq
et'
C.,
C',
aq
"
•
1-4
•
oo
•
N
•
c c;
.	 -cr - 4-4	 -
•
0
cq
CD
44,
cr)
cD
Cs)
• -1r
0 c0 CD
•	 .
CNI 1-4
4-4
273
decision 28 is acceptable, but we can still find a high degree of disagreement.
Some evidence is therefore provided that sources of conflict in busi-
nesses do not lie in dissatisfaction with participation and influence in the pro-
,cess of decision-making. It may be, however, that examining some examples
of disagreement taken from interview data, other characteristics of conflict in
business firms may be revealed. .Decision 26, in BF3, involved a joint in-
vestment in a new product between an American parent and its British sub-
sidiary. The new product would be designed in Britain but be destined prim-
arily for the American market. Disagreement occurred between the parent
and the subsidiary over the reliability of information about the market potential
_	
. —.
and the reliability of estimated costs. The subsidiary board felt that the ap-
praisal of the American market potential was optimistic, but they decided to
to along with the parent. When the product was introduced in the market it
did not produce the expected sales turn-over apart from not being competitive
enough in its technology. The board came to the conclusion that search activities
were unsatisfactory; cost estimations were too optimistic, the parent was far
too enthusiastic about the American market, and there was insufficient infor-
mation on the competitors product.
In decision 29, BF1 , the advent of a new technology spurred the
closing down of old-fashioned factories and the opening of new ones. There
were disagreements over the closing down of a site where the headquarters
had been operating for 40 years. One of the alternatives involved the extension
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of a modern site in another region and the complete closure of the sites
operating under the traditional and out-dated technology. A second alter-
native consisted of opening a new plant in a nearby region, and the partial
closure of the plants still operating on the traditional technology. Different
groups were pressing for each of these alternatives. The manufacturing
director of the site operating under the traditional technology and the finance
director were against closure, while the engineering directors of the new
technology unit argued that the old site was in no condition to stay open since
the technology had become obsolete and the factory operational costs were
high. These arguments were confronted with peopleb emotional attachment
to the old site and with defensive activation of interests to preserve their cur-
rent position. As Harvey and Mills (1970) observe, decisions involving adap-
tative changes have a greater potential for conflict since they usually imply
resistence from parties which believe their position will weaken as a result
of the decision. Apparently the opening of a new factory in the same region
-and only partially closing the original plant headquarters have calmed down
interests. Nevertheless it soon became evident that operational costs of the
old site were too high, the product was no-longer competitive since its tech-
nology was outdated. Expectations as to the new plant were also disappointing:
the labour force did not welcome the new technology, productivity was below
the expected standards, and the company had to face continuous problems
brought about by the interdependence between the industrial relations climate
of two plants situated in the same location.
Decision 39 in BF5, concerned the establishment of a factory abroad
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by BF5. The alternatives comprised the equipping of the factory in such a
way as to manufacture a wide range of products abroad all at once, or
gradually increasing the variety of products manufactured abroad. This
second alternative involved maintaining the present contract with the BF4
agent in the host country and also an existing contract supplying a competitor
with a given product line not initially manufactured abroad. Disagreement
arose as to which alternative would be the right one. The manufacturing
department favoured the second alternative but the sales department and the
board favoured the first alternative. Since financial resources did not allow
much flexibility, the second alternative had been adopted. In 1976, three
years after its establishment, the subsidiary was still struggling for survival,
the leasing period was about the expire and the company received notification
to move. Profits would not cover the acquisition of a new building and the .
company was not able to convince the parent, or other financial sources in
their own country, to lend the necessary funds for the acquisition. In view
of the previous financial history of the company no other choice had been left
_
but closure.
In decision 51, which concerned the building of a new distribution
depot by BF4, disagreement arose between engineering and design depart-
ments as to the concept of a distribution depot. One side emphasised the need
for cost reduction and the other emphasised that priority should be given to the
flexibility of the building so that adaptations for growth could easily be made.
Since chances of gaining board approval for the project were higher for less
_
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costly projects a decision was taken for the second alternative which was later
considered less successful than expected. After some few years the depot
design was considered obsolete and incapable to absorb new methods of dis-
tribution.
. The example 52 was a BF4 decision to transfer personnel from an
old depot to a modern lay-out depot where new methods of distribution and
operation were ready to be introduced. In deciding to locate the modern
depot near the old depot BF4 had also made the decision to transfer the per-
sonnel from one depot to another. It was known that the work force in the old
depot had maintained a low performance standard, and the industrial relations
climate was poor. This issue had never been raised when the transference
decision was made. There was no disagreement within the board as to trans-
ferring the personnel; all were duty-bound to secure employees' jobs. More-
over it had been assumed that industrial relations would improve with a better
-work environment and the atmosphere that would be provided by the modern
^
depot. The new methods of work nevertheless extended the working day which
was strongly rejected by the work force. During its three initial years of exis-
tence,performance in the depot was below average and industrial relations
problems above average.
The examples above illustrate the type of conflict which arises in
some decisions perceived less successful. As opposed to non-business or-
ganizations where conflict seems often due to pressure of interest groups
having their interests threatened, the case examples in businesses suggest
that conflict manifestations involve different views over whether alternatives
are likely to achieve the intended outcomes. Conflict however does not seem
to affect decision outcomes, judging by the case examples as well as cor-
relational results. Disagreement/agreement are characteristics of both,
more and less sucCessful decisions. In decision 52, for example, there was
no disagreement within the coalition concerning the transference of personnel
to the new depot, but it has still been considered as less successful for the
resultant outcomes: the depot was operating below expected performance
standards and industrial relation problems were frequent.
The case-examples show some interesting characteristics of decision-
making in businesses, as well as reveal what is seen as relevant to success,
and lack of success. In non-business organizations remedial and incremental
decisions are taken so as to satisfy vested interests. In businesses, decisions
are also remedial, but here, alternatives are chosen which require minimal
investment and are less costly. So, solutions would do for the time being,
provided that there are no sharp changes in the status quo. Of course traits of a re
medial decision to satisfy vested interests were also found, such as in the case of decisioi
Nevertheless, more important than achievement conciliation of interests in
this case was the fact that demand for the traditional product was declining
sharply, and lack of profits did not compensate maintaining the plant head-
quarters open even to operate partially. Thus, it seems that in business or-
ganizations, the criterion for success is based more on whether expected levels
of performance are achieved than is based on process characteristics.
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.8.5. Summary and Some Preliminary Conclusions - Business Organizations
It has been suggested that, in general, decision-making outcomes
result from an interplay between instrumental and behavioural variables
which are intended to capture the essence of the decision-making process.
Whilst this general argument is maintained, the separate analyses of non-
business and business organizations refine it for each type. It is found that
in the study of processes, at least in elite decision-making processes, taking
all forms of organization together is not illuminating. At minimum, business
and non-business concerns have to be analysed separately. With the sub-
division of the sample, some distinct features in the decision process of these
organizations were identified, including those features which seem to be rele-
vant to successfulness.
The results for non-business organizations have suggested that the
decision pace results from an interplay among instrumental and behavioural
aspects: the kind of resources committed is as important as participation,
influence and conflict among the parties involved. In these organizations,
nevertheless: resources have very little constraint on what is going on in the
process and do not appear to affect decision-making outcomes. On the other
hand, outcomes are directly related to influence distribution and then to par-
ticipation and conflict. In business organizations, however, resources are
the more immediate concern of, and condition for, decision-making, for they
are generated by the work of the organization itself rather than provided by an
external organization. Then, the decision issues and the way the process is
;
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conducted,is dominated by whether money, technology, raw material and
other specific kinds of information are available or not. If resources are
not available everyone is drawn into the decision . making, higher management
and external and internal units from various points in the hierarchy. Those
in the top of the hierarchy are usually involved in decisions requiring a greater
amount of money and may be in a position to resolve some critical issues with
external organizations.
In business firms, disagreement does not appear to be linked to influ-
ence distribution and to a collision of interests. Rather, it appears that in-
terest units tend to disagree over the best course of action. What appears
striking here is that in organizations where profits have primacy and where
participation in decision is a secondary value, influence distribution appeared
more acceptable. While in business firms influence is shared between higher
management and other interests, in the non-business setting the latter is not
reported as having much influence (see Table 7.3 for correlation coefficient
between amount of influence and diversity of interest). In these organizations
a compromise may not be easily reached during the decision process and con-
flict sometimes tends to persist. In business firms by contrast, compromise
appears to be the usual way of resolving conflict. If in these organizations
conflict in the decision process reflects difference of views over alternatives
more than it involves the reaction of groups who feel their interests are threat-
ened, then conciliation may also be less problematic, and may not lead to delays
in the process or result in unpredictable disturbances. In fact, studies
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describing conflict in business decision-making tend to focus on disagreement
over the feasibility of alternatives, as to whether it fulfils a given economic
criterion (March and Simon 1958, Shirley et al 1976), and on conflict between
functional groups applying different criteria to evaluate alternatives (Lawrence
and Lorsch 1967).
If conflict in business organizations has little to do with decision-
making outcomes, resources availability on the other hand, has primacy.
Whether the coalition can count on more resources in time, and whether
critical information is available with a certain degree of accuracy, is crucial
1.0 success. In general, rationality and efficiency seem to be important, if
appropriate resources go along with appropriate involvement, some possible
delays can be avoided and then proactivity and propitiousness be achieved.
The findings for business organizations appear to be consistent with
theories focusing on decision-making in this kind of setting. Thus, what is
associated to successfulness in business reflects what has traditionally been
seen as theoretically relevant to performance in business firms. Both
normative theorists and organization theory, although with a difference in
focus, have suggested that acquisition of resources and information constrain
success both of the organization and decision-making.
Normative theory has concentrated on issues such as information
reliability and feasibility of alternatives. Studies following this line have
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focused on methods which can improve the organization capacity to provide
Information for decision-making (Alexis and Wilson 1967,-Keen and Morton 1968).
Characteristics of information (such as accuracy, reliability and amount)
establish the rules for action; it prescribes procedures to be used in order
to decrease uncertainty and thus increase the chance that intended outcomes
will be achieved.
Satisficing theory on the other hand, focusing on behavioural aspects
of decision-making, has pointed to the limitations of search activities and
emphasized the decision-maker's limits in processing information. Achieve-
ment of decision-making goals depends on how search has been conducted
and on satisfaction with search outcomes.
While aspects of information and efforts to reduce uncertainty as-
sociated with it, are seen as factors which constrain success in decision-
making by the theories above, at the organization level, performance depends
on acquisition of scarce resources (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967) as well as
on how the organization characteristics and decision-making systems fit the
kind of environmental uncertainty to which the organization is subjected
(Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).
If these research results appear to be consistent with the literature
findings, any definite conclusions are limited by the small size of the corre-
lation coefficients. Variations in the size of the business firms may have
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introduced a wider variance in the type and importance of the decisions studied,
which may perhaps explain the small correlation coefficients. While on the one
hand this may leave shortcomings in the data, it can be argued that it allows
generalizations to a greater variety of business firms on the other.
The absence of strong correlations between independent and dependent
variables in business firms suggests that various other factors may yet be
found to explain success. Nevertheless, it should not be expected that a con-
ceptual model restricted to decision-making characteristics only, will be able
to explain all the variations in decision success. For example, the conceptual
framework has not been designed to demonstrate the influence of sudden en-
vironmental 'events upon the decision process and outcomes. An examination
of the interview data 'of some decisions perceived as less successful have
suggested that unpredictable changes in the environment may impede achieve-
ment of expected outcomes. It became clear during implementation that it
would be impossible to attain intended outcomes, and interruptions and ob-
stacles arose. It appeared that even when successful outcomes were taken
for granted, environmental discontinuities changed the situation creating further
difficulties which seemed to demolish any previous gains. Praduct development
decisions, like decision 30 and decision 41 in Appendix A are typical cases.
In these examples the product development programme had to be interrupted
because the product was no longer competitive in technology and price.
Decision 48 is another peculiar example. it is a BF4 decision which
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involved an extension of a depot in response to a merger of BF4 with another
company. Before the merger, BF4 had made an agreement with British Rail
to lease a depot served by a rail terminal. The agreement was set up for
40 years, but after 20 years BF4 would have the opportunity to cancel it pro-
vided that it paid £61,000 to British Rail. However the merger brought the
need for an extension of the depot. In 1969 the firm had been confronted with
two alternatives: either it would build a completely new depot in the region or
it would have to extend the British Rail depot. In 1970 just after the merger,
BF4 decided on the depot extension, but what it did not visualise was its 5%
annual growth. It soon became apparent that the depot could not cope with in-
put and throughput requirements after the merger. As a consequence, the
company found itself confronting the same problem, but with a further con-
straint: the land did not allow a further extensioh of the size needed. The •
first decision to extend the depot in 1970 has, therefore, been considered by
the organization as less successful; the operational costs of the old depot
•vere high, as the lay-out technology had already been overtaken by more ad-
vanced technologies, and the land does not permit further extensions.
In the case of the examples above, reasons for success/unsuccess
may yet be obscure. It may be argued that information on radical changes in
technology and, in the case of decision 48, on sharp changes in past growth
curves, were insufficient at the time the decision was made. Alternatively,
It may be argued that these decisions were taken at the time according to all
:
possible information existing or to its information capacity at the time.
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Informants in the business organizations concerned argued that external
changes which altered intended outcomes of decisions were impossible to
predict at the time the decision was taken.
Nevertheless, the case examples in this chapter have indicated that
business organizations like the non-businesses, also tend to take remedial
decisions to satisfy and conciliate divergent interests, however, primarily,
due to resources constraints. For example, businesses often do not decide
for the most modern product technology. First, because the relevant re-
sources may not be available, scarcity of resources directs the decision to-
wards less expensive projects, even under the knowledge that more advanced
product technologies are being developed. Secondly, new product technology
may overcome those existing in a shorter period than initially predicted. 7..
This seemed to be the case of decisions 30, 41 and 51 where intermediate
product technologies, not outdated but not the known most advanced, were
adopted in the hope that there would be some time before the latter would be
fully developed under feasible costs. Whether reasons for success or lack of
it in decisions like those lie external to the organization or are linked to
decision-making characteristics is an issue which remains unresolved by the
present research. While there are some who suggest that there are certain
precipitating events for which there might be neither time, resources nor
enough information to be able to predict their occurrences and consequences
of these events (Quinn 1978), others point out that most firms have not yet
developed the capacity to detect small and gradual changes in the environment
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which may indicate a significant departure from the past (Ansoff 1975).
Further research investigating the effects of environmental changes as well
as decision-making characteristics is required before any definite conclusions
can be reached.
The effect of information, availability/scarcity of resources and lack
of control over external events on decision-making seemed more evident in the
decisions of business firms. While these aspects are of primary importance
In business organizations, in non-business , participation and agreement are
crucial to achieve success. Although there is conflict in businesses decision-
making, and some decisions may be taken to satisfy opposing interests, this
is not seen as critical to outcomes. Use of resources, and information, and
.
unpredictable external events, on the other hand, is seen as constraining suc-
cess. In businesses more important that what happens in the making of the
decision are the results, a criterion to appraise whether expected performance
standards are achieved appears to be usually in mind. The differences on the
criteria for success in between these two types of organizations reflect their
different concerns and goals they give primacy to. Thus, as Blau and Scott
(1964) points out, efficiency and rationality are clearly of paramount impor-
tance to business organizations, while political characteristics define the stan-
dards of quality in non-business.
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CHAPTER IX 
SOME MAJOR THEMES 
This chapter discusses some major theoretical and methodological
issues which have concerned this thesis. Some of the theoretical points are
analysed in the light of the findings on business and non-business organizations
taken together, that is, both the firms and the universities and health districts.
A study venturing into a new area has obviously to create new concepts, in-
struments and methods of identification of the phenomena under study. As
with much research, methodological restrictions are inevitable for further
developments and refinements are still needed. Finally, suggestions for fur-
ther research prompted by this experience are presented, in the hope that future
research will be able to create more complete models of decision-making
success and avoid some of the methodological difficulties which this research
has had to face.
.9.1. The Respective Predominance of Behavioural and Instrumental Aspects 
Based on contrasting forms of theorizing, the conceptual model which
guided this research was designed so as to attempt the evaluation of the relative
import of instrumental and behavioural aspects in determining decision pace and
the outcomes of decisions. The effort to encompass both these aspects, the
instrumental and the behavioural (which might better be called the interpersonal
or even political) come from an attempt to provide a more comprehensive view
of decision-making than hitherto. Previous studies in the field have usually
concentrated on mutually exclusive paradigms.
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It is repeatedly apparent in the opening chapters of this thesis that the
MEANS to decisions, PROCESS, and RESULTS have been the customary themes
treated by the various decision-making theories. Studies have tended to focus
either on "means and results", as with the normative theorists, or on "tre an s
and process" as with those studies concerned with search as a process and the
theory of choice, or on process only as with those studies which see decision-
making as a power and bargaining game. Within the first paradigm, means and
results, for example, behaviour is directed to the attainment of goals, usually
expressed in quantitative terms, for which information and resources are the
most important instruments. Those studies which concentrate on means and
process or on process description, view decision-making as a behavioural melee
where outcomes are the result of political activities rather than a consequence
of an intellectual exercise.
This research can be seen as an attempt to reach beyond the partialities
of such pi evious approaches. It seeks to draw a line through these major as-
pects of decision-making - means, process, results - in the sense that it
examines the instrumental and behavioural balance of each in its contribution
to success or failure.
It will be recalled that the separation in terms of goals of business
from non-business organizations in analysis and interpretation arose from the
failure to find any results of interest on all eight organizations analysed to-
gether. The examination of the results separately for 5 business firms and 2
Process
Pace 
.••••••
•n••••••.'
n•••••••
•••••••'
Conflict and
Influence
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universities and a health service district did suggest that the decision-making
of these organizations can indeed by distinguished by their differing emphases
on instrumental and behavioural. This is shown figuratively in Figure 9.1.
Leaving aside the details of the relationships among variables, which have
been fully discussed in the previous chapters, and using for illustrative pur-
poses only those variables which have been shown to be conceptually and em-
pirically most important for success, the findings are depicted in their most
simple form. This figure, in fact attempts to reproduce Figure 4.1 (Chap-
ter IV) in a simplified form. (the arrows indicate the direction of the argument).
FIGURE 9.1 PREDOMINANCE OF MEANS . X PROCESS IN BUSINESS
AND NON-BUSINESS ORGANIZA TIONS
Resources
Availability
Business
— — — Non-business
Figure 9.1.  implies that for any kind of organization, whatever its goals,
successfulness depends on whether relevant resources are available as well as
on whether there is conflict among interests who have a stake in the decision
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process. But empirical support for this is weak, even fragile. The picture
hardens and confidence in interpretation grows when business and non-business
are analysed separately. It becomes plain that in the latter what happens during
and within the process itself is crucial. Whether intended outcomes are achieved
and whether implementation is propitious or disturbed depends on who partici-
pates an:I how much conflict there is in the process. The contrast in the business
firms is fascinating. Managerial performance within the coalition is more im-
portant. Acquisition of specific and critical information and resources in time
are the conditions for attaining intended results, and who is involved and con-
flict are much less significant or not at all so. Thus, while in business organi-
zations outcomes are constrained by means available to make the decision, in
non-business settings where the goals and structure are different they are con-
strained by what happens in the process.
The findings suggest, in fact, that decision-making may become
incremental due in the one situation to resource constraints and in the other
to the pressure of vested interests. As described by Lindblom (1959), in-
cremental decisions are basically remedial in nature, not too much different
from the status quo. The results of the project reported here suggest that
in non-business organizations incremental decisions may be taken to con-
ciliate opponent interests. Here decisions are more politically oriented and
concerned with short term goals. By contrast, business firms are motivated
_	 _
to utilise resources effectively towards the achievement of commercial out-
comes such as return over investment. In financial terms, the most that
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university and health organizations concern themselves with is restraining costs
and expenditure (Wortman 1979), especially when they are financially dependent
upon an external organization such as the UGC or DHSS in Britain. Yet such
concerns must affect one or other of the numerous internal interests which then
may well attempt to exercise influence on the decision-making so as to block
Implementation or at least to defend the resources they already have. In this
type of decision, as the case examples have indicated, incremental decisions
are seen as a way around, or way to live with, the persistence of conflict.
Cost reduction, for instance, cannot be implemented as initially intended, but
some reduction has to be carried throueLany way. So all parties lose in this
game, but none lose too much. In some cases, the direction of movement is
changed as a result of continuing pressure even after the decision has already
been Made. In other cases, authorities yield to pressure by the withdrawal
of a given topic from the agenda. In these organizations therefore, attainment
of intended outcomes is limited by previous conflicts.
Business organizations, on the other hand, may make incremental
decisions because either technical or financial resources and information are
not available. For example, in the less successful product development
decisions the business firms concerned did not implement a product develop-
ment programme based on the most advanced known product technology. This
was because either they had not acquired the necessary resources of expertize
and money, or they did not have sufficient information to foresee the effects
of the new technology on the industry. As Quinn (1978) points out, many
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important decisions in business firms are incremental so as to avoid unneces-
sary risks, to gain time, to gather more information and better prepare for
the Implementation of the decision.
Information/resources and conflict/influence respectively may be the
areas in which each type of organization lacks control. They are the areas
emphasized by theories of decision-making in each type of setting. Theories
based on price determination, market simulation, and other problems of
industrial firms, tend to focus on information, search activities and resources
(Alexis 1967, Scott 1976, Simon 1976, Cyert and March 1963). Inferences
from research in public bureaucracies (Lindblom 1959, Allison 1969, George
1972, Crozier 1976) and in universities (Blau 1973, Baldridge 1971, Cohen
et al 1972, Butler et al 1977) emphasize instead participation and the dynamics
of relationships between independent groups.
.. 9.2. The Differing Concepts of Success in Business and Non-business
Organizations
The discussion in the previous section indicates that the empirical
results align theniselves constructively with theory to point to decisional dif-
ferences among organizations. The predominance of instrumental or behav-
ioural aspects reflects what these organizations see as their main concern or
goal. Turning now to the more perceptual facets of the data, with perceived
success in mind, reveals the criteria Of success used in the two types of
organizations covered by this thesis. Both define success by outcomes, that
is, a decision is more successful if intended outcomes are achieved (proactivity)
292
and if some unexpected gains emerge (propitiousness); a decision is less
successful if intended outcomes are not achieved and unexpected problems
emerge with the making of the decision (disturbance).
It might then appear that both kinds of organization define success
in similar terms. ' However the concept of success is more complex than is
shown by the three dimensions just mentioned. It seems that in non-business
organizations success is not defined only by the outcomes of decision-making.
The data have suggested that in these organizations, process and outcomes
are not very distinct. Conflict for example can be a characteristic of both
process and outcome (disturbance ). Success is linked to participation and
agreement as well as to degree of control over outcomes. Extending the
Interpretation beyond what the immediate data suggest, and first looking at -
decision-making from the point of view of the authorities at the top of the
hierarchy, a successful decision is the one free of the sort of confrontation
with other parties which may block the decision process and decision implemen-
tation. From the opposite point of view of those who have less say in the
decision-making, participation and a negotiated decision may be the, criteria
of success.
In non-business organizations, agreement is important to all parties
high and low in the dominant coalition, for it may be the only way decisions
can reach implementation and thus intended outcomes be achieved and unex-
pected benefits gained. On the other hand, it may be that difficulties in
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reconciling economic criteria with providing a better quality education or
health service to users, within limited resources which the organization
itself is not able to stretch very much, makes participation and agreement
. the most visible criteria of decision-making success. It is not the easiest
thing to reduce expenditure and obtain the agreement of those affected! In
business, on the other hand, what happens during the process of making the
decision is not as important as financial performance, which is here the
most visible criterion. The analyses of case examples of less successful
decisions have shown that even when conflicts of interests led to the course
of action most likely to satisfy vested interests, even more visible than con-
flict was the continuous decline in sales and profits of the product based on
the traditional technology. In judging and reporting about less successful
decisions executives frequently referred to a quantitative indicator of perfor-
mance which could be low profits, or low productivity or high costs. Whatever
it was, there was always some indication in the case that financial outcomes
were disappointing.
The contrasting notions of succes in these organizations reflect what
has been described as the business and non-business organization's concerns
and goals. Thus one implication is that single decisions appear to be oriented
according to these goals and then are evaluated with these goals as reference.
Where profits have primacy (Heydebrand 1973, Dill 1965) decisions are analysed
-
according to quantitative criteria, which executives always appear to have in
mind whatever the type of the decision. Here support is provided for Simon's
(1976) argument that decisions in businesses are evaluated in the light of
the organization's conservation objective, which is the maintenance of a
positive value between input and output. Where goals are comparatively
abstract as they are outside the sphere of business, there is no common
denominator by which to appraise activities, such as money affords, and
emphasis is given to the political climate (Blau and Scott 1963, Heydebrand
1973). Agreement and power to influence outcomes become the most visible
criteria (Braybrooke and Lindblom 1970). 	 •
.9.3. The Meaning of the Data
The data obtained in this research by the kind of methodol-ogy used
must be largely a reflection of differences in perception of what is a success-
ful decision. That should be so for the purpose pursued here. The way organi-
zations react depends in the first place on how the dominant coalition interprets
the mality and needs of the organization (Child 1972). Silverman (1976) defends
a generalization of this point, that organization behaviour should be interpreted
via the meanings participants attach to situations. Thus what is seen as associ-
ated with success and lack of success is what executives do and emphasize when
making decisions. What they see as linked to success is part of their own as-
sumptions of what causes a given result, and such assumptions therefore may
be the guidelines for action. As Wilson (1980) points out, it is upon assumptions
of cause and effect that executives choose and negotiate.
-
When such assumptions are vague, as they may be in decision-making
in non-business organizations, agreement may become a substitute for "truth",
as Lindblom (1970) suggests. Agreement becomes the parameter for decision-
making. As it does so, connections with the initial intentions become attenuated
and this is perhaps one of the features which led Cohen et al (1972) to dub univer-
sities as "organized anarchies".
.9.4. Methodological Difficulties and Limitations of the Sample
No research project is perfect, and certainly not this one. The con-
clusions put forward arise from an empirical basis that suffered more than
most from the chances and mischances to which field work is exposed.
The difficulties in finding organizations to co-operate in a project
and the time constraints on executing the research resulted in an unbalanced
sample. At first, this did not look so important for the initial purpose was
to select organizations as a means of selecting decisions. However, since
separate analyses for business and non-business organizations eventually
proved much more fruitful than the analysis for the 53 decision cases across
all organizations, an appropriately balanced sample of both forms of organi-
zation would have allowed interpretation and generalization to be more confident.
Ideally the sample should have been wide enough to incorporate a greater variety
of organizations, manufacturing and services, public and private, and so on,
and thus would have permitted more effective analyses of sub-groups, such as
was found necessary with business and non-business. It might also have per-
mitted better controls within any such sub-groups. For example, it is obvious
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that within the business group there should have been more homogeneity in
size to afford the possibility of controlling for extraneous variables such as
decision-making autonomy, and the importance and range of type of decisions.
To be able to systematically contrast dynamic/stable environments might
reveal where control escapes an organization and what then happens to decision-
making.. Does it become desparate or a ritualized farce? Unfortunately the
defects of the sample of organizations in this project limit the generalizations
that can be made and reduce confidence in those that are made.
As far as the sample of decisions is concerned the prime objective
was to obtain a sufficient number of extreme cases along the success con-
tinuum. The sample is not all that could be desired in this respect, but a
good spread was obtained with the sample being classified roughly in three'
groups: more successful decisions, moderately successful and less success-
ful decisions. Here again the ideal was to obtain an equal number of extreme
-cases of successfulness, but this was not possible for some basic reasons.
For example, it was common to find another decision following on an unsuccess-
ful one to correct the latter's mistakes. Managers then tended to concentrate
on the successful sequel, that is on the most recent decision. As mentioned
in Chapter V, this was not easy to avoid, especially in some cases where the
list of decisions was not discussed personally with the chief executive but was
mailed to the researcher a few weeks after the introductory interview. Gradu-
ally with more personal experience in the field work it became possible to ac-
quire more control over the selection by asking more pertinent questions and
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becoming more assured in doing so. In two cases, decision 1 versus decision
2 and decision 41 versus decision 42, it was possible to obtain data both on the
unsuccessful decision and on the subsequent readjustment decision. This suggests
that a further project might do better in thiswrespect.-We learn-from experience.
A second explanation for the form taken by the sample of decisions may
possibly lie in the difficulties the informants found in defining the criteria for
classifying the degree of success in the decision concerned. In the case of non-
business organizations, this appeared most et r idenTwith whit appear to be too
many decisions classified as moaes rate1y-sTie-ce-s-srf715'-eihips-the-se -were deci-
sions where the most visible criterion, agreement/disagreement, did not apply.
•
In any case, one would expect to find a greater ambiguity in the appraisal of
decisions in organizations where goals are more intangible, and the final
product more difficult to measure (Thompson and McEwen 1958)- In business
organizations, however, managers also hesitated in categorizing a decision as
successful or unsuccessful, but here a greater number of decisions were placed
at each extreme.
In the business firms also, managers showed more difficulty in clas-
sifying decisions whose outcomes had been changed by unexpected environmental
events .  In these cases, they felt that the decision had been taken with all possible
information at the time, but performance was inevitably disappointing in relation
to what had been expected because of events intruding between decision and its
implementation. Thus, it appears that although managers do appraise decisions
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in terms of performance outcomes, whether or not it has been possible for
them to exercise control over events appears to be another important dimen-
sion of their criteria of success. While with hindsight this now appears clear
to the researcher, to the informant it obscured the criteria he himself was
using. In such cases executives showed considerable doubt over where to
classify the decisions. Was a decision which began successfully but was later
seen as a failure because of subsequent events to be called successful or not?
This difficulty may well have restricted the distribution of decisions along the
success scale.
Furthermore, any research evaluating performance and using per-
ceptual measures is subjected to risks of distortion. There is a large body
of research which shows that individuals may cognitively distort the magnitude
or implications of a setback (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959, Weiner et al
1971, Staw and Ross 1978). They may absolve themselves of any personal
.responsibility and attribute the event to other individuals or to external sources
(Streufert and Castore 1968, Weiner et al 1971). However, this is a general
supposition and there is no indication or measurement of how much such dis-
tortions may have interfered with the sampling of decisions or the perceptual
measures of success.
All these difficulties seem to be inherent to the topic of success itself,
which always attracts doubt and controversy. It is also a matter which to the
organization's members implies evaluation of their own performance, and the
data is therefore subject to unknown risks of distortion and concealment. It
299
is the encouraging intelligibility of the results which gives grounds for hoping
that in this research some data is indeed better than no data,
.9.5. Suggestions for Future Research 
Following the example of much research in the decision-making area,
this research adopted a conceptual framework as a guideline for field work
and interpretation. Although this set boundaries for the research, and directed
the researcher's attention to certain issues and perhaps therefore away from
others, it did not prevent the appearance of considerations which whilst out-
side the practicable scope of this project might well be taken into the reckoning
when designing future research.
.9.5.1. Future Conceptual Models 
The conceptual framework was designed to examine possible relation-
ships between decision-making characteristics and decision success. However,
in business organizations apart from resources availability only weak correla-
tions were found between other independent variables and success. It is sug-
gested, therefore, that other factors not captured by-the model nor tested em-
pirically in this research may yet add to the explanation of success.
If the decision-making variables used here describe those aspects
upon which the organization has some control, it may be that an alternative
explanation of the degree of success achieved by a decision lies in factors
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external to the organization. The more in-depth investigation of the interview
data about decisions perceived as less successful provided some Initial clues
as to a wider interpretation beyond that due to resources alone. Unexpected
environmental events, for example, may interfere with the attainment of out-
comes and new problems may appear as a result of making the decision. In
some cases, it seemed that the organization had been caught unawares by a
surprise such as a sudden withdrawal of its major customer, the. appearance
of a new technology or unexpected growth. Here, informants attributed the
resultant outcome to the organization's lack of control of the environment.
The relevance of external factors may be greatest with business firms, of
course, but their possible relevance should be allowed for in research whatever
the organizations under study. may be.
If the results for business firms have suggested that environment may
set constraints in decision-making, the data generated for non-business organi-
zations have pointed towards the role of the organization's structure in shaping
the style of decision-making. It is the peculiar features of the structure of
universities that apparently provide the opportunity for particular types of
conflict. They are simple organizations structurally, being not much more than
a set of mutually independent subunits each striving to advance its own "product"
but compelled to compete for resources in order to do so. Health districts are
very similar but not so extreme in this.
The research reported in this thesis, having concentrated on decision-
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making variables only, was not able to compare and assess the potential res-
pective influences of characteristics of the environment and of the organization
on the process and outcomes of decision-making. Some research has been
carried through in this area (Horvath and McMillan 1978, 1979). These
authors suggest that some organizations by their flexible technology system
have the capacity to respond more quickly to environmental changes and re-
design their product markets. From this point of view, the complexity of
technology influences the degree of interdependence between organization
subunits and hence whether the decision-making system will be more or less
centralized.
Thus further models, of decision-making success should include
variables capable of depicting the influence of factors other than those of the
decision-making process only. More complete models attempt to cover how
both variables of environment and variables of organization shape decision-
making characteristics and then constrain the outcomes. Encouragingly, some
research concerned with how organization complexity impinges on decision-
making performance is already being developed by others at Bradford (Astley
et al 1980).
.9.5.2. Single Decisions and Strategy 
As pointed out in Chapter II, this thesis has been concerned only with
single discrete decisions. Empirically the study became limited to those deci-
sions which the chief executive could recall as clear events. These may or
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may not include those kinds of decisions some authors argue are gradually
formed into a pattern or strategy without there being any clear intention or
plan .g. Mintzberg 1977, Horvath and McMillan 1979). When this study
was first contemplated in 1977, the single decision appeared a more manage-
able unit of analysis, and it still seems so. But since then research experi-
ence in this field has grown, and perhaps from now on more ambitious projects
can be attempted.
Because when this study began previous approaches to decision suc-
cess were restricted to the study of more technical decisions or to those for
which quantitative criteria could be used, it was desirable to aim at a greater
variety in the type of decisions covered, and that was the priority. This at
least was achieved.
. Of course, it may be that some or all of the 53 decisions reported
•in this thesis were extracted from streams of interrelated decisions. As
mentioned earlier, some decisions did appear highly interrelated one arising
from the problems of another. This does-not diminish the validity of the
data. The fact that single decisions may be part of an overall strategy does
not deny that each has specific form. But if single decisions occur in the
context of a "stream of decisions" and if it is possible to identify the principal
outcome of a strategy, then here there would be a rewarding area for future
work. Single decisions could be analysed in terms of similar dimensions of
success, but now in relation to the strategy from which they are extracted
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for analysis. In this way, each single research project is one of a stream
of projects and tries to make its contribution.
APPENDIX A
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APPENDIX A
List of the Decisions Studied by the Present Research
Organ iz -*	 Decisions 
talons
Ul	 Dl.	 A policy on vacation catering facilities
D2. A review of the vacation catering facilities
D3. Reorganization of computer offices
D4. The introduction of new disciplinary procedures in the Halls of Residence
D5. A new building for a new discipline
D6. Expansion in the sports centre
D7. The increase of fees for the halls of residence - Ul
U2	 D8.	 The increase of fees for the halls of residence - U2
D9. A reorganization of the university basic structure
D10. A reorganisation of the halls of residence administration
D11. Introduction of an administrative computer
. D12.	 To change the university's administrative computer
D13. To launch the university's development programme
D14. The introduction of a system of a centralized timetabling for
university examinations
HD
	 D15.	 Closure of a ward
D16. The closure of social clubs in a district hospital
D17. Rationalization of patients' meals
D18. Organization of work of school nurses
D19. Centralization of stores
13 F3
	 D20.	 The introduction of a new printing press
* See Appendix D for details
D21. A new business in Germany •
D22. Reduction of inventory
D23. Reorganization and manning reduction
D24. A new business in India
D25. Reorganization of factory lay-out
D26. The introduction of an American product design
BF1	 D27.	 The manufacture of a new electronic equipment
D28. A new contract in Sao Paulo
D29. The opening of a new factory
D30. To terminate a development programme
. D31.	 Reduction of workforce
D32. The closure of a factory
D33. The manufacture of a new product
BF5	 .D34.	 Introduction of a profit share scheme
D35. A new business in France
D36. To reduce workforce
D37. ,	 Selection of a managing director
D38. To move into the export business
BF2	 D39.	 To establish a new factory in Venezuela
D40. A negotiation with two rival unions
D41. A development of a new product
D42. The termination of a development programme
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D43. A new business in Libya
D44. An introduction of a new shareholder'
D45. Centralization of stores
D46. Computerization of the clerical work .
D47. Acquisition of new equipment
BF4	 D48.	 Extension of a depot
D49. Changing a factory layout
D50. The introduction of computer terminals in distribution sites
D51. The building of a new depot
D52. , Staff transference to a new site
D53. The introduction of a new technology
APPENDIX B
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ABOUT THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire is about the decision
with which you are familiar. Some questions require a brief description of how
the decision occurred, but most are rating scales which are quicker for you to
complete. For these, please circle the best alternative. Questions on the right
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
Interview questions
1. When did this decision start ?
2. What is the earliest thing you can
remember about this decision ?
3. Why was it made ?
4. How important was this decision to
this organization ? Why ?
5. What was done to clarify the initial
situation that originated this decision ?
6. What was the main sequence of events ?
7. Who was involved in this decision ?
When ?
8a.Were there any occasions in which it was
recognized that things had been overlooked
or mistakes made ? What were they ?
8b. What was done about them ?
9. Who authorized action and when ?
10. Were all possibilities explored ? If no,
which ones should have been explored ?
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ha. What action was taken to gather the
information necessary for this
decision to be made ?
11b. How far were these activities successful
in gathering information ?
(1) Not at all
(2) A little
(3) Some
(4) Quite a bit
(5) Very much
11c. What should have been done then ?
12a. Were there any disagreements in views
about the decision being taken ?
12b. How was agreement attained ? What
degree of compromise was there ?
13. What unexpected opportunities, advantages
and benefits did this decision bring to the
organization if any ?
14. What unexpected problems and
difficulties did this decision bring .
to the organization if any ?
-
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APPENDIX D
THE SAMPLE : SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ORGANIZATIONS 
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the major characteristics
of the organizations in the sample, so as to show differences between business
and non-business firms in terms of formal organizational structure and deci-
sion-making autonomy. Descriptions of organizations have been arranged to
provide an idea of their internal formal structure and of links with other
organizations which could possibly set limits to or influence their decision-
making process. Additionally, each organization has been described in its
general activities, size and performance.
In general, the appendix provides complementary information which
may throw some light on the interpretation of research findings and may also
.be useful in the understanding of the context in which focal decisions took place.
For research purposes, homogeneity of information on each organ-
ization would be desirable, but it was not possible within the time available to
achieve this. Apart from the difficulties arising from differences between
diverse types of organizations, collection of data not originally structured by
the researcher is always problematic. Organizations' published material may
not have similar contents or information may be unavailable for research
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purposes. Therefore, when a complete organizational chart was not available
for the study and connections of the company with the parent have been built
up from published information, from reports and interview data, the figures
presented in this appendix may not always represent hierarchical structure
accurately. It may happen that more intermediary levels exist between a
subsidiary and its headquarters or instead,it could be directly accountable
to group board of directors.
Since all business firms studied were wholly owned subsidiaries of
corporations, a general description of group activities and perf3rmance has
also been given for each of them. In general, information on decisions was
collected in only one organization of a group or corporation, except in Business
Firm 1. Because ii is the management company of Trading Company 1 and
located on the same site, information was gathered on decisions either taken
separately by each of them or jointly. Section on Business Firm 1 therefore,
provides a sketch of their organization.
With Health Districts, similarly to business firms, there is an
attempt to depict how organizations hierarchically superior to the District
such as A. H. A. , control District performance and activities.
In the Universities case, however, the chapter presents a descrip-
tion of Council and Senate. Despite the fact that in a university system there
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is no corresponding higher level, more or less external to it with powers
over its activities, these organs have been described because they have con-
trol over resources and university action in a similar way.
Since in the Health Services, organizations at the same hierar-
chical level have similar duties and patterns of relationships with superior
levels, this appendix provides only a general description of districts which
can apply to any of them. The same is done for universities. Apart from
minor differences between their internal structures their organization is
basically the same as any other British university. Therefore, it was not
felt necessary to go into separate details for each university of the sample.
1 Business Firm 1 (BF1)
The company history starts with the history of the whole group and
goes as far back as 1884 with a small factory in the North of England which
produced telegraph equipment. Since then it has diversified its production
going from cycle tyres through cables and manual telephone exchange equip-
ment. In 1912 it started production of automatic telephone exchange equip-
ment and during the World Wars it began to delielop navigation . instruments.
In the following years the firm widened its activities even more, developing
from street lighting control equipment to domestic appliances.
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After a merger with two other groups also engaged in the manufac-
ture of telephone exchange equipment, BFlbecame the nucleus of the new joint
group. In 1978 it accounted for 40% of the whole group sales and had about
20,000 employees.
At present, BF1 International's major business is telecommunica-
tions and although industry and government are its main customers it also
develops and manufactures products for the private sector.
Although the company showed an outstanding performance in the
last few years it has been hit by a sudden change in market conditions which
demanded a re-orientation towards the future. Joint efforts within the whole
group have been made towards a quicker modernization.
As shown in Figure 1, BF1 International has under its respon-
sibility 5 subsidiaries operating in the Americas, Europe and Commonwealth
countries. They include Telecommunications - Trading Company 3 - in which
some of the decisions reported here occurred. Figure 2 shows the internal
organization structure of Trading Company 3. Internally, it is divided into
five major products technology business, a sector responsible for providing
_
services to customers and five functional areas. It has about 12,000 emp-
loyees and is also of substantial importance for the company accounting for
one-fifth of the group business.
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1.1. The Group
As already mentioned, the group was formed in the sixties by a
merger between three big telephone and engineering firms who owned a num-
ber of subsidiaries. The group operates in five continents and hence serves
international and home markets with a total of 300 establishments, and ap-
proximately 58,000 employees. It engages in the production of a wide range
of products for government and industry, and is organized into two major
businesses, electronics and telecommunications.
At the end of March 1978 group sales achieved £611.1 millions.
Profit before taxation was £42.9 millions and assets employed till that date
amounted to £283 millions. In 1978 the group won the Queen's Award for
Its performance in exports.
.1.2. Links between Business Firm 1 and Group Headquarters 
-	 Figure .1 shows the connections of BF1 International and Tele-
communications with the headquarters. BF International is under direct
responsibility of the executive office, and most of its directors are also on
the group board. The company is financially dependent on the holding com-
panies at the same level as itself.
In spite of having its own board of directors the Telecommunications
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Company is dependent on the managerial side of BF International and finan-
cially on the holding companies. Although some of its directors are members
of BF International they do not participate In the Executive office. Financially,
this company is entirely dependent on the head offices. Capital investment
is authorized only up to £252,000 if it is -already-ou-the budget. The._Thie-
communications company's chief executive can authorize a capital investment
of £50,000. There are many regulations concerning expenses, but for regular
purchases there is no fixed limit foriirst rank executives,__
All major decisions have to be approved by the Management Company
,	 -
and until the budget is authorized the Trading coinpany 3 cannot move. There
Is a daily control of cash flow exercised by the corporate financial depart-
ment. The intensity of the control is dependent on the company's financial
performance. A senior executive expressed his concern over the group's
emphasis on short term financial targets which in this opinion may be detri-
mental to long run achievements and growth.
The group adopts standardized procedures for all subsidiaries in
legal matters such as contracts, insurances, properties, transport and ten-
der guarantees. Visits overseas, performance bond,s „inter-company trading
and appointment of executives are also under BF1 International.
_
.2 Business Firm 2 (11'2)
The company had initiated its activities in the North of England by
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1918. By 1926 it had approximately 500 people and in 1929 it was acquired
by an electrical company which then merged with other electric and electronic
groups in 1968. At present, it is the management company for the combined
switchgear resources of 4 electrical groups. With 1500 employees, it is one
of the 16 companies of a group manufacturing and servicing comprehensive
ranges of electrical generation and transmission equipment. Activities of
the company hence includes development and manufacturing of a wide range
of slxitchgear equipment and associated equipment for service.
In 1977, the company doubled order intake, and increased export
orders to two-thirds of the total. Exports have shown a substantial increase
In Africa, Asia and America. Unfortunately, separate sales figures for the
company had not been published in the whole group report but some of the
engineering group figures were, however, available and will be discussed
in the next section.
Being a manufacturer of electrical equipment, the company's main
customers are other industrial groups and electricity authorities. Competi-
tors in the UK, Europe and the Americas consist of companies owned by
other stronger groups manufacturing engineering and electrical equipment.
In its internal structure, the company is divided into 6 major func-
tional areas, whose directors are also members of the board. Figure 3
shows its internal organization.
C.,
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2.1.  The Group
The group is one of the largest manufacturing groups in the world
and its activities include major interests in heavy electrical and power engin-
eering, industrial equipment, telecommunications, electronics and consumer
products. As shown in Figure 4 it is divided into five areas of activities
which comprise engineering, industrial, telecommunications and electronics,
electrical components and consumer products. This present structure is an
outcome of a combination in the late 1960's of three of the UK's major electric
groups. The company is substantiaLly represented in all continents by its
many subsidiaries and associated companies.
In 1977 the Engineering division comprising 20 companies achieved
a turnover of £306M comparing with I2.206M turnover for the whole group,
Including overseas. Contributions to total earnings were 15% in that same
year. The division had also shown am outstanding performance in export sales
with a figure of 001M.
Current assets for the company as a whole amounted to E1,520.7M
and a profit before taxation of £278M was declared in 1977. For this same
year the company declared an average number of employees excluding those
working outside the United Kingdom cf 156,000.
2.2.  LInks between Dusiness Firm 2 and Group Headquarters 
Although from April 1978 tbe company was given greater autonomy
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It still has Co obtain board approval for investments superior to El million.
It is also supposed to submit a proposal to the main board when investment
implies a risk for the business as a whole.
The group has a reputation of exercising a thorough financial and
budgetary control but still allowing a high level of autonomy in its subsidiaries.
In general, the headquarters only in_fluence in terms of guidelines, provided
that a company has shown an acceptable financial performance over the years.
However, policies regarding wages and salaries and other standardized pro-
cedures which run from minor issues such as type of cars for directors to
major issues like industrial disputes have been introduced for all subsidiaries.
In much the same way the group issues annual accounting instructions and
provides a great bulk of accounting procedures, rules for issuing contracts
and a code for prices and payments in contracts and licences which is uniform
for every unit.
The headquarters, on the other hand, do not interfere with develop-
ment of technology, and provide cenlral research resources.
The company is linked to headquarters by means of the management
company whose director is a member of the main board, as shown in Figure 4.
Although this figure serves to illustrate those links, it cannot be taken as fully
portraying group hierarchical struct..are since it had been built up from annual
reports and is probably oversimplified.
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Formal meetings with Engineering Division directors occur five
or six times a year, with a budget meeting once a year with the corporation's
managing director. Informal contacts by telephone with the Engineering
Division Director are more frequent and are always used when a quick
decision which is corporation wide in its effects has to be taken.
.3 Business Firm 3 (BF3)
The company came into existence in 1887 to manufacture equipment
for the newspaper industry under licence from its US parent. In 1895, 15%
of the shares were obtained by the American parent which gradually increased
its holding until BF3 became a wholly owned subsidiary in 1967.
The company is engaged in development, manufacturing, and
marketing of equipment for the printing, graphic arts and computer industries.
Its main products are printer's machinery, stereo-casting equipment, and
bindery equipment. Although it is small in size, employing only 800 people,
and represents only a small proportion of the total group activity, BF3 sup-
plies not only UK but other countries around the world. It is in a highly
specialised market in which the activities of competitors can readily be iden-
tified.
As shown in Figure 5 it is internally differentiated in four main
functions, sales, finance, manufacturing and technical. The directors of
11.•n••
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these functions are all members of the board which also has management
responsibility over other companies of the same group in the UK and one
on the Continent.
In 1976 tangible assets amounted to £7,276,760 and net profit
before tax reached a figure of £2,343,445.
3.1.  The Corporation
The company is part of an American corporation founded in 1893,
employing today 18,000 around its many subsidiaries in the US and overseas.
The corporation was formed in 1963 by a merger of a company engaged in
the manufacture of a wide range of electrical products and another whose
main activity was development and manufacturing of graphic system. Al-
though the corporation is a diversified manufacturer of electrical, consumer
and industrial goods, the electrical product business, which also encompasses
typesetting equipment, is responsible for almost 70% of the corporation sales
volume. The Graphic Systems group (Figure 6 ) was a major leader in this
performance, achieving record sales and profits. This group is a world
leader in the manufacturing and marketing of typesetting and composition
systems, and comprises 20 companies in 12 countries, among them BF3 in
the UK.
The corporation's current assets amounted to $466,025,610 in 1977
and net profit in this year achieved a figure of $3,404,344.
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.3.2.  Links with the Headquarters 
In the Chief Executive's view, operationally BF3 does not depend
for anything on the headquarters. On the other hand, HQ monitors BF3
financial performance and sanctions major items of expenditure. On the
management side, the company has to refer to the International Graphic
System's Board for major decisions (Figure 6). In Fiore 6 the links between
companies and headquarters may be oversimplified.
4  Business Firm  4 (BF4)
BF4 is a transport division of a confectionery and grocery products
group. It first began as a small department under a sales function in the early
sixties. For a while it was moved under the purchasing department, but when
the market changed to a buyer's market with the advent of supermarkets and
the growth of big custoMers in the mid sixties, it went back under sales func-
tion. By that time, standard of services to customers had become as impor-
tant as cost control, and the company then formed a transport and a warehouse
committee which consisted of specialists in transport and a warehouse com-
mittee which consisted of specialists in transport and distribution, a finance
expert, and representatives of the purchasing and organization and methods
functions.
In 1969 the group merged with another, both incorporating many
subsidiaries and associated companies. The merger prompted the creation
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of a transport and distribution division to coordinate activities and reduce
costs. Transport and distribution, therefore, began to be recognized as a
function in its own right and included the following functions: finance and
administration, stock movement and control, personnel and training, depot
operations and sales. BF4 organizational structure is shown in Figure 7.
In spite of being small, employing only 600 people and being a
service organization, the function is very important for the business as a
whole since it serves the main production divisions which represent 50%
of the whole group profit. That profit is dependent upon their work.
Apart from its usual job of moving both raw material and finished
goods from factory fo factory, and from factories to 20 depots and from there
to customers, the division also has the responsibility for advising transport
and distribution departments overseas. It develops its own methods of ware-
house organization and transport, and has facilities for the development of
equipment to improve warehouse efficiency.
4.1. The Group
The group was formed in 1069 by a merger of two big companies
which had already been associated for some years. The history of the com-
panies goes as far back as the eighteenth century to small shops of grocery
and pastry. Since their early days the companies have diversified, gone into
exporting, built new factories, and moved into operations overseas.
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Now the group is one of the world's largest producers of chocolate,
sugar ccnfectionery and grocery products. They have about 30,000 employees
operatins twenty factories in 4 continents.
With the international headquarters in the North of England, the
grcop is organized into six trading divisions and two service divisions as
shcwn it Figure 8.
The European and Overseas divisions are responsible for factories
arcand Europe and the Commonwealth respectively. The Export division is
reponsble for sales elsewhere around the world.
.	 •
Performance of the company in 1977 was outstanding. Sales,
profits aid capital expenditure were the highest in the company's history.
Sales at £469 million were 22% higher than in the previous year; profits -
rose by £10.2 million to £469 million giving a trading margin of 10% against
9.61 in 1)76, and investment in fixed assets amounted to £23.8 million com-
pared wi:h £16.1 million in 1976. Exports from the UK at £49.9 had in-
ere2sed eubstantially, 59% in value and 27% in volume.
4.1,  Lnks with Headquarters
As shown in Figure .8 the headquarters provides various types of
services auch as finance, personnel development and computing to compauies
-
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which are members of the group, including BF4. It makes use of services
which range from decoration of offices to typing, organization and methods,
and personnel selection. It is financially controlled through central accoun-
ting, central purchasing, and the insurance and contracts department. Des-
pite having a separate budget, BF4 does not have its own bank account, since
it is a non-profit organization.
The group has strict budgetary control with very well established
rules. Each division prepares a three year plan for inclusion in the general
corporate plan. If a project is new and requires expenditure over £100,000
a case must be put to the board. Even if it is operating satisfactorily, a
division has nonetheless to prepare a case to the board if any change in
direction is needed; Whatever the circumstances, the group board can
block a division's plans if there is a company wide risk.
Links of BF4 with headquarters are illustrated in Figure 8. Its
chairman is a member of the Group Board. Apart from providing a monthly
report on division performance, the chairman and managing director have a
monthly meeting with the board to report.
5 13usiness Firm 5 (BF5)
This company is one of the 28 companies which form the engin-
eering division of a big group. It was founded 26 years ago by two small
firms, a textile and soap company, and a plastic and cold cables firm.
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They then amalgamated to manufacture a single product, cables. When one
of the owners died, the other company took over and from then on there was
a series of takeovers. BF5 was acquired by its present owners in 1968 and
Is a wholly owned subsidiary.
The main activities of the company now .consist of production of
certain plastics and other chemicals for coatings applications.
Being a very small company, employing only about 100 people,
It faces fierce competition from larger European and British companies.
In spite of being small the company feels that they are important for the
group as a whole. It commenced building on a new site in 1978 and despite
the demands of running the business in difficult world markets whilst
organizing the new factory, earned record profits mainly in export
markets.
As far as internal structure' is concerned, the company is differen-
tiated into three departments and a company secretary's office. Directors
of those departments are all members of the board. Organizational struc-
ture is shown in Figure 9.
5.1.  The Group
The group comprises diverse engineering companies grouped into
341
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four divisions whose principal activities are: manufacture and marketing of
special steels, non-ferrous products, manufacture and supply of machine
tool equipment, manufacture of papermaking, textile, hospital and industrial
laundry machinery. The company is also engaged in the development of resi-
dential, commercial and industry property. BF5 is part of the engineering
division, which achieved the group's biggest trading profit.
The whole group employed 14,000 people in the UK In 1978, and
has subsidiaries operating in USA, Commonwealth countries and Europe.
Group sales were £230M in 1977/78 but profits were not sufficient
-
to finance all expenditure. In 1978 net assets amounted to £86. 3M.
5.2.  Links with Headquarters
Despite being financially monitored by the parent, BF5 has a large
degree of autonomy for decisions which do not demand high investment, once
capital expenditure is specified in its budget. Apart from being a financial
umbrella for BF5, the holding company provides assistance on insurance,
auditing, loans, health and insurance.
As shown in Figure 10,each major business area has a divisional
board which is responsible for various separate companies which also have
their own boards of directors. Figure 10 has been built up from the parent
343
344
annual report, and should therefore be considered as an illustration of
group complexity rather than of details of hierarchical structure.
6 Health District (HD)
HD is one of the biggest districts in the Northern area serving
a population of 32,300 with its 9850 staff members. As a teaching district
It comprises four hospitals with an overall total of 2567 beds to serve this
community.
As a health district it operates within the same framework as any
district in the NHS and has similar organization structure and function within
the same guidelines. The district is the basic operational unit within he
health service and the term refers to population served by health services.
The group of people responsible for the planning and operation of integrated
services within each district is called a District Management Team, which'
is usually composed of: District Administrator, District Treasurer, District
Nursing Officer, District Community Physician, a Hospital Consultant and a
General Practitioner.
Usually in each district there is a single District Medical com-
mittee to represent all general practitioners and specialist staff in the hos-
pitals but in this district, due to its size, the two biggest hospitals each has
Its own medical committee. As opposed to other members, who are appointed,
medical representatives are elected.
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The DMT is responsible for management and coordination of most
operational services of the NHS. One of its essential tasks is the formula-
tion of policies and planning of services to attend community needs for health
care and consequently the organization of action to diminish gaps between
those needs and standard of services actually provided. It is the District's
responsibility to implement plans already approved by the next higher level,
the Area Health Authority (A HA).
Each member of the DMT has duties concerning his particular
office as well as those in which he shares responsibilities with the others
In the team. Therefore, apart from being accountable individually to the
••	 .
AllA for the management of some district services they are also jointly
responsible for functions delegated to the team. Within the management •
team, each member is equal in status, no member being superior to another
on the managerial side. Decisions should, hence, be reached by consensus.
When divergence of views makes Consensus impossible of attainment, the
decision has to be referred to the AHA..
Frequency of meetings of members of the team varies between
once a week and once a month.
Figure llshows the organizational structure of the DMT. The
MIT is also in charge of providing institutional and support services such as
the provision of stores, catering services and maintenance services required
COMMITTEE
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FIGURE II  HEALTH DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
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by hospitals. As it can be seen in this figure, those services are under
managerial control of the district.
6.1. Area Health Authority
As can be seen in Figure 32 ,inter-organizational relationships
within the health services are remarkably complex and from the department
of Health downwards there are many subsystems within the health services
itself and other interest groups which either directly or indirectly influence
or impose constraint on DMT actions. Nevertheless since this study does
not intend to go deeply into the health services organization structure this
- •	 - chapter will only briefly describe the AHA ,.the NHS sybsystem to which- .--•-- -
the district is directly accountable.
The AHA which this district is part of also comprises two other
districts one of which too is involved with teaching activities. As any other
AIM it is responsible for the planning of services, establishment of priorities
and allocation of resources according to community needs and national and
regional guidelines.
One of the Authority's jobs is to appoint officers, the Area Team
Officers (A TO) and members of District Management Teams. It is also
responsible for reviewing and challenging objectives and plans submitted
to it by the DMT and A TO. AllA should be able to resolve competition for
resources among districts and evaluate their performance.
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Whilst responsibility for major operational functions is delegated
to districts, the AHA has mechanisms of control to ensure that each district
under its authority is doing its job properly. Consequently, DMT's have to
submit an annual proposal to AHA recommending objectives and priorities
for development services, allocation of resources, action to tackle difficulties
and to obtain proposed objectives. DMT's have, therefore, autonomy to
manage services but within the limits of an agreed plan. As well as helping
districts to formulate their proposals, Team Officers advise the area on the
approval of those plans and provide information on each DMT's progress to-
wards previously agreed targets. However, ATO are not responsible for
district performance. While hierarchically superior to DMT, they are both
•	
.	 ..••	 e	 .	 .
accountable to AHA.
The same sort of organization structure is repeated in the level
Immediately above, the regional level, which similarly is in charge of re-
sources allocation to areas and delegates responsibilities to Regional Team
Officers to assess area performance. •liowever, whereas RHA and AHA are
mostly involved with allocation of resources and setting of priorities accor-
ding to national policies for the population areas for which they are respon-
sible, districts are primarily absorbed in implementation of plans and iden-
tification of community needs.
.7 The Universities
Although both universities are amongst the most recent of Britain's
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universities, they started their activities in the nineteenth-century as
colleges of technology. After the Robbins committee suggested in 1963
that Colleges of Advanced Technology should be given the status of univer-
sities, they were all granted the Royal Charter late in the decade, including
Ul and U2.
Despite having similarities such as size, Ul with 4769 students
and U2 with 4283 students (1977 data) and a common emphasis on Engineer-
ing and sandwich courses, they differ in academic organization. Whilst Ul
has moved away from a departmental type of structure to grouping disciplines
in Schools of Studies, U2 on the other hand is structured in more conventional
departments. However, at the next level the result is much the same, except
for a difference of terms. Whereas Ul arranges its multi-subject Schools
into what are known as Boards of Studies, Engineering, Life Sciences, Physical
Sciences and Social Sciences, U2 is divided into Faculties of Engineering,
• Science, Social Sciences and Arts. While disciplines in Ul range from Engin-
eering subjects through Medical Sciences to Computer Sciences and Peace
Studies, U2 offers a .smaller number of disciplines but puts even more em-
phasis on contact with industry and commerce. It then has a reputation of
being one of the leading Universities in getting rapid employment for its first
degree graduates. In 1976 the unemployment rate for U2 graduates was 6.2,
well under half the figure for graduates from British Universities taken as a
whole.
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In 1978-9, out of 4,918 Ul students, 2,442 were science or
technology based, 1130 arts based, 670 arts/science based and 670 post-
graduates. In 1977-8, of 3,915 U2 undergraduates, 789 were studying .
pure or applied sciences, 1796 engineering, 823 were studying arts or
social sciences, 507 were engaged in interdisciplinary subjects and 583
were involved in postgraduate courses.
Figures 13a and b show the administrative structure for Ul and
1)2 respectively. While administrative responsibilities are divided between
the Registrar's Department and Bursar's Department in Ul, in 112 they are
all under the Registrar's control or under direct supervision of the Vice-
Chancellor. In Ul for example, the Finance, Estates and Building, and
Catering functions are under the responsibility of the Bursar's Department,
but in 1)2 those functions are all encompassed by the Registrar. The Regis-
trar's function in 1)1 seems, therefore, to be more concerned with academic
areas, whereas in U2 this function deals mostly with finance and adminis-
trative based activities.
7.1.  Organizations which may influence the Universities' Decision MakingSystems
As in the health organizations, in universities there are also other
people and bodies outside the day to day administrative system which can
influence or impose constraints on universities' decision making processes.
They are, for instance, financially dependent on other organizations who
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provide money to them such as local authorities (indirectly through student
fees), research councils, and mostly on the University Grants Committee.
Figures 13a and b represent mostly a day to day administrative
structure. However, the system in which decisions are taken is much more
complex than what apparently is shown in these figures. Despite the maxi-
mum executive responsibility represented by the Vice-Chancellor, there
are bodies which are also responsible for university government such as
the Court, Council, Senate and Board of Studies, and there is external rep-
resentation on the first two of these. The Court is the largest of these and
meets annually to receive a report of the Vice-Chancellor on the work of the
- •	 -	 -	 -	 - -	 ,	
•	 r - •	 :
University and also the annual statement of accounts. It is presided over by
the Chancellor and is attended by members of Senate and COuncil and rep-
resentatives of educational, religious, civic, industrial, commercial, and
professional organizations. The Council, apart from the Vice-Chancellor
and Pro-Vice-Chancellor and members of the Senate and Court, similarly
includes personnel outside the University such as representatives of counties
and industries: This organ is, on the other hand, mostly responsible for con-
trol and disposition of all properties and finance of the University.
The Senate, comprising mainly academic staff and the Librarian,
Is the supreme academic authority in universities. Each Board of Studies,
_	 _ _ .  
_	 _
or Faculty, is responsible to it.
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While these bodies represent the main line of authority, author-.
ization for non routine decisions is based on information and suggestions
made by committees and sub-committees. Senate and Council have powers
to establish such committees which are responsible for specific areas and
problems. Their job is to gather relevant information, formulate plans and
advise Senate and Council on alternatives available. Although the Vice-
Chancellor and Pro-Vice-Chancellors are members of all committees
which deal with subjects important for the university as a whole, there is
also opportunity for participation of students, academic and non-academic
staff in those committees. Figure 14 shows this parallel system in which
decisions are taken in universities.
APPENDIX E
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